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1. Zusammenfassung 
 
Ohne gesellschaftliche Akzeptanz können CO2-Abgaben in aller Regel weder eingeführt noch erhöht 
werden, auch wenn sie der effizienteste Weg zur Umsetzung energie- und klimapolitischer Ziele sein 
mögen. Eine verbreitete Befürchtung ist jene einer möglicherweise regressiven Wirkung auf die Ein-
kommensverteilung. Wir untersuchen die Auswirkungen einer sozialen Abfederung und anderer Rück-
verteilungsvarianten einer CO2-Abgabe im Hinblick auf Einkommensverteilung und Effizienz sowie 
mögliche Gestaltungsoptionen zur Förderung der gesellschaftlichen Akzeptanz. Unsere Analyse 
basiert auf Simulationen mit dem Allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodell GENESwIS und auf einer reprä-
sentativen empirischen Erhebung mit 1'200 Befragten. In der Umfrage wurde die Akzeptanz verschie-
dener Varianten einer CO2-Abgabe mit einem Auswahlexperiment untersucht. Die Befragten wurden 
über Auswirkungen der Gestaltungsvarianten in Bezug auf Umwelt, Verteilung und Wettbewerbsfähig-
keit informiert, die sich an den Ergebnissen der Simulationen mit GENESwIS orientierten.  
Dieser innovative Ansatz führt zu mehreren neuen und überraschenden Ergebnissen: Wird die um-
weltpolitische Wirksamkeit einer CO2-Abgabe klar kommuniziert, verringert dies den Wunsch nach 
umweltpolitischer Zweckbindung. Die Betonung von Verteilungseffekten führt zu einer Bevorzugung 
progressiv wirkender Varianten. Hierbei sticht die Pro-Kopf-Pauschale heraus: Allein die Hervorhe-
bung ihrer Verteilungseffekte macht sie zu einer der am häufigsten gewählten Varianten.  
Kombinationen aus umweltpolitischer Zweckbindung und Pro-Kopf-Pauschalen, wie sie in der 
Schweiz praktiziert werden, haben Vorzüge bezüglich Akzeptanz und im Hinblick auf umwelt- und 
verteilungspolitische Ziele. Gemäss unseren Simulationen reicht es aus verteilungspolitischer Sicht 
aus, nur einen Teil der Einnahmen pauschal rückzuverteilen. Allerdings ist die effiziente Verwendung 
von Einnahmen für umweltpolitische Zwecke im grösseren Rahmen schwierig. Zudem ist die Rück-
verteilung über Steuersenkungen wirtschaftlich effizienter. Dieses letzte Argument ist jedoch schwer 
zu vermitteln, so dass die Vorteile für die Umwelt das Argument für eine Ökosteuerreform sind, das 
deutlich mehr Menschen erreicht.  
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2. Résumé 
 
Bien que les taxes environnementales soient un instrument efficient pour atteindre les objectifs des 
politiques climatique et énergétique, elles ne sont pas toujours socialement acceptées. Une crainte 
fréquente est que ces taxes pourraient avoir un effet régressif sur la distribution des revenus. Dans ce 
projet, nous analysons dès lors les impacts sociaux de ces taxes, ainsi que plusieurs options pour la 
redistribuer les recettes fiscales, de sorte à maximiser leur acceptabilité sociale et politique. Nos 
analyses se basent sur des simulations avec le modèle d’équilibre général GENESwIS et sur des 
données provenant de 1'200 réponses à une enquête nationale représentative, basée sur la méthode 
des choix discrets. L’objectif principal de l’enquête était de vérifier l’acceptation sociale de différents 
types de taxes carbone. Les participants à cette enquête étaient informés des conséquences de 
différentes taxes carbone sur les émissions,  les inégalités sociales et la compétitivité des entreprises, 
effets qui ont été estimés par le modèle GENESwIS. 
Cette recherche originale a produit plusieurs résultats innovants et surprenants. En informant 
correctement les personnes enquêtées sur l’efficacité environnementale des taxes, on peut réduire 
leur demande d'affecter l’utilisation des recettes fiscales à la seule protection de l'environnement. De 
même, en présentant les impacts redistributifs des taxes, on augmente leurs préférences pour une 
restitution forfaitaire des recettes de la taxe. Une fois bien expliquée, cette option devient même la 
plus attractive pour les personnes ayant répondu à notre enquête.  
Combiner une distribution environnementale et forfaitaire des recettes de la taxe sur les émissions de 
carbone, comme cela est actuellement pratiqué en Suisse, paraît donc une option acceptable. Selon 
nos simulations, réserver une partie des recettes de la taxe pour une distribution forfaitaire suffit pour 
réduire les craintes émises quant aux conséquences sociales néfastes d'une taxe environnementale. 
Néanmoins, il reste difficile de concevoir, à grande échelle, une affection des recettes à la protection 
de l'environnement. De plus, réduire d'autres taxes grâce aux recettes de la taxe carbone semble plus 
efficient d'un point de vue économique. Comme ces arguments sont difficilement compréhensibles 
pour une majorité de citoyens, il semble encore et toujours plus aisé de légitimer une taxe carbone par 
ses impacts environnementaux.  
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3. Summary 
 
Without public acceptance carbon pricing instruments cannot be implemented, even if they may be 
suitable for efficiently pursuing climate and energy policy goals. One frequent concern is that such 
levies could have a regressive effect on income distribution. We investigate how social cushioning and 
other revenue recycling options affect income distribution and efficiency, and how they can be defined 
such that public acceptance is maximized. We base the analysis on simulations with the general 
equilibrium model GENESwIS and on a representative national survey with a total of 1’200 respon-
dents. In the survey, we tested the acceptability of alternative designs of a CO2 levy with a choice 
experiment. Survey respondents were informed about environmental, distributional and competitive-
ness effects of each carbon tax design, according to simulation results from GENESwIS.  
 
This original setting generates a series of novel and surprising results: Providing information on the 
expected environmental effectiveness of carbon taxes reduces the (generally strong) demand for 
environmental earmarking; Making distributional effects salient generates an important demand for 
progressive designs. The case of lump-sum recycling is particularly striking: it is sufficient to show its 
desirable distributional properties to make it one of the most preferred designs.  
 
Combinations of environmental and lump-sum recycling, as currently implemented in Switzerland, 
seem attractive considering acceptance as well as environmental and equity considerations. Accord-
ing to our simulations, reserving a share of the revenues for lump-sum recycling is sufficient to 
address social concerns. On the other hand, effective environmental recycling is difficult to design on 
a large scale, and recycling through tax cuts is economically more efficient. As the latter argument is 
understood by few, environmental motivation still remains the much more prevalent argument for 
environmental tax reform.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Relevance of the topic 
In the face of climate change, depleting fossil fuel resources and acceptance issues with nuclear 
power, it seems ineluctable for energy prices to increase. The Swiss New Energy Policy scenario sets 
ambitious goals towards a more efficient and less carbon intensive energy system. If this scenario is 
to be converted into a set of policies, obtaining public acceptance is imperative. In a democratic 
system like the Swiss, public acceptance is of especially great importance as political parties and the 
general public can in many cases block or alter legislation. However, various studies and past voting 
results in Switzerland have shown that it can be difficult for environmental levies to find a majority 
among voters (Thalmann 2004). It has also been shown that the way environmental tax revenues are 
used has an impact on the public opinion of such measures. According to Thalmann (2004), con-
sumers prefer measures which are designed to use revenues for energy or environmental causes. 
One important concern is, however, that levies raised on energy goods could have a regressive 
effect. This distributional effect can be countered by specifically targeted tax revenue recycling 
options. Therefore, it is of great interest to find out both how social cushioning and other recycling 
options affect income distribution and efficiency, and how the revenue recycling and cushioning 
options can be defined such that public acceptance is maximized. 
1.2 Objective of the study  
The project aims to investigate the acceptability of various designs for CO2 levies, with a focus on 
distributional effects and social cushioning measures. More precisely, we investigate how social 
cushioning and other revenue recycling options affect income distribution and efficiency, and how 
they can be defined such that public acceptance is maximized. We base the analysis on simulations 
with the general equilibrium model GENESwIS and on a representative national survey. In the survey, 
we tested the acceptability of alternative designs of a CO2 levy with a choice experiment. Survey 
respondents were informed about environmental, distributional and competitiveness effects of each 
carbon tax design, according to simulation results from GENESwIS. 
GENESwIS, a computable general equilibrium model for Swiss energy and climate policy analysis, is 
enhanced in this project to distinguish between different types of households. The disaggregation of 
the households is done according to criteria regarding place of residence (city, agglomeration and 
periphery) and regarding the composition of the household (kids, no kids and retired). A further dis-
aggregation of these categories is conducted according to living standards.  
To address the question of the acceptability of cost effective climate policy, the design of the repre-
sentative national survey generally draws on stated preferences under partial information. A total of 
1’200 respondents were contacted by phone and questioned with regard to their preferences related 
to the magnitude of carbon taxes for which also various design options exist. In the survey, we tested 
the acceptability of alternative designs of a CO2 levy with a choice experiment. Survey respondents 
were informed about environmental, distributional and competitiveness effects of each carbon tax 
design, according to simulation results from GENESwIS. Furthermore, we analyze voting behavior in a 
large ballot on energy taxes in Switzerland, rejected in 2015 by more than 2 million people. 
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The remainder of the report shall be organized as follows: In the second chapter, the modeled 
scenarios are introduced. In the third chapter, the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
simulations are described and their results are presented. In the fourth chapter, the public accept-
ability of energy levies and taxes is explored with the help of a survey. Chapter 5 concludes.  
Several appendices show the scientific output of the project, including papers with results from an 
additional (non-representative) survey conducted in Geneva and a note regarding the assessment of 
answers to questions that we were able to add to the VOX survey on the popular initiative for 
replacing the value added tax with an energy tax. 
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2 Scenarios  
2.1 Basic considerations 
In the CGE model runs, two basic scenario types are distinguished, depending on the origin of the 
energy price increase (see Table 1). The main set of scenarios (domestic scenarios) assumes a reform 
of the CO2 levy1 to comply with the CO2 targets of the new energy policy. Another set of scenarios 
(international conflict scenarios) assumes energy price increases due to developments in global fossil 
fuel markets. The idea is that political crisis could lead to temporary price increases for crude oil and 
natural gas. 
As a second scenario dimension, the two basic scenarios are combined with different revenue 
recycling and cushioning options, which leads to a total number of 12 counterfactual scenarios (see 
Table 1).  These scenarios are evaluated relative to a baseline scenario. In the following, the two sce-
nario dimensions as well as the baseline scenario shall be explained more in depth. 
Table 1: Counterfactual scenarios 
 Domestic 
Policy       
International 
conflict             
Recycling through taxes   
   Income tax  
   Value added tax 
IncTax 
VAT 
 
Lump-sum recycling    
   Lump-sum per capita  
   Social benefits 
   Social benefits + child benefits 
   Social + child + retirement benefits 
LumpSum 
Social 
SocKids 
SocMix 
LumpSum_F 
SocKids_F 
SocKids_F 
SocMix_F 
Recycling through imported carbon offsets   
   Offsets counting to domestic target 
   Offsets for additional abatement 
Offsets 
 Abate 
 
 
2.2 Baseline 
The GHG emissions trajectory in the baseline scenario originates from Prognos 2012a. The report’s weiter 
wie bisher (engl.: business as usual) scenario provides information on the likely future development of the 
                                                             
 
1 In the international literature, the term CO2 tax is more common than CO2 levy. In Switzerland, the term CO2 
levy refers to the fact that the levy comes with provisions for complete revenue recycling, which makes it 
neutral in terms of the public budget. Under this terminology, a tax is something which increases the public 
budget. In this report, we use the term CO2 levy when we refer to the existing Swiss levy. To be in line with the 
usual terminology in environmental economics, we still use expressions such as tax base, tax rate, carbon 
taxation, environmental taxes and alike. This does not imply that we question the revenue neutrality of the 
levy.  
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CO2 emissions. These were supplemented with historical data on non-CO2 emissions.2 We assume that 
their share in total emissions remains constant over the modeled time horizon.  
The paths of fossil fuel prices were estimated from a more recent source than Prognos 2012a, the World 
Energy Outlook 2014 (IEA 2014). Import prices for energy carriers are set according to projections of 
the World Energy Outlook 2014. A logarithmic fit was used to extrapolate the missing years. Prices in 
CHF of 2015 can be found in Table 2. 
Table 2: World energy prices (CHF2015 /GJ)  
 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Oil 17.25 17.99 18.75 19.54 20.37 
Gas 9.99 10.34 10.71 11.08 11.47 
Source: IEA 2015 and own calculations 
Labor growth in the model is composed of two factors: (1) active population growth and (2) labor 
productivity growth. The full-time equivalent forecast is taken from the scenario A-00-2015 of the 
Federal Statistical Office. The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs estimate a productivity growth of 
0.9% per year (Surchat 2011). We combine the two to get total labor growth. From these values, an 
average annual GDP growth rate of approximately 1.2% results in the baseline. 
The idea behind the calibration of SEPIA’s baseline scenario is to reproduce the set of parameters 
mentioned above. Since GENESwIS is a CGE model and hence has a different structure than the 
models used by Prognos, only a limited number of target parameters from Prognos’ model were 
deliberately chosen for baseline replication. In the GENESwIS world, hardly justifiable assumptions 
would be required to replicate WEO2014 import prices, Prognos end user prices and Prognos 
demands at the same time.  
Based on these considerations, we replicate basic macroeconomic projections for labor and GDP 
growth and, using import prices for fossil fuels from IEA 2014, GHG emissions paths per type of fuel 
input and electricity demands from Prognos 2012. It follows from the aforementioned that variables 
which are not targeted in the calibration will be somewhat different from the Prognos results. 
The following baseline policies are implemented: 
• Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS): sectors that belong to the ETS must buy permits for CO2 emis-
sions due to heating fuels and for geogenic emissions. Aviation is included in the ETS scheme in 
2020 (in the model; start in 2020 due to 5-year time-steps) and trades ETS permits for CO2 
emissions from transport fuels. As permit price projections by Prognos 2012a are much above 
current prices and projections, we replace them by more modest assumptions which are close to 
the upper end of current projections. We assume a price of 10 CHF per ton of CO2e in 2015 and 
price increases of 10% per year.    
• A CO2 levy on light heating oil and natural gas is applied to non-ETS sectors and household con-
sumption. The CO2 levy is set at the following levels: 60 CHF2015 /t in 2015 and 84 CHF2015 /t in 
2020 and following years. 
                                                             
 
2 The UNFCCC’s GHG inventory was used for non-CO2 data, see 
http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php. 
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• Subsidy for the buildings program: 280 mio CHF from the CO2 levy’s revenue is used to incen-
tivize insulation. The remainder of the CO2 levy’s revenue is recycled as a lump-sum transfer to 
households. 
2.3 Energy price increases 
2.3.1 Domestic scenarios 
The New Energy Policy (NEP) sets goals for both energy demands and greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions. In the domestic policy scenarios, we set NEP quantity targets for total GHG emissions. We 
attain the domestic policy trajectories in GENESwIS by imposing endogenous levies on CO2 emissions 
from non-ETS sources (including transport). Table 3 provides a comparison of the domestic policy 
and baseline trajectories. 
Table 3: Greenhouse gas reduction targets for the domestic policy scenarios  
  2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
CO2-eq 
emissions3     
(Mt)  
Baseline 50.5 47.6 44.3 41.4 38.7 
Domestic policy  41.2 35.1 29.4 24.9 
% Δ  -13.5% -20.8% -28.9% -35.6% 
Source: Prognos 2012a and own calculations 
The NEP scenario assumes crude oil prices (90 US$/t in 2035) that differ from the WWB baseline (113 
US$/t in 2035), because globally more ambitious climate policy reduces oil demand and thus net oil 
prices. Despite this, we use the WWB import price assumptions also for the domestic policy scenario. 
This allows for better comparability, and it is in line with the ceteris paribus approach that prevails in 
CGE scenario design for good reasons. 
2.3.2 International crisis scenarios 
Despite the recent slump in crude oil prices, real energy price increases are expected internationally 
due to depletion of conventional fossil fuel resources, but also due to investment needs in European 
electricity generation and transmission capacities. Furthermore, political conflict and/or insecurity 
about political developments have shown the potential to push crude oil and natural gas prices much 
higher than what pure cost considerations might suggest.  
To capture the important differences between price increases that are induced domestically or 
abroad, we add a scenario which is driven by international price increases only, i.e. higher import 
prices for fossil fuels and possibly electricity (foreign scenarios, labeled “_F”). The rationale for this 
scenario is that also in the case where energy price increases arise from international developments, 
there could be a desire to mitigate the social consequences of these changes. In this event, however, 
the financing of social cushioning measures is complicated by the fact that the price increases are not 
linked to higher public revenues, but are likely to even reduce overall tax revenues.  
                                                             
 
3 In GENESwIS, we use the Kyoto definition for GHG emissions, but assume non-CO2 GHGs and LULUCF emissions to follow 
business as usual paths in all scenarios. 
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It is difficult to find a plausible scenario for large international price increases that go much beyond 
the WWB baseline assumptions: In the original NEP scenario, import prices for crude oil are lower 
than in the baseline. In the 2014 IEA World Energy Outlook (WEO), the highest projected energy 
prices are found in the Current Policies Scenario, which – unlike the New Policy Scenario used for the 
projection of fossil fuel prices in the baseline scenario for this report – does not include recently 
introduced and announced policies. Nominal numbers e.g. for crude oil are above the Prognos 2012a 
baseline assumptions, but as the WEO 2014 uses more recent (i.e. 2013) US Dollars, prices in the 
Current Policies Scenario converted into CHF are not much different from Prognos 2012a baseline 
assumptions. Furthermore, the WEO does not expect large price increases for electricity in Europe. 
Significant international price increases beyond the baseline assumptions are conceivable mostly in 
the event of severe political crisis. Therefore, we define the scenario with foreign price increases as 
an international crisis scenario, assuming a temporary 50% price increase for world market prices of 
crude oil and natural gas in the periods 2020 and 2025 (the SEPIA version of GENESwIS has 5-year 
periods). For this scenario, revenues for social cushioning shall be generated by increasing income 
taxes to generate additional tax revenues of 1 bio. CHF.   
2.4 Revenue recycling and social cushioning 
The second scenario dimension concerns the full recycling of additional tax revenues associated with 
the changes in scenario dimension 1. In CGE counterfactual simulations, revenues of all taxes change, 
but overall revenue neutrality is assured by an equal yield constraint that keeps public goods 
provision constant. When domestic CO2 and energy taxes are increased, it creates room for lowering 
other taxes or for transfers or subsidies according to the chosen recycling or cushioning option in 
dimension 2. As discussed above, international price increase scenarios are likely to reduce tax reve-
nue, which means that, in order to keep public goods provision constant and to finance social 
cushioning measures, increased (marginal) income tax rates are assumed.  
2.4.1 Recycling through taxes 
Regarding the recycling through tax reductions, two alternatives are simulated using the two most 
important types of taxes: a proportional value added tax reduction (scenario “VAT”) and a propor-
tional reduction of marginal tax rates on labor income (scenario “IncTax”). The tax recycling variants 
are combined with the domestic policy scenario, but not with the international crisis scenario, 
because it makes little sense to raise additional revenue through income taxes to then recycle these 
revenues again through the income tax. Also, we do not intend to simulate the consequences of 
shifts between income tax and value added tax. 
2.4.2 Lump-sum recycling 
Lump-sum transfers to all households (scenario “LumpSum”) are a main element of the current 
approach for recycling the revenue of the CO2 levy. Lump-sum recycling is usually not recommended 
by public economists, because they tend to search for opportunities to reduce the excess burden of 
existing taxation. However, Imhof (2012) has shown for Switzerland that lump-sum recycling can be 
preferable to tax reductions for distributional reasons, while the difference in total excess burden is 
not very prominent.   
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For better effectiveness in addressing distributional issues, lump-sum transfers could be differenti-
ated to become targeted social policy (scenario “Social”). In reality, such social policy comes in many 
forms including allowances and benefits of various kinds. Effective targeting to low income groups is 
known to be a major challenge in this policy area. Especially, subsidized premiums for health insur-
ance are granted to many middle class households. We thus assume that only 70% of the transfers go 
to households in the lowest income category, 25% to the second lowest, and 5% to the third lowest.  
Targeting groups of society which are considered to be especially vulnerable to energy price increas-
es can take many forms. In the model – and also in reality – vulnerable groups need to be identifiable 
on the basis of easily observable personal attributes. In the analysis of the household data, two such 
attributes become evident:  
• Statistically, having children increases the risk of possessing a low equivalized disposable 
household income. 
• Similarly, being retired increases the risk of having a low equivalized disposable household 
income. However, retired people will own, on average, more assets.  
We thus introduce two more lump-sum scenarios. Both of them use 50% of the revenues for 
targeted social policy as described above. The other 50% of revenues are used for  
• child benefits (scenario “SocKids”), i.e. an equal transfer per child, 
• child benefits and first pillar retirement benefits (scenario “SocMix”), i.e. children and retired 
persons receive equal transfers per capita.  
According to the base year household data we use, there are 1.20 mio. children and 1.24 mio. retired 
persons in Switzerland. 
2.4.3 Recycling through carbon offsets 
For green taxes, existing literature suggests that survey respondents favor recycling for environ-
mental purposes. Mostly due to the limited disaggregation of the household data, it is difficult in the 
model to represent subsidies for renewables or public transport in a satisfying way. To maintain the 
notion of green funding, we simulate revenue recycling into carbon offsets. Given that domestic 
offsetting (in combination with voluntary commitments) seems to explore its limits already at the 
moment, we concentrate on imported offsets. These are assumed to be available at the same price 
as GHG allowances in the ETS. We simulate two alternative offset scenarios:  
• Imported offsets count towards the CO2 target of the domestic scenario (scenario “Offsets”). 
As abatement can be purchased from abroad, this scenario is not necessarily in line with the 
Swiss domestic abatement objectives which have been communicated (e.g. -30% GHG emis-
sions in 2030 compared to 1990). The recycling via offsets lowers the CO2 levy which is 
necessary to reach the overall target. 
• Foreign offsets purchased from revenue recycling add to the overall GHG abatement 
(scenario “Abate”). The domestic reduction targets have to be attained with domestic 
measures or through the existing ETS. 
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3 Simulations with GENESwIS 
3.1 Distributional effects of CO2 levies in applied general equilibrium 
Putting a price on carbon by imposing a CO2 levy or installing a cap and trade system affects real 
household income in different ways. The composition of expenditure effect unfolds through rising 
prices for carbon intensive commodities. Households who spend a larger share of their income on 
these goods bear a higher financial burden. This impact is usually regressive in income, because the 
shares of expenditure for gasoline and electricity tend to be higher for poor than for rich households 
(see e.g. Poterba 1991). Changing factor prices determine the composition of income effect. For 
example, capital income from sectors which are confronted with falling relative factor prices decreas-
es, unless capital is internationally fully mobile. This is a progressive impact as long as capital income 
accounts for a higher share of income for richer than for poorer households, which is usually the 
case.  
Composition of income effects can be larger than composition of expenditure effects, even more so 
when revenue recycling enters the picture. A distributional analysis is incomplete without regard to 
the use of revenue raised from carbon pricing. Hence, partial approaches are unable to explore 
impacts of carbon taxes in a meaningful way, and general equilibrium analysis becomes necessary. 
Whereas many studies have addressed economic impacts of carbon pricing on aggregate levels, 
studies tackling distributional effects are much less frequent.  
Metcalf 1999, although he finds a US carbon tax to be regressive, points out that any impacts on 
income distribution from environmental taxation can be adjusted through a suitable choice of the 
revenue recycling regime. Even quite regressive effects of carbon pricing can be turned into neutral 
or at least mildly progressive distributional outcomes. This has been confirmed by many studies (e.g. 
Barker/Köhler 1998, Rausch et al. 2011), especially for lump-sum per capita recycling. 
Distributional consequences of carbon taxation differ a lot between regions. Oladosu and Rose 2007 
highlight peculiarities for their region of investigation, the Susquehanna River Basin in the north-
eastern USA. They find carbon taxation at a tax rate of 25 US$ per ton of CO2 to be mildly progres-
sive. This is mainly due to a dominant composition of income effect with a slightly unusual back-
ground: Apart from a decline in capital income which hits households in higher income brackets 
harder than poor households, employment declines across all household groups. Higher income 
households suffer a larger loss, because they tend to earn higher wages and are employed in sectors 
which are more strongly affected by the overall decline in output. Under these circumstances, even a 
uniform percentage reduction of the income tax strengthens the progressivity of the impact 
Another regional study from Beck et al. 2015 shows a highly progressive carbon tax even before 
revenue recycling. It investigates the distributional impact of the 30 C$ carbon tax imposed on all 
fossil fuel combustion in the Canadian Province of British Columbia. Electricity is mostly generated 
from hydro, which translates into a rather small composition of income effect. On the other hand, 
the composition of income effect is large, because capital moves out of the region due to high energy 
prices and puts pressure on labor supply – a factor which is much less mobile. Consequently, real 
wages decline, affecting higher income households more, due to their higher dependence on labor 
income. 
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Research on developing or emerging economies underlines even further, how much distributional 
impacts of carbon taxation depend on economic structure and conditions (see the anthology from 
Sterner 2011). In an analysis of a reduction of vehicle fuel subsidies in Indonesia, Yusuf and 
Resosudarmo 2011 discover evidence for a rather strong progressivity. Higher income households 
spend a larger share of income on vehicle fuels and commodities closely associated than poorer 
households, who in many cases cannot even afford public transport. Furthermore, the poorer 
households have very little access to income from factors affected by the tax reform.  
Liang and Wei 2012 emphasize the different impacts of carbon taxation and revenue recycling 
options in urban and rural households in China. The carbon tax as well as most of the explored 
revenue recycling schemes tend to widen the existing gap in income between urban and rural house-
holds. Urban households bear a higher burden of the income tax and receive a higher share of 
government subsidies. Therefore, revenue redistributed through these channels, e.g. through a uni-
form income tax rate reduction, increases disparities. Only a lump-sum transfer to households in 
proportion to the population narrows the urban-rural income gap. It is, however, inefficient in the 
sense that in the long term all incomes decline more significantly than in a reference scenario with-
out revenue recycling.  
For Switzerland, useful insights are delivered by the studies Ecoplan 2012a, 2012b and Imhof 2012. 
Ecoplan 2012a analyzes the impacts of two scenarios of an ecological tax reform for 2020, 2035 and 
2050 with two different levels of ambition, combining a CO2 levy on fossil fuels and a levy on 
electricity consumption. Each scenario is supplemented with several revenue recycling options. Only 
the redistribution through lump-sum per capita transfers leads to an overall progressive effect. In 
terms of efficiency, however, the lump-sum option is inferior to the other recycling alternatives, 
which points to a trade-off between efficiency and distributional objectives. Lower income house-
holds with children particularly benefit from the lump-sum per capita rebate, whereas no differences 
were detected between rural and urban households. Imhof 2012 considers three alternative tax 
policies to achieve a 20% reduction of CO2 emissions below 1990 levels and combines these with four 
revenue recycling regimes. Similar to Ecoplan 2012a and 2012b, per capita lump-sum redistribution 
turns out to be the only progressive option. 
3.2 Model structure 
3.2.1 Basic set-up 
GENESwIS is a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Swiss economy designed 
to analyze energy and environmental policies (Vöhringer 2012). For the simulations in the current 
report, it has been adapted to include multiple households and to a dynamic-recursive design. The 
time horizon is 2015-2035, in 5-year steps.  
Households maximize their utility under a budget constraint. They earn wages by providing labor and 
receive a rate of return by renting out capital. As a further element of income, they receive social 
benefits from the Government. Firms maximize profit under technology constraints and the assump-
tion of perfect competition. Non-satiation in consumption and flexible prices imply that demand 
equals supply in all markets. The Government collects taxes (income tax, value added tax, mineral oil 
tax, CO2 levy) and uses the revenue for lump-sum transfers (social benefits) and public goods provi-
sion. Equal yield is assumed, i.e. the income tax rate is modified to keep public goods provision 
constant.  
18/68 
 
 
Domestic and foreign goods are assumed to be imperfect substitutes and are aggregated following 
Armington’s description of a small open economy. Capital is modeled as putty-clay to incorporate the 
rigid character of investment decisions and crowding out of investments. Thus, free capital invested 
into one type of sectoral capital (industry, energy, housing, or services) cannot be transformed back 
into capital for another sector. Savings and investments are treated as entirely domestic. GENESwIS 
exhibits flexible labor supply such that agents can choose between labor and leisure. 
3.2.2 Household aggregations 
Two alternative household aggregations are considered for the model simulations in this report (also 
see Figure 1):  
• by family type: households with children, without children, and retired population (above 65 
years), each of the three categories divided into five classes according to economic standard 
of living; 
• by location of residence: households in cities, agglomerations, and in the periphery, each of 
the three categories divided into five classes according to economic standard of living. 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the households aggregations used in the CGE simulation. “C 1-5” 
denotes the five classes of economic living standard. 
3.2.3 Production and trade 
GENESwIS’ sectoral aggregation is designed for the analysis of energy and environmental policies. It 
is displayed in Table 4, while Table 5 presents the commodities that are produced by the sectors or 
imported. The output of the refinery sector is disaggregated into transport fuels, i.e. Diesel and 
petrol, light heating oil, and other mineral oil products (see Figure 2). The latter are added to the Rest 
of Industry commodity. To reflect some flexibility that exists in refinery processes, there is a constant 
elasticity of transformation of 0.2 between the different outputs. Physical quantities and emissions 
associated with the different uses of energy carriers are tracked. When they are taxed, this is done in 
accordance with the fuel specific emission factors. 
Aggregation by  
family status
Households with children
C 1-5
Households without children
C 1-5
Retired households
C 1-5
Aggregation by 
domicile
Households in cities
C 1-5
Households in agglomerations
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Figure 2: Disaggregation of the refinery production sector 
Table 4: GENESwIS’ sectors 
Energy Other 
Electricity  Food and beverages  
Natural gas and district heating Housing and real estate  
Refineries  Transport  
 Other emission trading sectors  
 Rest of industry  
 
 
Rest of services  
Table 5: GENESwIS’ commodities 
Energy Other 
Electricity Food and beverages 
Natural gas and district heating Housing and real estate 
Crude oil Transport services 
Heating fuels Rest of industry  
Transport fuels Rest of services  
In GENESwIS, production functions take the form of sectoral nested constant elasticity of substitution 
(NCES) production functions. Special attention is given to the use and production of energy. Figure 3 
displays the nesting structure for the sectoral NCES production functions (values of the elasticities of 
substitution are provided in the data chapter 3.3). The top structure, linking capital, labor, energy 
and other inputs is a standard and recognized structure (see for example Paltsev et al. 2009 and 
Böhringer et al. 2010). The energy nest, more disaggregated, has been designed with the idea that 
there is little substitution between different types of energy use, whereas within these types of 
energy uses diﬀerent energy carriers or types of production can be substituted to each other.  
Transport is subdivided into purchased transport services and own transport, represented by the 
consumption of transport fuels. The electricity entry on the transport side of the nesting tree repre-
sents opportunities for electromobility.  
In the heating nest, light heating oil can be substituted by natural gas and district heating. Further-
more, opportunities for better insulation are represented through an entry of rest of industry pro-
ducts. This is where subsidies from the buildings program are applied. The electricity entry on the 
heating side of the nesting tree represents both electricity for heat pumps and electricity use for 
appliances. 
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Figure 3: Nesting structure for GENESwIS’ production functions. 
The Armington representation of trade treats domestic and foreign goods and services as imperfect 
substitutes. Armington elasticities are taken from GTAP and GTAP-E data (Hertel 1997 and Burni-
aux/Truong 2002, see Table 7). Crude oil is only imported.  Also, no natural gas is extracted in 
Switzerland. Despite this, the input output table entails some domestic production in the gas sector, 
which accounts for transport and distribution services. To this, we add the domestic activity of 
district heating.   
3.2.4 Consumption  
According to the preferences in their utility function, households choose between consuming goods 
and services, and enjoying leisure time. Investment is determined by preferences for savings. The 
nesting structure for consumption is given in Figure 4. Households substitute between the different 
goods and services with an elasticity of substitution of one (Cobb-Douglas nest). The nesting in 
energy use is specified precisely as for sectoral production, although different benchmark shares 
apply, which alters substitution possibilities. Elasticities of substitution for the energy nests are the 
same as for the Rest of Services sector (values are provided in Table 6 in the data chapter 3.3). 
Intermediate inputs
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Figure 4: Nesting structure of the GENESwIS model for household consumption. 
3.3 Data 
GENESwIS is based on the 2008 energy related disaggregation of the Swiss Input-Output Table (IOT) 
(Nathani et al. 2013). The IOT data is complemented by household data from the HBS (Household 
Budget Survey) of the years 2007-2009 (Federal Statistical Office 2010b, 2011, 2012). The integration 
of the IOT and HBS data draws on a similar exercise conducted in Ecoplan 2012b. In the following, we 
introduce the structure as well as the necessary adaptations to the input data. 
3.3.1 Input output data 
Work on the Swiss Energy IOT 2008 included the following main tasks:  
• The commodity "Coke and refined mineral products" has been disaggregated into "Heating 
fuels", "Transport fuels" and "Other refined mineral products". The latter is added to the Rest of 
industry commodity. The Refinery sector remains aggregated, because the production processes 
of the three commodities are highly integrated. The data sources used for the disaggregation are 
the Energy NAMEA data (Nathani et al. 2013) and the Swiss energy statistics (Swiss Federal Office 
of Energy 2009). 
• "Crude oil" is separated from "Products of mining and quarrying". It is solely composed of 
imports. 
• The value added row of the IOT is disaggregated into labor, capital and income taxes. Labor was 
calculated from data of the Federal Office of Statistics, more precisely from full time equivalent 
and gross monthly wage data per economic sector. 
• To model insulation, an input from Rest of Industry is included in the heating nest. The total 
value of this input is set to 5% of total Construction demand, excluding own demand and road 
and infrastructure, which amounts to 1/3 of total construction (see Körber and Kaufmann 2007). 
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ServicesGoodsHousingFood
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The input of insulation into each sector is distributed according to the respective sector’s share in 
total demand for heat. This way, each sector has the same benchmark value share of insulation 
in its heating nest. Insulation is not modeled for the energy sectors, because their inputs of 
heating fuels are used mostly for industrial processes rather than for heating buildings.  
3.3.2 Elasticities of substitution 
The elasticities of substitution for the value added (KL) and the total value added vs. energy (KL,E) 
nests are particularly important for the representation of energy efficiency improvements. Table 6 
lists the respective elasticities used in GENESwIS.  
Table 6: GENESwIS’ elasticities of substitution 
Nest Sector 2015 2025 2035 
KL Other emissions trading sectors 0.303 0.505 0.707 
 All other sectors 0.319 0.745 1.170 
KL,E Rest of industry 0.296 0.691 1.805 
 Other emissions trading sectors 0.312 0.728 1.144 
 Electricity / gas/ mineral oil 0.102 0.204 0.306 
 Food and beverages 0.180 0.359 0.539 
 Transport 0.112 0.224 0.336 
 Rest of services / housing 0.091 0.364 0.819 
The elasticities of substitution between capital and labor (KL nest, see also Figure 3 and Figure 4) are 
derived from Mohler/Müller 2012. They estimate elasticities for the Swiss manufacturing industry, 
e.g. for Emissions trading sectors and Rest of industry. To account for differences in short-term and 
long-term elasticities, the elasticities of substitution are set in GENESwIS to be linearly dependent of 
time. As the elasticities in Mohler/Müller 2012 apply to a timeframe of 14 years, the values are used 
for 2025 and are doubled for 2050 (which is outside the actual model horizon). A linear approxima-
tion is fitted through these two points. It is assumed that the remaining sectors display the same 
elasticities as the Rest of industry sector. 
The elasticities between energy and the value added nest (KL,E nest, see Figure 3 and Figure 4), are 
taken from Mohler/Müller 2012 for Emissions trading sectors and Rest of industry, and from 
Ban/Okagawa 2008 for the remaining sectors. A similar linear fit as for the KL nest elasticities is set 
up. As Ban/Okagawa 2008 compute their elasticities on a timeframe of 19 years, the first anchor 
point for the elasticities is set to 2030, doubling in 25 years. 
Table 7: GENESwIS’ Armington elasticities  
Commodity type  
Electricity 2.8 
Fossil fuels 1.9 
Food and beverages 2.2 
Rest of industry 2.5 
Services  1.9 
Source: Hertel 1997 and Burniaux/Truong 2002 
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3.3.3 Household data and taxes 
For the two alternative household aggregations (described in section 3.1.2 and depicted in Figure 1), 
we use the data set which Ecoplan created for its model simulations for the 2012 report on the 
economic effects of Switzerland’s energy strategy 2050 (Ecoplan 2012b). Ecoplan’s data set is based 
on the Federal Statistical Office’s (FSO) household budget survey (HBS) (Federal Statistical Office 
2010b, 2011, 2012). The HBS data from 2007 to 2009 were pooled. The division into categories 
according to standard of living equally takes into consideration income and consumption expenditure 
and relates them to the number of people in the household on OECD’s modified equivalence scale 
(OECD undated). The number of households in each category can vary. Thus, the living standard 
categories are different from income quintiles. 
Since the data from the HBS do not precisely match the macro data in the IOT from 2008, a calibra-
tion process was required. To this end, Ecoplan introduced, next to the 15 regular household types in 
each aggregation, a capitalist to whom all excess capital income was assigned. In this way, around 
half of the total capital income was allocated to the capitalist (Ecoplan 2012b). As we decided to 
avoid Ecoplan’s approach to define a capitalist household, further modifications became necessary to 
fit the HBS data to the model. Generally, we prioritized HBS data over totals from the IOT with the 
aim to minimize data modifications for channels which affect distribution between households.   
When dynamic model consistency has to be guaranteed, there are limits to modifying capital income 
in the IOT. Thus, similar to Ecoplan, we had to allocate additional capital income to the households. 
Instead of creating a capitalist, we distributed this additional income to the households in proportion 
to the capital income given in the HBS data. To keep capital income tax payments constant without 
modifying tax rates, we had to assume that this additional capital income remains untaxed. This 
assumption allows for a correct representation of marginal capital taxation in the model.  According 
to the HBS data as well as in the model, labor and capital are taxed at different rates on a household 
level. As our approach does not change incentives for investment and labor provision in the model, 
we believe that it is the economically most neutral way in which the given problems with data 
matching can be resolved.  
 
The following list provides further details on the adjustments: 
• Labor income is higher in Ecoplan’s version of the HBS data than in the Swiss IOT. The 
discrepancy was corrected through a proportional deduction of 4% from labor income, balanced 
by an equal-sized correction to capital income. 
• As far as taxation is concerned, most of the social benefits can be treated in the same way as 
labor income, e.g. first pillar old-age pensions. In the Ecoplan version of the HBS household data, 
the income category “social benefits” also contains the second pillar, which follows a different 
taxation scheme and can hence not simply be added to labor income. Therefore, this portion was 
deducted from social benefits and added to capital income. To this end, the original HBS data as 
provided by the Federal Office if Statistics was drawn upon. It provides information on the value 
of the payments by the second pillar contained in the social benefit transfers. According to this 
data, an average of CHF 23.98 billion were distributed from this source for the years 2006-2008. 
As the original HBS data does not contain the same household categories, we distributed this 
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amount to the different household categories using the information that is actually available in 
the original HBS data.4   
• For fossil fuels, we prioritized the IOT data over Ecoplan’s version of the HBS data to ensure 
consistency with NAMEA (Nathani et al. 2013) emissions data. Adjustments to household 
demand for fossil fuels have been applied proportionally, separately for heating and transport 
fuels. 
We have undertaken considerable efforts to represent differences in factor taxation between labor 
and capital as well as differences between average and marginal labor tax rates for the different 
household categories. From Ecoplan’s HBS data, only the absolute tax payment for each type of 
household is known, but not how this is composed in terms of labor and capital tax. Hence, data on 
factor taxation from other sources needs to be incorporated and prioritized over HBS data where 
necessary. 
In a next step, this information is used to calculate the expected labor tax payment for each of the 
modeled household categories, also taking into account the composition of each household catego-
ry5. As similar information is unavailable for capital taxation, we assume a flat rate of 20%, which 
results in a reasonable match with the HBS data on tax payments. Due to the use of different data 
sources, the match cannot be perfect. For most household categories, the calculated expected tax 
payments lead to an overestimation in comparison to the tax payments disclosed in the HBS data. 
For the household categories in question, a portion of the capital was deemed as tax free, such that 
the expected tax payment and the actual tax payment match. Importantly, the amount of capital 
being exempt from taxation does not exceed the capital transferred from the IOT for any category. 
For four out of the 30 household categories, the expected tax payment is lower than the payment 
given by the HBS data. In these cases, the labor tax rate is increased such that the expected and the 
stated tax payment match. These latter adjustments are small, such that they do not distort the 
progressive pattern of the labor tax in any of the six types of households by which living standard 
                                                             
 
4 According to the HBS data, families with children do not receive any such payments (or none which are statistically 
significant); Couples without children receive an average of 42% of their social benefits from the second pillar pension 
funds, while for single households without children approximately 31% of their social benefits consist of payments from the 
second retirement provision pillar. From these facts, the following allocation rules were deduced: For the household classes 
“NoKids”, the approximation of 35% of social benefits transfers was allocated to capital income, while for households with 
children, no changes were introduced to the social benefits. The rate for retired households was then calculated from the 
remaining amount to be distributed; this resulted in a second pillar share of 39%. For the income classes structured 
according to geographic dispersion, no apparent pattern could be found, due to a lack of information on proximity to urban 
areas in the original HBS data. However, the share of Social Benefits coming from the pension fund increases in income. 
Therefore, a base rate of 15% was defined. With the aid of the total amount to be distributed, a rate added to each income 
class was then calculated. Following this approach, 21.8% (lowest income class) to 48.8% (highest income class) of social 
benefits were transferred to capital income. Note that this pattern can be observed only for the population as a whole. 
Therefore, this adjustment has only been applied to the disaggregation according to domicile, but not to the disaggregation 
according to family type, to which no differentiation in income has been applied. 
 
5 Tax rates from the Federal Tax Administration are available only for single households, married couples without or with 
two children. Tax rates for the households in the model were calculated considering the actual composition of the 
household. For example: The tax rate of a household of a married couple with one child would be calculated by taking into 
account 50% of the married couple without children and 50% of the married couple with two children. See Annexes 7 and 8 
for details on the composition of the various household categories. 
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categories are differentiated (Kids, NoKids, Retired, City, Agglo, Periphery). The resulting taxation 
pattern across the various household types can be seen in Figure 5. 
  
Figure 5: Average and marginal labor tax rates dependent on taxable labor income for the 
modeled household categories. 
The average labor tax rate is calculated on the basis of net labor income. For the calculation of the 
marginal tax rate, the capital income declared in the HBS plus the part of the social benefits deduced 
for the income of the second retirement provision pillar is added to this value. The underlying 
assumption is that, although capital income is taxed with a different tax rate than labor income, it 
still increases the marginal (labor) income tax rate. 
With the above, we have defined marginal and average tax rates for the thirty household groups. 
Now we still need to determine how rates change relative to each other. This is especially relevant 
for the scenario IncTax, which recycles the revenues of the CO2 levy through changes in labor income 
tax rates. More generally, it is relevant for any scenario that uses the labor income tax as an equal 
yield mechanism, which means that labor income tax rate adjustments are used to keep public goods 
provision constant. This applies to all scenarios except for the scenario VAT, where revenues of the 
CO2 levy are recycled through adjustments of value added tax rates. 
In GENESwIS, marginal labor tax rates are applied, while endogenous transfers ensure that ultimately 
tax payments are in line with average tax rates. These endogenous transfers depend on labor supply, 
which is endogenous to the model, as well as on the difference between the average and the 
marginal tax rates for the respective household. When marginal tax rates change endogenously, e.g. 
due to recycling of CO2 levy revenues, that difference has to become endogenous as well. To this 
end, we search for a function which represents the following relation: 
𝛥𝛥(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀) = 𝑓𝑓(𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) 
 
MR denotes the marginal tax rate and AR the average tax rate. That is, we want to find the 
percentage change in the difference between marginal and average tax rates that belongs to a given 
change in the marginal tax rate. The resulting multiplier is used in the model to inflate the transfers, 
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or more precisely to deflate them, because with revenue recycling rates decrease rather than 
increase. The problem can be formulated in the following way: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀0 − 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀0 + � 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀0 − 1� ⋅ 𝑥𝑥 ⋅ (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀0 − 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀0)
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀0 − 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀0
= 1 + � 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀0
− 1� ⋅ 𝑥𝑥 = 1 + ∆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ⋅ 𝑥𝑥 
 
The subscript zero denotes initial values. The variable x corresponds to the slope of the linear log-log 
regression of the difference MR-AR on MR. The logarithmization of both the dependent and indepen-
dent variable is necessary as the model reports and requires percentage changes. All tax rates are 
calculated on a net basis and are hence higher than their gross based counterparts. With the term 
presented above, only two known values are required: the change in marginal tax rate, ∆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, and 𝑥𝑥, 
the slope coefficient that results from the linear regression. 
Before the calculation, the data used is weighted with the benchmark labor income for each house-
hold category. This step mostly serves to ensure that the retired household groups with very low 
levels of labor income do not influence the overall result too much. The calculated slope coefficient 𝑥𝑥 
is 1.1944. Figure 6 illustrates the regression. 
 
Figure 6: Regressions of the difference between the marginal and the average tax rate on the 
marginal tax rate for the household aggregation by family type. The data has been 
weighted with benchmark labor income and logarithmized. 
Other taxes that are taken into account are: 
• The Value Added Tax (VAT): non deductible VAT, and VAT on household consumption. Source: 
Nathani et al. 2013. 
• Mineral Oil Tax. The mineral oil tax payments by sectors are given by Nathani et al. 2013. Mineral 
oil tax rates are calculated by fuel (petrol and Diesel, light heating oil, natural gas) and by group 
of users and levied as quantity based taxes. 
• Remaining taxes in the IOT data are assigned to domestic production, investment, household and 
government consumption, depending on the activity specified in the IO table. 
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Domestic scenarios 
3.4.1.1 Abatement 
To meet the dynamically tightening emission restrictions of the domestic scenarios (reaching -35.6% 
CO2-eq relative to baseline in 2035, see Table 3), the tax base of the CO2 levy is broadened to include 
fossil transport fuels. Despite this, the goals of these scenarios cannot be attained with current tax 
rates of the levy (84 CHF/tCO2). Figure 7 displays the time path of tax rates which are compatible 
with the objectives for the respective time periods. The tax rates increase from about 230 CHF/tCO2 
in 2020 to about 670 CHF/tCO2 with predominantly negligible differences between the revenue 
recycling variants. For the different lump-sum recycling variants, the tax rates in 2035 vary between 
669 and 671 CHF/tCO2. The superior macroeconomic performance of tax recycling variants (scenarios 
IncTax and VAT) leads to slightly higher tax rates of the CO2 levy required to meet the targets (677 
and 675 CHF/tCO2 respectively).   
 
Figure 7: Rate of the CO2 levy in CHF2008 / t CO2 
These numbers, as any other quantitative computable general equilibrium model result, should not 
be interpreted as a forecast. In the past, technological and macroeconomic surprises have often 
ridiculed such numbers, certainly over a twenty-year time frame. With the upcoming commercial 
breakthrough of electromobility and other ongoing technological advances, affirming such numbers 
is even more presumptuous today than some years ago. In contrast to many other CGE models, 
GENESwIS uses dynamic elasticities of substitution for key energy related nests (see Table 6). Despite 
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this, the elasticities could reflect past relationships of substitution more than future ones. Thus, 
rather than predicting, we make an effort to investigate economic effects and their relative impor-
tance in a general equilibrium setting with empirical data.6  
In this spirit, the main implication of Figure 7 is that ambitious levy-based greenhouse gas abatement 
requires a broad tax base when high tax rates are to be avoided. Without including transport fuels in 
the tax base, the abatement objectives cannot be attained. Even then, the tax base, which excludes 
fuel related emissions that are regulated under the emissions trading system (ETS), covers less than 
two thirds of total GHG emissions in 2015. This share declines over time in the scenarios, thus 
implicating rather high tax rates to attain the objectives in 2035. 
 
Figure 8: Composition of greenhouse gas emissions (Mt CO2-eq) 
This issue also leaves its traces in Figure 8, which shows the composition of greenhouse gas emis-
sions. With the simulated policies, Other emissions remain largely unabated, turning the 2035 objec-
tive into a real challenge for fuel related emissions. Again, it becomes apparent that further exemp-
tions in addition to the ETS, such as a prolonged nonconsideration of transport fuels, make the 
                                                             
 
6 The rates of the uniform CO2 levy which are suggested by different CGE studies for Switzerland are generally within the 
same order of magnitude for similar levels of abatement. Simplistic direct comparisons between numbers from different 
studies are not particularly insightful, especially when the studies have been published in different years. As baseline 
emissions change over time (for example, due to higher demographic projections), the effort for reaching a given emissions 
path changes as well. Also, the later the study, the shorter the remaining adjustment period up to a particular target year. 
Furthermore, even with similar parametrizations, differing model structures (especially with respect to sector aggregations 
and CES nestings) imply that different models produce somewhat different quantitative results. This is a prevalent and even 
desired characteristic of model-based economic research. 
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objective of a 35.6% reduction of total greenhouse gases unattainable, at least when climate mitiga-
tion relies mainly on the CO2 levy and on the ETS. In one way or another, emissions from other 
sources than heat generation will have to contribute when abatement is meant to be ambitious. 
Emission reductions relative to the reference scenario are especially large for heating oil, with natu-
ral gas and electricity as available substitutes. Emissions from transport are approximately halved in 
2035, while electricity demand (not in the figure) increases by 10.6%. Differences between revenue 
recycling variants are again negligible.  
3.4.1.2 Macroeconomic impacts 
With regard to overall economic performance of the simulated policy reforms, we have not found a 
so-called double dividend, i.e. welfare in the model decreases by about 1% in 2035. The definition of 
welfare used in the model entails consumption, leisure and preferences for investment. It does, 
however, neither include benefits of reduced climate risks nor ancillary benefits of mitigation mea-
sures such as lower health costs under reduced air pollution. It can be inferred from estimates of 
ancillary benefits in Ecoplan 2012a and 2012b that they considerably narrow the overall welfare loss 
for our simulated scenarios. Furthermore, even double dividends are well possible in the Swiss con-
text, provided however that tax rates of the CO2 levy are much lower than in the scenarios simulated 
here. 
 
Figure 9: Aggregate welfare impact of domestic policy scenarios relative to the reference 
case (in %) 
There are noticeable, although modest differences between the revenue recycling variants. The two 
variants which reduce existing taxes (income tax or value added tax) perform better in terms of 
aggregate welfare than pure lump-sum recycling. The former variants significantly reduce the excess 
burden of existing taxes, while for the latter variants this is not the case. It has to be added, however, 
that the aggregate welfare measure displayed here does not evaluate the social progressiveness or 
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regressiveness of the reform. In welfare theory, different aggregations of individual welfare indica-
tors are possible, depending on the social preferences assumed. Thus, for welfare measures which 
entail considerable inequality aversion, the order of the scenarios will be reversed. Instead of pre-
senting alternative welfare measures, which tend to remain somewhat crude and arbitrary, we pre-
sent distributional impacts in sub-chapter 3.4.1.3. This allows the reader to evaluate the impacts 
according to own social preferences. 
According to our simulations, income tax recycling is slightly more successful in reducing excess 
burden than value added tax recycling. Typically, the relative performance of these two variants 
depends on model specifications, more precisely on factor mobility assumptions and the modeling of 
income taxes. Although GENESwIS does not consider international factor mobility, we do capture the 
higher excess burden of income taxes. This is due to the elaborate modeling of labor taxes: For each 
household category, we tax labor according to the applicable marginal tax rate. This ensures that the 
full distortionary effect of income taxes is taken into account. At the same time, virtual lump-sum 
transfers ensure that actual tax payments, which reflect average tax rates, match with the data. 
When marginal tax rates change under income tax recycling, we adjust also the virtual transfers. This 
is necessary to correctly represent the empirical relationship between marginal and average tax 
rates. The latter do also change, but less than marginal tax rates.7 Overall, the appropriate modeling 
of marginal taxation is an important determinant for the economic impact of income taxes and 
income tax recycling. It importantly affects distributional impacts as well. After all, differences in 
economic efficiency between income tax recycling and value added tax recycling are small. Thus, 
policy choices can be based on distributional properties and on considerations of practicality for tax 
authorities and federal budgetary planning. Differences in aggregate economic efficiency between 
lump-sum recycling variants are equally slim, which allows for focusing on distributional impacts 
when choosing among these variants.  
Looking at the consumption of goods and services only (see Figure 10), we find similar patterns as for 
aggregate welfare, although the magnitude of the changes is larger. For the lump-sum recycling 
variants, declining real wages increase the demand for leisure and reduce labor supply and thus the 
real income which is available for conventional consumption (see Figure 11). Hence, the decrease is 
especially pronounced for these scenarios. In turn, the VAT recycling variant is a notable exception: 
Although it is slightly inferior to income tax recycling in terms of aggregate welfare, it is clearly the 
top variant in terms of consumption of goods and services. Reduced VAT rates increase the attrac-
tiveness of consumption relative to investment (also see the investment graph in Figure 11), which – 
at least in the medium run – increases consumption. The shapes of the consumption and investment 
curves foreshadow that the curves for the scenarios IncTax and VAT could intersect in the very long 
run. 
In Figure 11, real return to capital slightly decreases for all recycling variants. This does, however, not 
imply that investment would be lower for all variants. In the lump-sum recycling variants, for 
example, relative factor prices shift in favor of capital remuneration. The resulting factor substitution 
keeps investment levels roughly constant, despite an overall economic contraction.  
                                                             
 
7 For further information, see section 3.3.3.  
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Figure 10: Consumption for domestic policy scenarios relative to the reference case (in %) 
 
Figure 11: Labor supply, investment, wages and return to capital for domestic policy scenarios 
relative to the reference case (in %) 
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Labor supply increases under the two tax recycling scenarios, especially, of course, when labor taxes 
are reduced, increasing real wages by more than 1%. The simulated percentage changes of up to 
+0.25% are, however, not a big boost in labor supply. Under the lump-sum revenue recycling 
variants, labor supply decreases. This is due to lower real wages, which reflect the general economic 
contraction. In GENESwIS, the shifts of labor supply and demand are the result of deliberate deci-
sions of the agents. Changes in labor quantities in the model are thus different from impacts on in-
voluntary unemployment, although some relationship between the two may exist.  
3.4.1.3 Distributional impacts 
Before we take a look at the overall distributional impacts of the domestic policy scenarios, let us 
draw the attention to Figure 12, which shows the per capita amounts that are recycled to the 
different household groups in 2035. In the scenarios with revenue recycling via the income tax 
(IncTax), and via the value-added tax (VAT), the amount of taxes saved increases in the living 
standard.8 As retired people exhibit little labor income compared to the other household groups, 
they are barely considered by recycling measures in the IncTax scenario, given that we merely lower 
marginal labor tax rates in this scenario.  
In the lump sum case, every person is by definition allocated the same amount. In the scenario with 
targeted social policy, the definition of the recycling ensures that funds are distributed among the 
bottom three categories of standard of living in each of the aggregations. Additionally, in the 
scenario with child benefits (SocKids), half of the total levied tax funds are redistributed as lump sum 
transfers per child. The SocMix scenario, in addition to the targeted social refunds and the child 
benefits also allocates transfers to retired people. Still, in these two cases, the pattern of the poorer 
households receiving higher compensation clearly remains. For further information on the recycling 
schemes, please consult chapter 2.4.  
It is important to note that in the figures of this sub-chapter, each bar represents impacts for the 
respective household group, in CHF per capita in Figure 12 and in percentage changes relative to the 
reference case in Figure 13 and Figure 14. Household groups differ in many respects, especially in 
• the number of households per household group, 
• the number of family members per household, 
• income, consumption and welfare levels. 
For example, within the highest standard of living category, more than seven times as many people 
live in NoKids households than in Retired households. For another example, per capita income in 
these rich Retired households is more than eleven times the per capita income in the poorest 
category of Kids households (see Annex 7). As a consequence, it would be misleading to, consciously 
or subconsciously, add up the bars for the different household groups to gain a picture of aggregate 
impacts. The latter have been presented in sub-chapter 3.4.1.2. 
With this in mind, we move on to the representation of distributional impacts of the domestic policy 
scenarios. We mostly analyze welfare impacts for the different household groups in 2035 (see Figure 
                                                             
 
8 The amounts displayed for these two scenarios are approximations based on benchmark year (2008) weightings and, in 
the case of the IncTax scenario, reference marginal tax rates. 
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13). Figure 14 presents the same indicator for 2025. Due to the lower tax rate of the CO2 levy, effects 
are less pronounced in 2025 than in 2035, despite the higher tax base for the CO2 levy due to the 
lower abatement requirement. Also, as the overall welfare indicator in 2025 is superior to 2035 (see 
Figure 9), a few household groups are above the break-even line in 2025, but below it in 2035 (Kids2 
households in the scenarios LumpSum and SocMix, Kids3 households in the scenario SocKids). Other 
than this, distributional impacts in 2025 and 2035 follow the same patterns in the different domestic 
policy scenarios. It might be helpful to reiterate at this point that the presented welfare measures do 
neither include benefits of reduced climate risks nor ancillary benefits of mitigation measures such as 
lower health costs under reduced air pollution. 
 
Figure 12: Revenue recycling per capita 2035 (in CHF2008) 
With recycling through lower labor taxes (scenario IncTax), the simulated reform of the CO2 levy 
becomes regressive for family households. This is different for retired households who are hardly 
affected by changes in labor taxes: Due to high savings rates and particularly low expenditures for 
transport fuels, they are hardly affected by the reformed CO2 levy (which includes CO2 pricing in 
transport) either. 
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Figure 13: Welfare changes relative to the reference scenario in 2035 (in %) 
With recycling through lower value added taxes (scenario VAT), the reform becomes somewhat less 
regressive, simply because VAT rates for the same good are independent of income. Overall, changes 
in VAT rates do not have large distributional consequences. This is because of two opposing effects: 
• On the one hand, rich households have higher savings rates than low income households. The 
larger consumption share of low income households alone would imply that lowering VAT rates 
has a progressive influence on distribution.  
• On the other hand, there is a lower VAT rate for goods that cover daily needs (2.5% instead of 
8%). With proportional VAT rate reductions, as simulated here, those who purchase more “8% 
goods” benefit more from the recycling. A more socially oriented reform could concentrate on 
the reduced rate. In this case, eliminating the reduced rate would make sense, given that this 
would save the costs of administrating this part of the tax while requiring less than the total 
amounts that can be recycled.  
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Considering the above, regressive effects of the magnitude shown in Figure 13 for the scenario VAT 
are not an implication of the recycling, but mostly of the CO2 levy itself. Considering further that 
Switzerland hardly exhibits energy intensive industries, the regressiveness of the CO2 levy is mainly a 
consequence of differences in the composition of expenditure. This becomes apparent when we 
consult the household data, more precisely the shares of expenditure for fuels in total household 
income. Compared to households in the highest category of standard of living, this share is about 
twofold in the lowest category. The difference is especially pronounced for households with children. 
For them, the multiplier is 2.34 (1.72 for households without children). Furthermore, the households 
with children in the lowest category exhibit the highest share of all households in the aggregation 
(3.6%). This contrasts to a share of only 2.2% for retired households in the same category.  
 
Figure 14: Welfare changes relative to the reference scenario in 2025 (in %) 
Thus, recycling needs to be progressive for the reform not to be regressive. This condition is satisfied 
by all the simulated lump-sum scenarios (LumpSum, Social, SocKids, SocMix). Transferring to house-
holds equal amounts per capita is already a highly progressive recycling variant, given that per capita 
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income for the richest household (Retired5) is more than eleven times that for the poorest house-
hold (Kids1). Indeed, the scenario LumpSum is clearly progressive overall, i.e. despite the regressive 
characteristics of the CO2 levy. The results indicate that using only a part of the revenue of the CO2 
levy suffices to neutralize potentially undesired distributional impacts. With a view to such a neutrali-
ty objective, the current recycling scheme of the CO2 levy – with a lump-sum recycling share of about 
two thirds – seems suitable.  
The welfare results for the other three lump-sum scenarios (Social, SocKids, SocMix) illustrate that 
about any social objective can be pursued by tailoring lump-sum transfers to specific groups. This is 
administratively simple for children and retired persons (through child benefits and first pillar 
pensions). Effective targeting to low income groups is somewhat more difficult. One possible instru-
ment is the subsidy for health insurance premiums, although it is granted also to many middle class 
households. In the scenario Social, we thus assume that only 70% of the transfers go to households in 
the lowest income category, 25% to the second lowest, and 5% to the third lowest. The main conclu-
sion that can be drawn from the simulation results of the different lump-sum scenarios is that using 
even a small share of the CO2 levy revenues for transfers to low income households and families with 
children is enough to solve the regressiveness issue. 
When CGE models, in contrast to the current version of GENESwIS, do not differentiate between 
households and thus report only for one representative agent per country, they have severe 
difficulties in investigating distributional effects. Then, the only way to do this is to look at impacts on 
functional income distribution by analyzing relative factor price changes. As rich households have a 
higher savings rate than poor households, it could be assumed that a reform might be regressive 
when relative factor prices change in favor of capital remuneration.  
Following this argument would, in our simulations, misleadingly reverse the conclusions on distribu-
tional impacts. As can be seen in Figure 11, net factor prices change in favor of labor in the scenario 
with recycling through the labor tax (IncTax) and in favor of capital in the case of lump-sum recycling 
(LumpSum, Social, SocKids, SocMix). With disaggregated households it becomes apparent, however, 
that the IncTax scenario’s reform is clearly regressive, while the reforms with lump-sum recycling are 
clearly progressive. This confirms the notion that single representative agent CGE models are unfit to 
investigate distributional issues. For this particular study, the two main reasons are the following: 
• Differentiated effects of lump-sum recycling cannot be taken into account. 
• Abstracting from revenue recycling, differences in expenditure composition between 
households are the main driver for the regressiveness of the CO2 levy. However, these 
cannot be captured without a disaggregation of households.  
3.4.2 Scenarios with recycling through imported carbon offsets 
3.4.2.1 Abatement 
By definition, total abatement is larger in the Abate than in the Offsets scenario. In the Offsets 
scenario, total abatement is defined by the domestic targets, and imported offsets count toward the 
national target. In the Abate scenario, the same targets are attained without imported carbon off-
sets, and the offsets purchased with the revenues of the CO2 levy are used for additional abatement. 
As the exogenously assumed prices for imported offsets are much lower than the rate of the CO2 
levy, this additional abatement is very sizable (see Figure 15).  
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Figure 15: Composition of emissions (in Mt CO2-eq), comparison between the two scenarios 
Abate and Offsets  
The revenues in the Abate scenarios are high enough to offset 2025 emissions several times and to 
overcompensate total Swiss GHG emissions in 2035. In the latter year, purchased emission reduc-
tions are almost equal to reference emissions. It is understood that the displayed quantities highly 
depend on the assumed prices for imported offsets. With perpetual 10% price increases per year on 
current prices for European allowances (see chapter 2.2), the assumed prices are more likely a little 
too high than too low, which indicates that the purchased abatement could even be higher than 
shown here.  
The purchased emissions reduction in the Abate scenario is smaller in 2035 than in 2025 for two 
reasons: 
• Due to tighter emission targets, the tax base of the CO2 levy is smaller. 
• Although the rate of the CO2 levy increases between 2025 and 2035, prices of foreign offsets 
rise much faster, by 10% per year according to the exogenous assumptions. 
The Offsets scenario can better be appreciated when compared to a domestic policy scenario with 
the same targets for total abatement (see Figure 16 for a comparison with the domestic policy 
scenario LumpSum). Although total emissions are the same by definition, the abatement is entirely 
domestic in the scenario LumpSum, but predominantly takes place abroad in the scenario Offsets. 
The scenario is constructed such that offsets are only purchased when this is cheaper than domestic 
abatement. This effectively sets the tax rate of the CO2 levy at the price level of the international 
offsets. The results thus give an indication of the Swiss abatement which can be achieved at marginal 
costs that are equal to international prices (assumed at 84 CHF/tCO2-eq in 2035). Domestic abate-
ment in 2035 is 11.3% relative to the reference scenario, which is a little less than a third of the total 
abatement.  
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Figure 16: Composition of emissions (in Mt CO2-eq), comparison between the Offsets scenario 
and a domestic policy scenario 
3.4.2.2 Macroeconomic impacts 
The Offsets scenario performs better than the domestic policy scenarios in terms of aggregate 
welfare (see Figure 17 for the Offsets scenario in comparison with Figure 9). However, the difference 
is in the order of magnitude of ancillary benefits of domestic abatement, which are not taken into 
account in the reported welfare measure.  
 
Figure 17: Aggregate welfare impact of imported offsets scenarios relative to the reference 
case (in %) 
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The superiority of the Offsets scenario in the model is by construction: In contrast to the domestic 
policy scenarios, foreign emission allowances, which are available relatively cheaply, may be used 
toward the national target, and Switzerland minimizes the cost of abatement by adjusting the choice 
between foreign and domestic abatement. 
It has been demonstrated in the previous section that the Abate scenario with additional abatement 
via the purchase of foreign offsets is very effective in terms of total greenhouse gas reduction, offset-
ting much more than total Swiss emissions. Yet, this scenario has detrimental effects on aggregate 
welfare (see Figure 17), because it fails to reinsert the revenues of the CO2 levy into the Swiss 
economy. This indicates that, because of the environmental effectiveness, purchasing foreign offsets 
for additional abatement could be a recycling option for a part of rather than for the entire revenues 
from the CO2 levy.  
3.4.2.3 Distributional impacts 
The welfare impacts of the Abate scenario on households mirror the severe macroeconomic 
consequences (see Figure 18 for 2035 and Figure 19 for 2025). This is less true for retired households, 
who receive a much higher share of their income through transfers. This income component is paid 
independently of macroeconomic performance, at least according to model assumptions.  
 
Figure 18: Welfare changes relative to the reference scenario in 2035 (in %) 
The Abate scenario could be seen as part of a decomposition exercise, because for the national 
economy it is identical to a CO2 levy without recycling. Interpreting the results as the true impact of 
the CO2 levy would however be misleading. The impacts are dominated by the macroeconomic 
contraction which is caused by the failure to reinsert the revenues into the economy. With a high 
income share of transfers for poor and retired households, this hits rich families more than others. 
The resulting picture is thus less regressive than for a CO2 levy with a hypothetical recycling which 
would be neutral with respect to distribution. Also, the overall decline in welfare is much higher due 
to large income effects, which are related to the domestic vanishing of the revenues.  
In face of these limitations, we can perfectly use the results in Figure 18 and Figure 19 to study the 
distributional consequences of the Abate scenario. Regressiveness of the tax concerns Kids house-
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holds only. Even for them, the differences between categories of standard of living are not very large. 
However, high negative impacts on families, especially on poor families with children, are clearly an 
issue in this scenario, which could be solved using a part of the revenues for lump-sum transfers. 
For the offsets scenario, the impacts are much less pronounced, but show similar patterns as for the 
Abate scenario. 
 
Figure 19: Welfare changes relative to the reference scenario in 2025 (in %) 
Figure 19 shows the welfare changes in 2025. Compared to 2035, the impacts are smaller. This is a 
direct consequence of the lower CO2 prices. The relative CO2 price increase between 2025 and 2035 
is higher for international carbon offsets than for the domestic CO2 levy. This is reflected in the 
relative welfare changes, i.e. the percentage increase of welfare losses between 2025 and 2035 is 
higher in the scenario Offsets than in the scenario Abate.  
The currently low prices for international offsets make it tempting to use imported abatement in-
stead of domestic abatement. With the assumed prices, a trajectory with a low, but increasing share 
of domestic abatement is attractive in the model. However, two aspects need to be considered:  
• Although an avoided ton of CO2 has the same effect on atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
regardless of the country of abatement, in climate policy domestic abatement is usually 
valued as the more important contribution. This may be a repercussion of the mediocre 
functioning of many international carbon markets as yet. It reflects as well the notion that 
only when all countries also contribute domestically, the necessary emissions reduction to 
comply with the so-called below 2 degree goal can ultimately be reached. 
• Once international carbon prices rise, it is not a simple endeavor to jump-start an aspiring 
domestic climate policy. There are considerable time lags in all phases of the energy transi-
tion, e.g. in policy design, political decision-making, pilot phases and implementation, as well 
as capital replacement cycles.  
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3.4.3 International crisis scenarios 
3.4.3.1 Abatement 
Increasing global fossil fuel prices by 50% is an (involuntary) CO2 abatement program. In 2025, the 
final year of the assumed crisis period, Swiss greenhouse gas emissions are 7% lower than in the 
reference case (see Figure 20). The “abatement program” is, however, a temporary one once that 
fossil fuel prices fall again. In 2035, GHG abatement relative to the reference case is only 0.5%. This 
picture may be overly pessimistic, because the model does not distinguish between different types of 
energy capital and thus underestimates the persisting effects of energy change.  
 
Figure 20: Composition of greenhouse gas emissions (Mt CO2-eq) 
In any case, even a 7% GHG abatement would not be enough to get anywhere near the emission 
reductions that Switzerland has pledged at UNFCCC COP21 in Paris. High global fuel prices might help 
to comply with climate policy goals, but even this is uncertain: When high crude oil prices are 
reported in the media, and these negatively affect the economy, it is usually not the best time for 
announcing ambitious climate policy.  
A disproportionate share of the abatement in 2025 originates from the decline in demand for natural 
gas, which is about 20% relative to the reference case. The reason for this is that, while crude oil has 
to be transported, refined and distributed, natural gas only needs to be transported and distributed. 
Thus, the impact of a 50% price increase for the primary energy carrier on prices of the final energy 
good is higher (see Figure 21). This change of relative prices to the disadvantage of natural gas 
triggers, relative to the reference case, substitution processes away from natural gas. Or rather: It 
slows down the substitution into natural gas which is observed in the reference case. This influence 
on substitution processes is unfortunate for climate policy, because natural gas has the lowest CO2 
coefficient among the fossil energy carriers. 
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Figure 21: Net fuel prices in the international crisis scenario LumpSum_F relative to the 
reference case (in%) 
All of the above (low abatement achieved, temporary nature of the abatement, undesired direction 
of substitution between fossil energy carriers) indicates that temporarily surging global fossil fuel 
prices cannot replace a well-designed and target oriented climate policy.  
3.4.3.2 Macroeconomic impacts 
Intertemporally, the international crisis scenarios exhibit a behavior that opposes that of the other 
scenarios. The losses in aggregate welfare are most pronounced in the periods 2020 and 2025, when 
high fossil fuel import prices are assumed (see Figure 22). The welfare costs in these periods are 
higher than in the domestic scenarios, at much lower abatement (see Figure 9 for comparison). This 
is, of course, a direct consequence of the deteriorated terms of trade which are inflicted on Switzer-
land via the global markets. Hence, we cannot choose between a domestic policy scenario and an 
international crisis scenario. We can, however, reduce dependence on fossil fuels and avoid a part of 
the terms of trade deterioration through carbon taxation. 
 
Figure 22: Aggregate welfare impacts of the international crisis scenarios relative to the 
reference case (in %) 
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A part of the detrimental macroeconomic effect of the international crisis scenarios persist until 
2035, because the weakened economic growth in 2020/25 reduces investment and thus future 
consumption (see Figure 23 and Figure 24). With a decrease in labor supply, and thus an increase in 
leisure, the impact on consumption of goods and services is again larger than the decline for 
aggregate welfare as a whole. Labor supply is, however, not very much affected: Relative to the 
reference case, the decrease never exceeds 0.2%. The larger impact on investment may partly be 
explained by the fact that capital intensive industries tend to have higher fuel costs. 
 
Figure 23: Investment relative to the reference case (in %) 
 
Figure 24: Consumption relative to the reference case (in %) 
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3.4.3.3 Distributional impacts 
Total redistributed revenues are much lower in the international crisis scenarios than in the domestic 
policy scenarios. This is due to the revenue being raised differently (through the income tax) and with 
much lower additional revenue (1 bio. CHF per year). While the distributed amounts are smaller, the 
redistribution patterns across households in the international scenarios resemble their domestic 
counterparts (see Figure 25 for 2025 and Figure 26 for 2035). The results indicate that much less than 
1 bio. of recycled revenues would be needed to offset regressiveness effects of the fuel price 
increase. 
 
Figure 25: Welfare changes relative to the reference scenario in 2025 (in %) 
As the macroeconomic cost is much lower in 2035 than in 2025, impacts are generally more favor-
able in 2035. By then, the scenarios predominantly become simulations of redistributive programs, 
which consist of raising additional income tax revenues of 1 bio. CHF in order to distribute the 
revenue lump-sum according to different social criteria. 
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Figure 26: Welfare changes relative to the reference scenario in 2035 (in %) 
 
3.4.4 Regional distribution of impacts 
One possible concern about carbon levies is that they could affect urban and rural households to 
different extents. Rural households are more likely to own a car and to drive larger distances with it. 
Living space per person tends to be larger in rural than in urban areas. Furthermore, densification is 
known to reduce energy demand for heating per residential unit. The hypothesis is thus that carbon 
levies affect rural more than urban households. 
To investigate this issue, we implement an alternative household aggregation. It distinguishes bet-
ween households residing in cities, in agglomerations, and in rural areas. Each of these categories is 
sub-divided into five classes according to economic standard of living (see sub-chapter 3.2.2). 
In the simulations, we have not found any evidence for relative disadvantages for rural households 
due to carbon levies. Indeed, the energy shares in total expenditure are very similar for rural and 
urban households. As can be expected, rural households spend roughly 50% more on transport fuels 
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more than this difference through a lower expenditure for heating fuels compared to inner city 
households (the respective shares are 2.1% vs. 3.1%). Differences in heating technologies are an 
important explanation for this: recently built single-family homes, which are rare in inner cities, are 
often equipped with heat pumps, sometimes with solarthermal installations or photovoltaics. 
Furthermore, the use of fire-wood in stove heatings is much more frequent in rural than in urban 
areas. Then again, district heating is more common in cities and agglomerations. However, the 
associated expenditure counts towards the shares provided above.  
The unimportant influence of the location on carbon levy impacts contrast with the importance of 
social patterns, which has already been described in sub-chapter 3.4.1. There is an indirect influence 
of social aspects on carbon levy impacts at different locations: Rural households have a likelihood of 
25% to belong to the household category with the lowest standard of living. This likelihood is 
significantly higher than in agglomerations (17.5%) or inner cities (19.4%). Thus, regressiveness of 
carbon taxes is a somewhat bigger issue for rural than for urban areas. On the other hand, our results 
show that using a small portion of the tax revenue for social cushioning will suffice to offset the 
regressiveness of the carbon levy.  
Given the above analysis, it is unnecessary from an economic point of view to especially address rural 
issues with carbon levies. Having said this, in the political arena perceived impacts dominate simulat-
ed impacts.  
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4 Public Acceptability 
4.1 Analysis of the environmental effectiveness of carbon taxes 
• See Annex 1: Baranzini, A. and S. Carattini, 2014. Taxation of Emissions of Greenhouse Gases. 
Freedman B. (Ed.), Global Environmental Change, Handbook of Global Environmental 
Pollution, Vol.1, 543-560, Springer. 
In a preliminary stage of the project, in parallel to the literature survey, we examined the empirical 
evidence on the environmental effectiveness of existing carbon taxes. We found that a number of 
studies point out that carbon taxes are effective as the theory predicts, provided that the policy is 
not designed in a way that allows for generous exemptions and exceptions. In addition, carbon taxes 
provide important local benefits, mainly driven by better air quality, which can represent a consider-
able share of abatement costs.  
Furthermore, we discuss how through time carbon taxes stimulate research and development, 
innovation and adoption of new technologies emitting less carbon. The empirical evidence based on 
the Porter Hypothesis suggests indeed a positive relationship between higher energy prices and the 
development of green innovation. This feature of carbon taxes and carbon pricing is generally 
underappreciated in many discussions about technological change and climate change, where pricing 
is downplayed as if innovation and diffusion subsidies were sufficient (see Baranzini et al. 2016, see 
Annex 2). We stress that carbon pricing and technology policy are largely complementary mecha-
nisms and should thus both be part of a climate policy package. 
Finally, we cover the issue concerning the possibility of a potential Green Paradox. While the empiri-
cal assessments of the Green Paradox are currently very rare, the theoretical analysis suggests that 
policymakers should carefully consider the potential reactions of fossil fuel suppliers to the an-
nounced future carbon tax paths. Yet, this by no means implies that carbon taxes should not be 
implemented to avoid counterproductive effects. On the contrary, carbon taxes should be imple-
mented taking into account the lessons from the Green Paradox literature, namely the risk that by 
anticipating extraction in reaction to a future policy tightening, fossil fuel producers can decrease the 
effectiveness of carbon taxes (weak version of the Green Paradox) or even lead to larger environ-
mental damages because of the cumulative effect of greenhouse gas emissions (strong version of the 
Green Paradox). 
4.2 Qualitative and quantitative analyses for the Canton of Geneva 
This part of the project aims at better understanding and explaining the observed delay in the 
implementation of carbon taxes and at highlighting the implications for policymaking in Switzerland. 
From an economic perspective, three reasons may explain this lag: 
1. First, countries may be free riding on the effort, if any, of other countries. This behavior 
would be fully rational in a (global) public good situation, as standard economic theory 
predicts. However, increasing evidence suggests that this explanation cannot be seen as 
complete, due to the role of social norms in social dilemmas as those resulting from the 
management of global commons (Carattini 2015; Carattini et al. 2015; Jordan et al. 2015; 
Ostrom 2009).  
 
48/68 
 
 
 
2. Second, carbon taxes may be ineffective. Yet, we mentioned above a set of empirical evi-
dence proving the effectiveness of carbon taxes, assuming proper design.  
3. Third, political economy reasons may provide an explanation for the lack of diffusion of 
carbon taxes.  
The latter explanation is explored in this project. The theoretical literature already identified lobbying 
from e.g. energy-intensive industries as a barrier to carbon taxes. For instance, Kirchgassner and 
Schneider (2003) emphasize the different political economy aspects related with the implementation 
of environmental taxes and identify the possible winners and losers among industries, politicians and 
bureaucrats. In practice, the power of lobbying has proven very powerful in avoiding possible energy 
taxes (cf. Rocchi et al. 2014) or in softening those that were eventually implemented (cf. e.g. Bruvoll 
and Larsen 2004; Godal and Holtsmark 2001; Lin and Li 2011; Spash and Lo 2012).  
However, lobbying from energy-intensive industries is probably not the only explanation for the 
lagging implementation of carbon taxes. Environmental taxes may also be unpopular among voters. 
The pressure of people disliking environmental taxes may be so strong to push politicians to abandon 
their proposed reforms (see e.g. the French case in Deroubaix and Lévèque 2006) or to reject the 
proposed reforms in a ballot (see e.g. the Swiss case in Thalmann 2004).   
Hence, this project aims at identifying drivers and barriers to the acceptability of carbon taxes. We 
analyze this question by collecting original data through three surveys in Geneva and in Switzerland. 
We discuss in 4.2.1 the qualitative analysis administered before the quantitative surveys that will be 
presented in 4.2.2 for the Geneva survey and 4.3 for the Swiss survey.  
4.2.1 Qualitative analysis  
• Annex 3: Baranzini, A., Caliskan, M. and S. Carattini, 2014. Economic prescriptions and public 
responses to climate policy, Haute école de gestion de Genève. Cahier de recherche No HES-
SO/HEG-GE/C--14/3/1--CH. Submitted for publication. 
To define the main issues and then the questions of the quantitative surveys, we first administer 
through semi-structured interviews a qualitative survey to a small and unrepresentative sample of 
about 40 adults living in the Canton of Geneva. The main findings are the following:  
1. First, private actions (e.g. improvements in energy efficiency) are preferred to public inter-
ventions to curb energy consumption and emissions. 
2. Second, when interviewers introduce explicitly the role of the public sector, the general 
opinion is to limit its intervention to communication and education (i.e. suasion). Market 
instruments are mentioned only by few respondents, and subsidies (e.g. for public transpor-
tation) are by large preferred to taxes. 
3. Third, interviewers face some resistance when they propose the implementation of a gener-
alized carbon tax. The main reasons are related to distrust in the government and a pre-
sumed ineffectiveness of carbon taxes in changing behavior. It follows that when they ask 
how tax revenues should be used, most respondents suggest keeping them in the environ-
mental domain.  
4. Fourth, social cushioning for low-income households is regarded as important, but the way of 
financing it should not be related to environmental tax revenues. 
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4.2.2 Quantitative analysis 
• Annex 4: Baranzini, A. and S. Carattini, 2016. Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: testing 
the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. Environmental Economics and Policy 
Studies, DOI 10.1007/s10018-016-0144-7 
We continued the investigation of carbon taxes acceptability with a survey administrated to more 
than 300 individuals approached in the streets of Geneva. Applying the insights from experimental 
economics, some respondents are requested at random to judge a potential “carbon tax”, while 
others a potential “climate contribution”. The literature already suggests several explanations for the 
reluctance of people to support energy and carbon taxes, also when they may be net winners. In 
general, people have a preference for progressive (or at least neutral) taxes, as shown by e.g. 
Brannlund and Persson (2012), Bristow et al. (2010) and  Kallbekken and Sælen (2011). They may also 
be concerned about competitiveness and employment effects (cf. Thalmann 2004). Another obstacle 
emphasized by the literature and barely addressed by policymakers is that people often do not 
conceive the difference between Pigouvian and Ramsey taxes (Kallbekken et al. 2011). Hence, people 
may fail to understand the incentive effect of environmental taxes and thus neglect any environ-
mental benefit from the new taxes unless revenues are explicitly earmarked (cf. the “issue-linkage” 
concept in Sælen and Kallbekken 2011). It follows that a frequent result in the literature is a high 
correlation between the perceived effectiveness of the environmental tax and its acceptability (cf. 
e.g. Bristow et al. 2010; Brouwer et al. 2008; Kallbekken and Sælen 2011; Sælen and Kallbekken 
2011). In this context, renaming the tax differently (“climate contribution” vs. “carbon tax”) can spur 
its acceptability (cf. Brannlund and Persson 2012; Kallbekken et al. 2011).   
Our analysis contributes to existing literature not only by confirming some of its stylized facts and by 
broadening their scope, but also by rejecting some other conventional wisdom. On the one hand, we 
confirm the high correlation between perceived effectiveness and acceptability. We also find that 
this correlation holds for the perception of co-benefits from carbon taxes, whose existence is often 
neglected by the people in the sample. Given the relative magnitude of co-benefits with respect to 
the abatement costs, this new result has important policy implications in terms of how climate policy 
could or should be marketed (see also OECD 2014).  
Our analysis confirms the role of earmarking revenues as a driver of higher acceptability, above all 
when revenues are earmarked for environmental purposes. It also describes how the need for ear-
marking revenues is related with the lack of trust in the government. Indeed, we show quantitatively 
that the correlation between perceived effectiveness and acceptability persists even if revenues are 
earmarked. That is, contrary to what is generally assumed (cf. e.g. Kallbekken et al. 2011), we find 
that perceived effectiveness increases acceptability even when revenues are earmarked for 
environmental purposes.  
We find that perceived effectiveness may matter for acceptability much more than the potential 
adverse distributional and competitiveness effects. In particular, we show that competitiveness 
effects may not necessarily be a concern for potential voters and that distributional concerns, 
although they represent an issue that people care about, may not be an obstacle for acceptability. 
This new evidence may have important policy implications: 
1. First, since we do not find a trade-off between effectiveness and competitiveness concerns, 
acceptability could be increased by targeting environmental effectiveness and renouncing 
to the exemptions to energy-intensive industries often granted for competitiveness rea-
sons. 
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2. Second, we highlight that regressive carbon taxes may not necessarily be unpopular. The 
society’s demand for equity could be met with other instruments.  
3. Thirdly, we provide evidence for an effect of the labeling treatment when revenues are 
earmarked. With the sample in this study, the maximal acceptability would be obtained 
with a climate contribution with revenues earmarked for environmental purposes. With 
respect to labeling, we thus extend to the field the laboratory evidence found in Kallbekken 
et al. (2011).   
The empirical approach described in this section suffers from three main limitations. All the limita-
tions are however addressed in the study at the national scale (see next section).  
The first concern is related with the external validity of the survey. Most of the insights presented 
here rely on the internal validity of the survey, with several questions being asked to the same par-
ticipants and with the label treatment being randomly allocated. Extrapolating the results obtained 
with this sample to a larger population would require them to be externally valid. Indeed, the sample 
is drawn from the Geneva population, which, even though does not differ dramatically from the rest 
of the country in terms of voting behavior on such issues, may possess different concerns from the 
average Swiss citizen. Furthermore, even assuming that the empirical results from this analysis can 
be extrapolated to the whole country, Switzerland may still represent a special case with respect to 
other developed countries, including its European neighbors, in particular concerning possible distri-
butional and competitiveness effects.  
The second concern is on the reliability of stated preferences. The most serious obstacle limiting the 
transposability of stated preferences to real-life decisions is the hypothetical bias, which implies that 
individuals may want to appear more pro-social and pro-environmental when they answer to survey 
questions than what they are in reality, since the decisions they take in surveys are not binding. 
Furthermore, real-life decisions such as voting may be also influenced by the media and lobbying. 
Future research can tackle these concerns by for instance analyzing voting behavior whenever the 
opportunity arises. While the vote that each individual casts cannot be observed, representative 
surveys can recover the ballot decisions and allow for comparison with the official data. Such surveys 
not only allow understanding the behavior and rationales of voters, but also those of the citizens that 
are entitled to vote, but choose not to (see e.g. Thalmann 2004). 
The third concern is related with the timing of the survey. Pressure from lobbies and media coverage 
increases when approaching a ballot or an electoral vote. Lobbying from energy-intensive sectors can 
in particular be very strong when it comes to vote on energy and carbon taxes (see Spash and Lo 
2012). Both lobbying and media coverage are shown to have an effect on people’s opinions on 
climate change and climate policy, along with other important events (Gallier et al. 2014; Jacobsen 
2011; Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui 2009). To anticipate what people would vote in a particular ballot, it 
would thus be ideal to administer the survey in a non-neutral period (Arrow et al. 1993). However, 
no non-neutral period was available at the time of the Geneva survey. But it was at the time of the 
national survey.  
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4.3 National survey 
4.3.1 Economic context 
On March 8th 2015 the Swiss population was asked to vote on a popular initiative from the Green 
Liberal party aiming at replacing the current value-added tax (VAT) with an energy tax.9 The Swiss 
government did not support the initiative and most other parties declared to be against it. In spite of 
the low probability of success of the initiative, the business organizations invested important efforts 
in a campaign emphasizing the limits of such proposal. 
The main arguments in favor of the initiative, as raised by the Green Liberals, were the following: 
1. Taxing dirty energy sources: allowing for a transition towards a more sustainable economy, 
by making renewable energy sources more competitive than dirty energies, without the need 
for additional subsidies. 
2. Ensuring fiscal neutrality: replacing a tax with another that ensures the same revenues for 
the government, and the same tax burden for citizens and firms. 
3. Helping consumers: consumers can save money on the VAT, while ecologically-friendly 
behavior is rewarded. 
4. Reinforcing the local economy: using more renewables implies an increased independence 
from oil producer states and gives incentives for green innovation in Switzerland. 
5. Saving on transaction costs: without the VAT, the reform would allow saving important ad-
ministrative costs to firms. 
The Swiss government shared most of these objectives. In February 2015 Switzerland was indeed the 
first country to submit a pledge to the UNFCCC pledge-and-review system in view of the COP21 in 
Paris. It pledged in favor of a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of 50% by 2030 with respect to 
1990 emissions. However, it criticized the decision to completely erase the VAT and replace it with an 
environmental tax, which is supposed to decrease energy consumption over time, and so reduce its 
own tax base. It also mentioned a series of concerns related with the competitiveness and distribu-
tional effects of the proposed reform. It did not propose a counter-proposal to be submitted to 
voters, but announced a gradual path towards higher energy prices with a climate tax starting from 
2021. 
The Swiss government challenged the capacity to finance in the future the important services cur-
rently funded by the VAT revenues – the main source of funding for the federal government – and 
mentioned in the debate a price of 5 francs per liter of gasoline to compensate for the fall in VAT 
revenues. This would have implied an increase in the price of gasoline of about 200%. This argument 
was rapidly appropriated by the political parties and organizations opposing the initiative, whose 
main arguments were the following: 
1. Unaffordable energy prices: exploding energy prices, e.g. 5 francs per liter of gasoline. 
  
                                                             
 
9 Another text was submitted to the population on the same day. It was a popular initiative of the Christian Democratic 
People's Party of Switzerland aiming at increasing fiscal exemptions for families with children. The initiative was rejected at 
75.4%. 
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2. Jeopardizing the funding of crucial government’s tasks: while the VAT represents a stable 
source of revenues, the energy tax rate would have had to be regularly increased (and so the 
price of energy) to keep revenues stable. 
3. Adverse competitiveness effects: the country’s prosperity at risk due to a loss in competitive-
ness. 
We consider that the last argument resonated particularly strongly in the specific period of the vote, 
which followed of only a few weeks the decision of the Swiss National Bank to drop its euro peg. The 
following appreciation of the Swiss franc was believed to be going to put under extreme pressure the 
many export-oriented sectors of the Swiss economy. 
The popular initiative was rejected at 92%. A few weeks after, the government announced its strate-
gy to meet the above-mentioned CO2 emissions abatement pledge, as well as to facilitate the 
planned phase out of nuclear energy. This strategy consists in higher taxes on electricity and heating 
fuels, while the precise tax rates are left to further discussion and dependent on the final objectives 
in terms of greenhouse gas emissions abatement. Gasoline is also expected to be taxed, but only 
after a period of adaptation. 
We exploit the specific context of this ballot and the debates following the presentation of the Swiss 
government’s energy strategy to administer the national survey in a non-neutral period. As part of a 
companion project, we also analyze the data from the VOX survey on this ballot.  
4.3.2 Survey setting 
It is particularly hard to observe real behavior (revealed preferences) as expressed in ballots. Even in 
Switzerland, ballots on energy taxes are relatively rare and voters express their opinion on a specific 
proposal. Previous research has shown the importance of the policy design (Bristow et al. 2010; 
Kallbekken and Aasen 2010; Sælen and Kallbekken 2011), and it is thus crucial to have information on 
different policy attributes and the combination thereof. The only way to obtain such information 
from a relatively large sample – that is, larger than what is usually available in the laboratory – is to 
rely on stated preferences. 
It is however possible to set a survey using a choice experiment design, making choices and trade-
offs the most realistic possible and thus reducing the hypothetical bias. In our choice experiment, we 
present all respondents with three potential choices: a carbon tax with a first design, a carbon tax 
with a second design, and the status-quo. The design of carbon taxes is dependent upon the combi-
nation of two attributes: the tax rate, measured in terms of Swiss francs per ton of CO2 emitted, and 
the use of tax revenues (see Table 8). Each respondent has to select one of the three options in 8 
different hypothetical ballots, with the attributes being randomly combined at each ballot. Respon-
dents are given one of the 15 randomly-generated versions of the questionnaire, depending on the 
language spoken. 
Table 8: Attributes 
Tax Rate (CHF/tCO2) 60 90 120 150 
Use of revenues Income tax 
rebates 
VAT 
rebates 
Lump-sum          
transfers 
Social 
redistribution 
Strengthening 
of the environ-
mental impact 
(offsets) 
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As all combinations included in the choice experiment previously entered the model simulations (see 
chapter 3), we are able to provide information to the respondents on the order of magnitude of the 
following impacts of each combination of tax rate and use of revenues: 
• Expected increase in the price of gasoline, diesel and heating fuel (in cents per liter, range of 
about 5 cents); 
• Expected reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (in percentage). Regardless of the use of 
revenue, a higher energy price in Switzerland is associated with lower emissions. When rev-
enues are used to strengthen the environmental impact of the policy, foreign offsets are 
purchased and we thus estimate the effect on greenhouse gas emissions abroad as well, 
relative to the emissions of Switzerland; 
• Expected impact on the overall purchasing power of Switzerland, based on a proxy for overall 
consumption (in percentage); 
• Expected impact on the overall purchasing power of low-income households (five categories 
from – to ++, scales in percentage provided to respondents in a separate note). 
We thus provide respondents with sufficient information for the most relevant variables that in the 
literature are shown to guide behavior, mimicking the effort that the government would (or at least 
should) do to inform the population in view of a ballot. The literature and our previous analyses also 
suggest that respondents may underestimate the effectiveness of carbon taxes while possibly over-
estimating the competitiveness and distributional effects, in particular in presence of lobbying from 
energy-intensive industries. In this setting, respondents are instead carefully explained the function-
ing and effects of carbon taxes. We expect this specific setting to lead to different results with 
respect to what most often found in the literature and possibly in our Geneva survey. We also give to 
respondents the possibility to reject all proposals, allowing us to measure not only the relative 
preferences for a given attribute, but also the overall likelihood that a carbon tax can ever become 
acceptable. 
We hired the agency Demoscope to administer the survey, which was structured as follows. First, a 
set of about 4’000 potential respondents were randomly selected and received by post mail the 
following material: 
• a letter presenting the study and encouraging potential respondents to become familiar 
with the issue and participate in the survey if called by phone, 
• a detailed one-page fact sheet explaining how carbon taxes work and the main implica-
tions of each recycling option, 
• the full set of choice cards for all 8 votes displaying the attributes and related  impacts of 
each choice. 
Second, a sub-set of the about 4’000 potential respondents is contacted and driven through the 
questionnaire, provided that she agrees to participate in the survey. When it comes to taking a 
decision on the ballots, all respondents are read a short and unique text describing the effects of 
each combination. This ensures that all respondents are provided with the same information, even 
those that did not spend time reading the material that they received at home. As many already 
“voted” at home as for postal vote, respondents were given the possibility to skip the oral explana-
tions and directly express their opinion selecting the most preferred choice between the two carbon 
taxes and the “none” option. 
As requested, the survey stopped when the quota of 1’200 nationally-representative respondents 
was reached. 
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4.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
The main descriptive statistics are provided in Table 9.  
Table 9: Nationally representative survey: summary statistics 
Variable    Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Gender (male) 0.486667 0.500031 0 1 1,200 
Age 51.71083 15.26269 18 94 1,200 
Nationality 0.896667 0.304521 0 1 1,200 
Household size 2.884167 1.332502 1 8 1,200 
Years of education 13.99164 2.938123 9 18 1,196 
Main transport mode 
Private vehicle 0.480687 0.499841 0 1 1,165 
Bicycle 0.162232 0.368822 0 1 1,165 
Bus 0.188841 0.391551 0 1 1,165 
Environmental concern and social preferences 
Global warming is very 
threatening  
0.400833 0.490272 0 1 1,200 
Global warming is 
somewhat threatening 
0.471667 0.499405 0 1 1,200 
Environment vs. growth 0.734167 0.44196 0 1 1,200 
Gradual carbon tax 0.635 0.481631 0 1 1,200 
Generalized trust 0.549036 0.497798 0 1 1,193 
Confidence in the 
government 
0.810009 0.392461 0 1 1,179 
Political preferences 
Participation in last 4 
ballots 
3.195305 1.235204 0 4 1,065 
Party at last elections      
UDC-SVP (& Lega) 0.232484 0.422753 0 1 628 
PS-SP 0.28344 0.451027 0 1 628 
PLR-FDP 0.175159 0.380406 0 1 628 
Center (PDC-PBD-PEV) 0.18949 0.39221 0 1 628 
Greens (& Green Lib.) 0.119427 0.324549 0 1 628 
Income 
<CHF 35’000 0.059561 0.236796 0 1 957 
CHF 35'000-50’000 0.144201 0.351477 0 1 957 
CHF 50'000-80’000 0.242424 0.428774 0 1 957 
CHF 80'000-120’000 0.304075 0.460255 0 1 957 
CHF 120'000-160’000 0.153605 0.360758 0 1 957 
CHF 160'000-200’000 0.047022 0.211797 0 1 957 
>CHF 200’000 0.049112 0.216214 0 1 957 
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4.3.4 Preferences for attributes and carbon taxes 
In this section, we assess the influence of each attribute on the individual decision to accept or not a 
carbon tax as proposed in the 8 ballots of our choice experiment.  
Based on the previous discussion, we formulate a set of hypotheses for the attributes in our study: 
[Hypothesis 1] Tax rate: We expect higher tax rates to lead to lower acceptability for carbon 
taxes, everything else equal. 
[Hypothesis 2] Revenue recycling: We expect acceptability to vary substantially depending 
on the use of fiscal revenues. We expect use of revenues for environmental purposes to in-
crease acceptability the most, followed by social cushioning addressing potential distribu-
tional effects. We expect lower acceptability with revenue-neutral recycling, as this approach 
(taxing here and reducing taxes elsewhere) is usually a criterion that the taxpayers do not 
request, nor probably understand. We do not have specific priors on the relative ranking 
within revenue-neutral recycling methods, i.e. income tax rebates, VAT reduction and lump-
sum transfers. 
Table 10 presents our first estimates. We display marginal effects from conditional logit for straight-
forward interpretation. Column (1) shows estimates for the full sample, i.e. 1189 individuals10.  
As expected, a higher tax rate is linked to a lower acceptability, everything else equal. However, the 
difference between 0 and 60 francs per ton of CO2 is relatively small in comparison with the other tax 
rates. Hence, in some situations, people might have preferred to select a carbon tax, with a moder-
ate tax rate, than no carbon tax at all. Given that at the time of the survey the tax rate was already 
fixed at 60 francs per ton of CO2, we did not include in the survey e.g. a 30 CHF tax rate.  
Based on the evidence from Table 10 we validate hypothesis 1. Furthermore, we note that except 
from 0 to 60 francs, the decrease of the acceptability coefficient is almost linear, suggesting that a 
well-shaped linear demand would be a good approximation for carbon taxes. This linearity allows 
speculating on the negative impact on acceptability of an extremely high rate, as the one suggested 
by the popular initiative promoted by the Green Liberals and rejected by the Swiss population. While 
promoters of and opponents to the popular initiative were disagreeing on the proposal's expected 
impact on energy prices, depending on the time horizon that they used in their campaigning, our 
most conservative computations suggest that in the short term the tax rate would have had to be of 
at least 300 CHF per ton of CO2. Figure 27 extrapolates linearly from the probabilities of success that 
we observe based on the tax rates proposed by the survey and predict the outcome of an initiative 
proposing a tax rate of 300 CHF per ton of CO2. For a like-to-like comparison, Figure 27 shows only 
the predicted likelihood of success if revenues were to be used as proposed by the Green Liberals. 
While interpreting any out-of-sample prediction always requires a lot of precaution, our extrapola-
tion provides support for the external validity of our choice experiment. At a rate of 300 CHF per ton 
of CO2 the predicted support is virtually zero, which is very close to the frequency of yes-vote 
                                                             
 
10 11 respondents did not answer to the vote questions. We treat them as missing values. To increase the reliability of our 
data, interviewers received explicit instructions preventing them from insisting to have an answer when respondents were 
unable to provide one. Most of these missing observations are related with people aged 60 and more. 
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received in the public ballot. That is, if anything, our choice experiment predicts less support than the 
ballot. 
Table 10: Nationally representative survey: Estimates from conditional logit 
    (1)   (2)   (3)     (4) 
Tax rate     
0 CHF (reference)     
60 CHF 
-0.0179 -0.0298 -0.0223 -0.0432* 
(0.0154) (0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0201) 
90 CHF 
-0.0515*** -0.0592*** -0.0558*** -0.0697*** 
(0.0153) (0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0205) 
120 CHF 
-0.107*** -0.122*** -0.108*** -0.122*** 
(0.0154) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0202) 
150 CHF 
-0.177*** -0.186*** -0.183*** -0.200*** 
(0.0157) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0207) 
Revenue recycling     
Income tax rebate (reference)     
VAT reduction 
-0.0132 -0.0104 -0.0152 -0.0162 
(0.0113) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0155) 
Lump-sum redistribution 
0.137*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.127*** 
(0.0117) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0156)  
Social cushioning 
0.144*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.135*** 
(0.0117) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0156) 
Environmental recycling 
-0.0209 -0.0289* -0.0244 -0.0555** 
(0.0131) (0.0140) (0.0136) (0.0179) 
Number of individuals 1189 1066 1114 650 
Number of votes 28536 25584 26736 15600 
Pseudo-R2 0.0342 0.0360 0.0351 0.0404 
 
However, a better outcome could probably have been possible with a different use of tax revenues. 
As the estimates show, reducing the current value added tax is not linked to any higher acceptability 
with respect to income tax rebates (the reference case, omitted due to multicollinearity). This result 
comes as expected and confirms our hypothesis on the low support for revenue neutrality. In this 
respect, it is important to recall that based on the modeling exercise, we do not find a double divi-
dend with these two ways to recycle revenues, the net effect on the domestic purchasing power 
being broadly as negative as with the other types of recycling. Hence, respondents informed about 
the potential beneficial effects of reducing distortionary taxes knew that they should not be expect-
ing a double dividend from lower income taxes, or a reduction in the value-added tax. 
We are however surprised by the estimates concerning lump-sum transfers, environmental recycling 
and to some extent social cushioning. The results that we provide for these variables are novel in the 
literature and deserve to be analyzed carefully. In particular, we find that lump-sum transfers and 
social cushioning are the most preferred options for recycling, while environmental recycling through 
the purchase of foreign offsets does not seem to obtain the support that it usually does. We have an 
explanation for all the three facts, all of them coming with very important policy implications.  
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Figure 27: Prediction with VAT recycling as in the Green Liberals' initiative 
We point to two complementary explanations for the relatively high acceptability of the lump-sum 
redistribution. First, the modeling exercise suggests moderate net gains for low-income households 
with lump-sum transfers. Only social cushioning does better, while the remaining types of recycling 
involve regressive effects. Respondents are informed about this fact and internalize the beneficial 
distributional properties of lump-sum redistribution. Second, respondents are informed that the 
current carbon tax on heating fuels is mostly redistributed through lump-sum transfers. This informa-
tion could have increased the legitimacy of this type of recycling. We highlight that our survey in 
Geneva shows that only a limited number of individuals were aware of the current heating fuel tax 
existing in Switzerland, and a smaller proportion is expected to have knowledge on the way revenues 
are redistributed (cf. Baranzini and Carattini 2016). Hence, our results support the choice of the Swiss 
Government to privilege full lump-sum redistribution in its Energy Strategy 2050. However, we stress 
that it will be crucial to inform the population on the reasons for this choice and in particular on the 
progressive effects of lump-sum transfers, possibly based also on empirical assessments on the many 
years of carbon tax on heating fuels and not only on analyses from modeling exercises. 
The most important result in Table 10 concerns the low demand for recycling fiscal revenues for 
environmental purposes. This result is at odds with most of the literature on the acceptability of 
environmental taxes (see Drews and van den Bergh 2015 for a review). In our opinion, the explana-
tion for this novel finding is twofold.  
First, we provide respondents with an estimate of the emission abatements due to carbon taxes. 
Interviewers were instructed on how to provide simple explanations on the price sensitivity of 
consumers and they reportedly had to use such information to answer the general public’s curiosity 
on the bases for the scenarios included in the choice cards. Hence, our survey addressed by construc-
tion one of the main obstacles to carbon taxes: perceived environmental ineffectiveness, which is the 
reason why people often ask fiscal revenues to be earmarked for environmental purposes. Since all 
carbon taxes in the survey are shown to be effective, and to the extent that the scientific credibility 
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of our study and institutions was not challenged, the main driver for the demand for environmental 
recycling is wiped out.  
Second, the demand for environmental recycling may not necessarily correspond to the most effec-
tive way of obtaining additional emission abatements as economists would interpret it. Even with our 
conservative estimate for the price of emissions on foreign carbon markets, we can have tremendous 
emission abatements with the revenue of a carbon tax between 60 and 150 francs per ton of CO2. All 
scenarios imply substantial negative emissions: even the lowest tax rate leads to abatement equiva-
lent to five times total Swiss emissions. At the current carbon price levels, it would be very tempting 
for policymakers to purchase many years of carbon neutrality and so achieve at an extremely low 
cost long-term pledges, such as “the balance” between emissions and removals by sinks. However, 
we understand that the respondents in our survey may wonder why compensating so much. The 
general public may also do not like the purchase of carbon credits in foreign countries and would 
prefer emissions to be abated at home. Indeed, people may have a preference for local investments, 
which provide a number of local co-benefits, and may also have ethical or practical reservations with 
respect to the use of offsets in general. There are many practical reservations in the case of carbon 
offsets, even though only a few of them concern withdrawing of emissions allowances from the 
carbon market as contemplated in our scenarios (see Conte and Kotchen 2010). Ethical reservations 
apply instead to all types of offsets. The main critiques challenge the commoditization of nature and 
the legitimization of carbon-intensive lifestyles that offsetting practices seem to provide (Anderson 
2012).  
Finally, we note that the relative effect of social cushioning does not completely surprise, given the 
low demand for environmental recycling through offsets. We also stress that distributional effects 
were made completely salient to respondents. Social cushioning was shown to provide the most 
progressive effects over all types of recycling, although lump-sum transfers perform similarly with 
moderate tax rates. 
Figure 28 extends the simulation of Figure 27 with the most popular recycling options, lump-sum 
recycling and social cushioning. As Figure 27 already showed, our choice experiment suggests that 
even with an extremely low tax rate recycling through VAT rebates could hardly provide a majority in 
favor of a carbon tax. With social cushioning, and especially lump-sum transfers, the picture is differ-
ent. While none of the two recycling options lead us to a majority with the tax rates considered by 
our survey, the prediction for recycling through lump-sum transfers suggests that anything below 60 
would be in principle acceptable. While we recall the necessary precautions in taking at face values 
such predictions, we stress how recycling modes can completely shift the demand for carbon taxes, 
possibly also beyond the required threshold to make them acceptable. Based on these findings, we 
reformulate hypothesis 2 as follows: 
[Hypothesis 2] Revenue recycling We expect acceptability to vary substantially depending on 
the use of revenues. In relative terms, we expect lower acceptability with revenue-neutral 
recycling, as revenue neutrality (taxing here and reducing taxes elsewhere) is an approach 
that the taxpayers probably generally do not request, nor understand. This is particularly 
true in the absence of an expected double dividend. Lump-sum redistribution can be associ-
ated to higher acceptability, provided that its progressive properties are made explicit. If 
distributional effects are salient, social cushioning and lump-sum redistribution can lead to 
higher acceptability. Recycling for environmental purposes may not be particularly demand-
ed, provided that the effectiveness of carbon taxes is guaranteed ex-ante. This effect may in 
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part be driven by the proposed type of environmental earmarking, such as the purchase of 
foreign carbon credits. 
 
Figure 28: Prediction with recycling as in the Green Liberals' initiative, with recycling 
through social benefits, and with recycling through lump-sum transfers 
4.4 Some lessons 
In the following lines we discuss some potential lessons from this chapter. We do this based on the 
two dimensions that are most relevant for the design of carbon taxes, namely the tax rate and the 
use of revenues. 
Tax rate 
We find that higher tax rates clearly imply lower acceptability. This recalls once again the sensibility 
of the general public’s preferences with respect to the cost of climate policy, above all when the 
latter is as salient as with carbon taxes. As pointed out in the literature, this reminds to policymakers 
the importance of the politics of small steps. In the specific case of Switzerland, we would suggest to 
first restore economic efficiency by introducing a tax rate for gasoline equal to the current tax rate 
for heating fuels and only in a second stage considering a tax rate increase.  Yet, we are aware that 
resistance to the taxation of heating fuels could be lower than for all fossil fuels as in our study. 
Several studies suggest that the acceptability for a given instrument increases when the instrument is 
in place. One reason for this is the limited effect on relative consumption: once the tax in place, 
people realize that their purchasing power compared to the other people is practically unchanged 
(Gowdy 2008; Howarth 2006). A second reason relates with the use of the generated fiscal revenues: 
revenue neutrality can increase acceptability ex-post, once people see that they are given some of 
the money back, provided that the redistribution is sufficiently salient. With full redistribution some 
households may even be net winners. Experiences with environmental taxes tackling local externali-
ties suggest that there may also be a third reason, linked to the generalized issue of perceived inef-
fectiveness. As discussed, the general public tends to underestimate the effectiveness of environ-
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mental taxes, especially absent any recycling for environmental purposes. However, if the effect of 
the policy is observable, people may review their beliefs ex-post, causing an important gap between 
perceived effectiveness (and acceptability) ex-ante and ex-post. Evidence in this sense has been 
provided for instance on pricing garbage by the bag in the quasi-experimental context of the Canton 
of Vaud’s forced adoption (Carattini et al. 2016). Based on this principle, Kallbekken and Sælen 
(2011) remind the importance of trial periods when new instruments are introduced (see also Cherry 
et al. 2014). Trials contributed for instance to the political support – expressed in the ballot of – to 
the Stockholm congestion charge. Trials might also have contributed to higher acceptability in 
Gothenburg, even though the policy was eventually rejected. In all cases trials play an informative 
role and allow minimizing the gap between perceptions on and the actual consequences of a given 
policy. 
Starting at a moderate price level would also reduce the opposition from energy-intensive lobbies. 
However, it is important that policymakers possess estimates of the potential competitiveness 
effects of carbon taxes. These are indeed likely to be small overall and should thus not be over-
emphasized. The general public is likely to be ready to give up a bit of economic growth, if they have 
no doubts on the environmental effectiveness of the measures that they are supporting. Competi-
tiveness effects on a few industries may be larger however.  Policymakers should not forget that the 
aim of incentive taxes is to redirect consumption and production towards more sustainable goods. 
While carbon leakage is an issue – depending on the realization of Paris’ pledges – it would be naïve 
not to consider that a transition toward a more sustainable economy does require the dirty activities 
to reinvent themselves or to go out of business. 
Recycling 
As expected, we find that revenue-neutral recycling through VAT is not the way to go to maximize 
acceptability. We are not surprised by this result, also in the light of the outcome of the March 8th 
ballot. However, all other findings come with original policy implications. In particular, our findings 
support the decision of the Swiss government to choose a full lump-sum recycling in the future 
extension of the current carbon tax on heating fuels to all fuels. Nevertheless, policymakers should 
be reminded of the important effort that we did to reduce the informational gap between the 
general public and economists.  
We provided respondents with clear, extensive, but concise information on how carbon taxes work, 
on the mechanisms through which higher energy prices lead to lower energy consumption – 
including scenarios for emission abatements – and on the distributional effects of each type of 
revenue recycling for any given tax rate. While doing this, we aimed at reproducing the informative 
booklets that the Swiss government prepares in view of all upcoming ballots. However, scenarios and 
quantitative assessments are often absent in the real informative booklets provided by the Swiss 
government. We believe that explaining how lump-sum redistribution works and how it can be 
progressive will be a first step in favor of higher acceptability for the proposed generalized tax on all 
fuels. We recall that the awareness on the current carbon tax and its redistributive mechanism is 
surprisingly low as measured by the Geneva-based survey. We note that the demand for progressive 
effects depends on how salient distributional effects are. Lump-sum transfers seem to be an 
administratively simple and fair way of ensuring revenue neutrality. Marketing them as such is very 
likely to positively contribute to their popularity. Providing additional information in the healthcare 
bill through which the refund takes place may also help increasing awareness about lump-sum 
recycling. 
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Based on our results, we expect that providing figures for the estimated emission abatements will 
improve acceptability and decrease the demand for environmental recycling. In this case, it will be 
important to explain to the population how the incentive effect works. The credibility of the scientific 
community may play a role in this context. We also indicate the importance of stressing the existence 
of co-benefits for the local population. The use of specific labeling reminding the necessity to con-
tribute to climate change mitigation may also foster political support for climate policy, as shown in 
the Geneva-based survey (cf. Baranzini and Carattini 2016). In this respect, the decision of the Swiss 
government to rename its CO2 levy “climate levy” should increase its acceptability.  
We note that any future plans of purchasing foreign carbon credits should take into account the pos-
sible political barriers. Economic efficiency supports foreign abatement, and a future integration of 
carbon trading markets at the worldwide scale may provide the necessary acceleration in the transi-
tion towards a low-carbon economy, as suggested by Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. In spite of the 
efficiency rationales, resistances may however occur and the Swiss government should start already 
now to build consensus in favor of integrated carbon markets and financial funds transferring re-
sources from high- to low-income countries. The Swiss government should also play an active role in 
fixing the weaknesses of the current schemes, in particular the room for abuse in the Joint Imple-
mentation framework (see Schneider and Kollmuss 2015) and the potential perverse effects at the 
country level of the Clean Development Mechanism (see Tirole 2012). 
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5 Conclusions 
Surveys and economic analysis yield very different results concerning the desirability of environ-
mental tax reforms and their preferred design. The general public is skeptical about such tax reforms, 
especially about their environmental effectiveness. Most economists are still convinced of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of such reforms. These desirable properties are also confirmed by our 
CGE simulations.  
In democracies, the policy preferences of decision-makers and voters should stand above the view of 
“technocrats”. At the same time, informing the public and elected officials about scientific findings is 
a significant part of the policy-making process. Also, the administration has a crucial role in designing 
the details of policies and should thus be informed about which policy instruments work in practice 
(i.e. evidence-based policy-making).  
A common argument by both the public and many economists against environmental tax reforms is 
that they have regressive distributional consequences: The argument goes that poor people spend a 
higher share of their income on energy and profit less from tax cuts. The international literature 
shows that this may well be the case, but that composition of income effects can reverse this effect 
(Oladosu/Rose 2006). In some countries or regions, even the CO2 tax itself may be progressive (see 
Beck et al. 2015 for British Columbia).  
In Switzerland, there is indeed a reduction of the share of energy in consumption with income. Thus, 
CO2 levies in Switzerland tend to be regressive from a composition of consumption point of view. 
Pure tax reforms are even more regressive through the tax reductions, if they benefit higher-income 
households more. This is especially pronounced when marginal income tax rates are lowered propor-
tionally, as in our scenario IncTax. Social cushioning through tax reform thus requires more than just 
proportional rate reductions, e.g. higher basic allowances. 
It is doubtful, however, whether this direction of reform will sound convincing to citizens. In general, 
they tend to favor subsidies over taxes, following the idea that – rather than taxing emissions – 
environmentally friendly behavior should be rewarded. To the vast majority, the purpose of recycling 
the revenues of an environmental tax through other tax cuts seems unclear. If this is what we 
wanted, why would we raise another tax in the first place? 
There is a point in this latter argument even from an economic point of view. The discussion on 
multiple dividends of environmental tax reforms mixes different objectives, which does not appeal 
much to citizens. Indeed, mixing objectives usually does not appeal to economists either. Following 
the Tinbergen rule, most economists reiterate that every objective should be addressed with its own 
policy instrument. While one can argue that raising one tax and lowering another one are two sepa-
rate instruments, combining these two measures into one reform (e.g. replacing the value added tax 
through an energy tax, as proposed by the popular initiative defeated in March 2015 in Switzerland) 
is not as compelling as some environmental economists might suggest. One important reason for this 
is that, in most cases, the non-environmental dividends could be achieved in other ways. The fact 
that they haven’t been reaped may be due to their low position on the political agenda. This lack of 
perceived urgency makes it unlikely that promoting the respective dividend creates major public 
support. It is particularly difficult to excite any non-economist with arguments about reduced excess 
burden of taxation when non-economists don’t know what this is or why excess burden of taxation 
would be a relevant category at all. They might at most accept that a tax with disproportionally high 
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administrative costs is repealed by the environmental tax reform, but this tax must be well chosen, 
as the resounding failure of the popular initiative "Replacing the value added by an energy tax" has 
shown. 
Social objectives find more sympathy. In accordance with the second fundamental theorem of wel-
fare economics, our simulations show that (almost) any distributional goal can be attained with 
customized lump-sum transfers. While, in reality, the precision of targeting may be limited, there are 
many instruments to aim at preferred distributional outcomes, such as child benefits, old age pen-
sions, or per capita lump-sum payments through health insurance.  
Inferring from existing policies, the correction of the primary income distribution does not seem to 
be a major priority in Swiss politics, although for some cantons this may be different. The household 
data reveal that the current tax system in Switzerland is not significantly progressive overall when 
social security contributions and health insurance premiums are taken into account. The specifics 
depend on the canton. The AHV/AVS old age pensions system has important social components. 
Having children, however, clearly increases the likelihood of having a low equivalent income and 
standard of living.  
Reforms, e.g. of the taxation for married couples, have repeatedly failed, partly because benefits to 
one group imply losses for other groups or burden public budgets. As there is no efficiency dividend 
for environmental tax reforms with lump-sum revenue recycling, the losers vs. winners problem 
remains. This problem also concerns economic sectors, with e.g. transport, gas and oil industries as 
predictable losers. With federalism, even revenue and expenditure shifts between public entities can 
be an issue.  
Currently, two thirds of the revenue of the CO2 levy on heating fuels are redistributed to households 
(lump-sum per capita) and firms (proportional to paid wages). This has apparent advantages: 
• Acceptance could be raised, because everyone receives an equal amount and thus benefits from 
the recycling. Unfortunately, awareness among households for the redistribution of revenues 
from the CO2 levy is very low. 
• Our simulations show that per capita lump-sum recycling makes CO2 levies clearly progressive. 
• The revenue recycling is automatic, which makes it possible to claim that there is no increase in 
the public budget. In contrast to this, raising CO2 levies to finance social or environmental pro-
grams may face resistance due to the expansion of government activity and administrative costs, 
among other things.  
The disadvantage of lump-sum recycling is the efficiency loss in comparison with pure tax reforms. 
We can confirm, however, the result of Imhof (2012), that the foregone improvement in excess bur-
den is rather small, especially when very regressive variants (recycling through income taxes) are not 
an option anyway.   
The remaining third of Swiss CO2 levy revenues is earmarked for CO2-reducing measures (buildings 
program and technology fund). We find that environmental earmarking clearly obtains the highest 
acceptance rates of any recycling variant. To many citizens it seems obvious that, as a CO2 levy has an 
environment and climate related purpose, this is also what the revenues should be used for – also 
because they doubt the environmental effectiveness of a CO2 tax.  
It is a major challenge to design such environmental recycling in an efficient and effective way. Effi-
ciency highly depends on the policy instruments chosen: Would investment and technology choices 
be taken politically or largely by private investors? What would be the transaction costs e.g. of pro-
gram implementation and monitoring?  
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When fossil fuel combustion is reduced, there are sizable secondary benefits, especially from health 
improvements due to lower air pollution (see e.g. Ecoplan 2012b), which need to be taken into 
account. Thus, CO2 levies with environmental revenue recycling could be an attractive option under 
welfare considerations as well, provided that they are designed in such a way that they are as effi-
cient as possible and effective in reducing fossil fuel use. How many programs fulfilling these require-
ments are conceivable, and what would be their maximum reasonable size? The existing CO2 com-
pensation schemes (e.g. Klik, EnAW, Cleantech) sometimes have difficulties to delineate between 
mutual projects, which could indicate size limits for domestic CO2 compensation schemes.  
Next to the current recycling through the buildings program and the technology fund, the feed-in 
tariffs for electricity from renewables sources could be expanded. This seems to be a favored option 
for many citizens: Supporting renewables is the single most given answer for recycling preferences 
when no preselected list of options is provided. It has to be kept in mind, however, that today many 
projects fail to come into existence due to long and complicated approval procedures. It remains still 
open how courageous we will be in practice when it comes to reshaping the energy system. Certain-
ly, trying to spend resources for programs which are obstructed through other channels would not 
yield the desired outcome.  
Buying international greenhouse gas emission offsets, e.g. allowances from the European emissions 
trading system, is yet another option. At current and currently projected prices, this is a cheap way to 
offset Swiss emissions. With ambitious domestic abatement objectives, it is not unrealistic to use 
revenues from the CO2 levy to offset total Swiss emissions several times, although at a significant 
cost in terms of domestic consumption and welfare. Replacing domestic abatement by imported 
offsets could be a cheap option, but secondary benefits of domestic abatement as well as inter-
national commitments need to be taken into account. The internationally communicated domestic 
greenhouse gas abatement objective for 2030 is -30% with respect to 1990. Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether buying foreign emission offsets is the type of ecological earmarking which 
many citizens would like to see.  
In summary, environmental motivation is the much stronger argument for environmental tax reform 
than efficiency improvements for the tax system. The latter argument is understood by few, while 
using revenues of environmental levies for environmental purposes appeals to many, even though it 
is a challenge to design additional environmental programs which are sufficiently efficient. Reserving 
a share of the revenues for lump-sum recycling can address social concerns. When environmental 
programs are financed with revenues from the CO2 levy, this could relieve other sources of financing. 
Provided that these savings are passed on to citizens, tax cuts could result in the end, which – to 
please also the neoclassical economists – would enhance efficiency of the reform. 
As  environmental motivations are key to the acceptance of carbon taxes, it helps to inform the pub-
lic about the positive effects of CO2 levies: they are effective in reducing emissions, there are sizeable 
domestic co-benefits of abatement, and at the same time the effects on international competitive-
ness are smaller than usually perceived. Revenue recycling needs to be advertised much more than 
through the existing small note in Swiss health care bills, which remains unnoticed by many citizens. 
For instance, personal annual reimbursement checks have proven to be effective in raising the ex-
post acceptance with existing green tax schemes. Generally, acceptance of environmental tax reform 
tends to be higher ex-post than ex-ante. Communicating well the advantages of the reform is espe-
cially effective in this respect. 
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Introduction
The United Nations (UN) Earth Summit, held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro,
oriented the international negotiations towards the stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system (see UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change). Later on, greenhouse gas emissions were regulated for a set of
industrialized countries, through the Kyoto Protocol. However, recent data indicate
that CO2 emissions, the main anthropogenic greenhouse gas, are still growing at the
global level, although in some countries mitigation efforts have produced
significant results. There is evidence (see, e.g., UNEP 2011) that it will be
particularly difficult to decrease emissions enough to avoid an increase of global
mean temperature above 2 C preindustrial temperatures in the twentieth century,
a benchmark considered by many as necessary to avoid very costly adaptation (see,
e.g., EU Climate Change Expert Group 2008). Hence, more efforts are needed to
curb the global level of emissions and tackle climate change. Often, carbon taxes
have been advocated by economists as an effective and potentially efficient
instrument for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, their application in
the real world remains relatively seldom. Only recently, several countries have
implemented taxes based on carbon or CO2 content, with of course wide differences
in the design, the tax rate, and the targeted products. Presently, we are aware of
11 countries having implemented a carbon/CO2 tax (Australia, Denmark, Finland,
Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland).
The precursors were the European Nordic countries, with Finland as the first
country introducing a tax explicitly targeting CO2 in 1990.
In this paper, we concentrate on the environmental impact of carbon taxes. Of
course, carbon taxes can be assessed based on other criteria, such as their impact
on households, on competitiveness, or on growth (see, e.g., Baranzini et al. 2000).
The structure of the paper is the following. Section“What Kind of Emission
Taxes?” discusses the main practical characteristics of carbon taxes.
Section “Environmental Impacts” analyzes the environmental performance of
carbon taxes, by highlighting their impact on technology, overall emission path,
and emissions of other pollutants. Section “Summary and Conclusions” summa-
rizes and concludes.
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Definition
Economic instruments used in climate policies can be divided into price or
quantity instruments. Emission trading programs are quantity instruments, since
the initial amount of permits corresponds to the emission target. Permit trading in
organized markets or by individual negotiation determines then their price.
With emission taxes, the environmental authority administratively determines the
price of emissions, and then emitters adapt their behavior. Therefore, emission
trading programs determine with certainty the amount of emissions (provided
that full compliance is ensured), while the price paid by emitters is unknown
a priori and it changes depending on market conditions. With emission taxes, the
cost to emitters is known and stable, while emissions are a priori unknown and
change based on technological conditions (e.g., variations in abatement costs),
number of emitters, and general macroeconomic situation. Those uncertainties
determine the economic efficiency of the instrument, as discussed in the seminal
paper by Weitzman (1974) and applied in the climate policy context by
Pizer (2002).
Since climate change is a global environmental problem, in theory, an emission
tax has to cover each emitter and to impose a charge per unit of greenhouse gas
released, which equates marginal abatement costs worldwide (for a conceptual
discussion of global environmental taxes, see, e.g., Thalmann 2012). It could
even be coupled with a sequestration tax credit, to take advantage of sometimes
lower abatement costs in forestry. To achieve economic efficiency, the tax
rate has to correspond to the marginal external costs from climate change, at the
optimal abatement level (“Pigouvian” tax). Rising costs of damages from the
accumulation of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere would thus imply an
increasing tax rate over time. Since efficiency is reached with this tax design, the
use of the generated fiscal revenues is completely independent from the climate
target and can thus be used for other purposes. However, in practice, emission taxes
are often conceived far away from the theoretically ideal design. Moreover, the use
of generated fiscal revenues (i.e., revenue recycling) may affect the acceptability of
emission taxes. Of course, the farther away from theoretical considerations, the
least the tax is efficient and cost- and environmentally effective. In what follows,
we briefly discuss the basic features defining emission taxes in practice, i.e., the tax
base, objective and tax rate, exemptions, and revenue recycling.
The tax base defines different types of emission taxes. We are unaware
neither of a tax whose base is greenhouse gas emissions nor of an international
emission tax. Therefore, the emission tax closer to the theoretical model is
a carbon or CO2 tax, applied at the national level. A carbon tax is a charge to
be paid on each energy vector, proportional to the quantity of carbon emitted
when it is burned. A CO2 tax is a unit tax, specified per ton of CO2 emitted.
It can easily be translated into a carbon tax, by knowing that a ton of carbon
corresponds to 3.67 t of CO2.
In addition to emission taxes, there are other taxes that affect emissions.
In particular, an energy tax depends on the quantity of energy consumed and is
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specified in some common unit (like in barrels of oil equivalent or in British thermal
units, BTU) measuring the energy content of fuel. Therefore, contrary to a carbon or
CO2 tax, an energy tax also covers nuclear and renewable energy, unless they are
exempted. Moreover, since oil and gas have greater heat contents for a given
amount of CO2 emissions compared to coal, an energy tax implies a greater charge
on oil and gas than a carbon tax. Other existing taxes are charged to specific energy
products and have an impact on emissions, but their tax base is smaller and the tax
rate is on the physical quantity of the product (e.g., on € per liter). Nordhaus (2010)
proposed an international tax on fossil fuel consumption. In the same vein, although
often for reasons unrelated to climate policies, several countries possess gasoline
taxes and taxes on energy sales (excise duties), sometimes per unit, other ad
valorem. Therefore, countries implicitly tax greenhouse gas emissions, even in
the absence of explicit emissions taxes. Of course, the smaller the tax base com-
pared to the sources of greenhouse gases, the lower the impact on emissions, for
a given tax rate.
Another feature determining the performance of emission taxes is its objective,
which then contributes in determining the tax rate. Since marginal climate
change external costs are difficult to assess, the optimal abatement target cannot
be determined and thus true Pigouvian taxes are not implemented (see Baumol and
Oates 1971). Given that emission taxes distribute abatement efforts depending on
marginal abatement costs, they can be used to achieve a given abatement target at
the lowest global cost (cost-effectiveness). If this is the objective, then the tax
rate has to be set high enough to modify emitters’ behavior so that the emission
target is reached. However, since abatement costs are not known by the
environmental authority, recent legislations generally set a maximum tax rate and
then let the authority modify it depending whether the emission target is achieved
or not. The tax rate has then to be continuously adjusted, in particular to
account for changes in the number of emitters, energy efficiency improvements,
changing possibilities for fuel substitution, and availability and cost of backstop
technologies. The cost-effectiveness approach has the advantage that it requires
only cost-minimizing firms and does not need strong assumptions such as profit
maximizing and perfectly competitive firms, i.e., it applies to more realistic
conditions.
Instead of cost-effectiveness, sometimes the stated objective of the emission
tax is purely financial, i.e., to collect an amount of money that can then be used to
finance abatement activities. This approach is of course not cost-effective, but
can be more politically acceptable. Some countries proposed, for instance, to
implement an international CO2 tax with a relatively low rate, but whose receipt
could be used to finance mitigation and adaptation measures (e.g., see the Swiss
proposal at the Bali Conference).
The tax rate level is influenced by the emission tax objective but also by possible
exemptions granted to some emitters. Of course, for a given abatement or fiscal
target, more exemptions mean higher tax rates for submitted emitters. Exemptions
or tax rebates may be granted to some firms or sectors because of competitiveness
fears, e.g., export-oriented or relatively mobile firms. Low-income households
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could also be exempted or submitted to a lower tax rate, although it would be
administratively more cumbersome. Even though those considerations could
decrease relocation of economic activities or be justified for distributive reasons,
exemptions are not the most cost-effective mean to reach a given abatement target.
Indeed, cost-effectiveness demands a unique carbon price to all emitters.
Competitiveness or distributional concerns are thus more effectively treated by
using the generated fiscal revenues or a set of complementary policies (e.g., social
cushioning, carbon-motivated border tax adjustments).
From our discussion above, we observe that the management of the generated
fiscal revenues is central in many aspects of carbon tax implementation. There are
four main ways to use the generated fiscal revenues: earmarking to a specific
activity (environmental or not), redistribution to an economic agent (household or
firm), reduction of another tax (e.g., on labor or on capital), and not earmarked, i.e.,
to the general budget. Depending on use, the generated fiscal revenues could thus
increase acceptability and environmental effectiveness, decrease distributive
impacts, or even reduce inefficiencies in the general fiscal system.
Environmental Impacts
General Considerations
This section surveys the environmental impacts of existing emission taxes.
We are thus not presenting ex ante studies which are used, e.g., to determine the
tax rate necessary to achieve a given emission target or to simulate the impacts of
a hypothetical emission tax. In addition, we focus mainly on empirical analyses
based on real data, because ex post studies that assess the impact of emission
taxes through simulations of the “counterfactual” (the level of emissions that
would have been achieved without taxes) should be considered with caution
(see below). The assessment of environmental performance has to account for the
induced emission abatements in the short term, but also the more indirect longer-
term impact of emission taxes, through, e.g., the associated technological changes
and firms’ adaptation to new incentives. Moreover, it is necessary to consider three
additional dimensions. First, emission taxes reduce other pollutants, in addition to
greenhouse gases. Therefore, there are supplementary benefits associated with
emission taxes (“secondary or co-benefits”). Second, since there is no worldwide
emissions tax, a carbon tax implemented in a country influences trade flows or
encourages activities to relocate and thus increase emissions in other regions
(“geographical carbon leakage”). As a result, the net impact of the tax on global
carbon emissions may be lower (see, e.g., De Melo and Mathys 2010 for a detailed
survey). Third, climate policy may have an impact on the extraction path
of resource owners, eventually leading to a different timing of emissions (“inter-
temporal carbon leakage”; see the “Green Paradox” in section “Counterproductive
Carbon Taxes? The Green Paradox” below). In addition to those dimensions, we
note that the practical features of implemented emission taxes make it difficult to
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precisely assess their impact. Indeed, they are often only one instrument in
a package of policy measures aimed at reducing emissions. Their implemented
design is often difficult to model, since they possess several exemptions
and exceptions, in particular to energy-intensive industries or to industries
facing international competition. Moreover, they are often part of a general
fiscal reform, which replaces other taxes on energy and reduces the share of
traditional taxes (e.g., on labor and capital). Finally, the generated fiscal revenues
may be used to finance abatement activities and technologies or environmental
projects.
Assessment of Emission Reductions
Supply and demand price elasticities are central in the environmental effectiveness of
emission taxes, because they determine emitters’ behavioral changes. Suppliers’
response can eventually lead to “inter-temporal carbon leakage,” i.e., the displace-
ment of emissions through time. In addition, the point of imposition, the entry of new
polluters, tax exemptions, and the use of the generated fiscal revenues are other
factors contributing to the environmental performance. As noted by Baranzini
et al. (2000), there are several methodological difficulties to assess the specific
features of implemented emission taxes and to consider the different dimensions
determining the empirical assessment of their environmental impacts. It is thus not
surprising that the majority of studies in the literature base their conclusions
on projections from scenarios, based on either top-down or bottom-up studies. The
meta-analysis of Patuelli et al. (2005) reviewed specifically this literature, but related
to the impact of environmental tax reforms more in general. By analyzing 61 studies
comprising a total of 186 simulations, Patuelli et al. (2005) find that the studies
projected an average CO2 reduction of 9.7 % due to environmental tax reforms, with
studies in a short-term frame showing an impact of 6 %, while those in a longer term
about 13 %, with notable differences depending on regions. As anticipated, those
results have to be interpreted with caution, since in several studies the emission
reduction levels are chosen a priori. In addition, econometric simulations suffer
a series of other drawbacks (for a discussion, see, e.g., Speck et al. 2006; Andersen
2010. Furthermore, the scope of meta-analyses can be limited by the comparability of
taxes in terms of design and size.
Only a few studies use an empirical approach based on real data. Among them,
Lin and Li (2011) deal with methodological issues and in particular with
endogeneity (endogeneity may lead to biased results and has thus to be accounted
for. In our context, the main source of endogeneity is the reverse causality between
policy and emissions. Estimations of the impacts of a climate policy on emissions
have to consider that higher levels of emissions may lead to more stringent
policies). They use a difference-in-difference approach to compare the emissions
per capita of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway, before and
after the introduction of a carbon tax. As a control group, they used similar
European economies, but which have not implemented carbon taxes. They find
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a significant effect of carbon taxation for Finland only, whose impact corresponds
to a reduction of 1.7 % in the growth rate of CO2 per capita, compared with the case
in which the countries would have followed an emission path without carbon tax, as
in the control group. According to Lin and Li (2011), the nonstatistically significant
result for the other countries is mainly due to the important tax exemptions to
energy-intensive sectors. This analysis is partly corroborated by Bruvoll and Larsen
(2004), who analyze the impact of carbon taxes on CO2 emissions in Norway, over
the period 1990–1999. Norway is a country with relatively high-carbon tax rates in
some specific sectors (e.g., US$ 51/t CO2 for gasoline in 1999), but several
activities are submitted to lower rates or exempted (e.g., cement production). The
authors use a multisectoral model to compare emissions with (based on real data)
and without carbon taxes (“the counterfactual”). They find that carbon taxes reduce
emissions by 2.3 %, mainly through an increase in energy efficiency and change in
energy mix, while impact on scale is negligible. Given the relative high tax rates,
the authors maintain that the impact would have been much greater, if emissions in
sectors expected to be great contributors to emissions were not exempted. For the
same country, Godal and Holtsmark (2001) show that the exempted sectors would
face an average decline in operating profits from 17 % to 22 % if the privileged CO2
exemption regime would end. The Norwegian failure to extend the tax base to the
exempted industries shows that increasing the level of existing taxes on emissions
may be politically more feasible than including additional emission sources. If the
goal is to achieve an emission abatement target cost-effectively, the lesson may thus
be to start with low taxes and a broad taxation base rather than high taxes on some
sectors and complete exemptions on others (Godal and Holtsmark 2001). Of course,
for the tax to be environmentally effective, all the submitted sectors have to be
sensitive to energy prices. Indeed, in a study on a panel of (mainly) energy-
intensive industries in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, Enevoldsen et al. (2007)
show that with the exception of natural gas and electricity (whose long-term
elasticity is between 0.10 and 0.28 in the three countries), all energy inputs
are to a significant extent sensitive to energy/carbon taxes (elasticity between0.42
and 0.62). Given the low tax elasticity of electricity, the authors encourage
policymakers to target the electricity mix and to reduce the relative carbon content.
Moreover, cross-price elasticities show some evidence of substitution between coal
or oil and electricity. Considering broader input aggregates, Enevoldsen
et al. (2007) find that the energy input has a tax elasticity in the range of 0.35
to 0.44 for the three countries. This implies that energy/carbon taxes not only
affect the energy mix but also decrease energy consumption. In addition, the study
finds positive cross-price elasticity between labor and energy, which means that
energy/carbon taxes induce a switch from energy-intensive to labor-intensive
sectors (see e.g., EEA 2011a).
Concerning the impact of existing product taxes on emissions, there is a huge but
more general literature on price elasticity of gasoline consumption (vs. emissions).
A number of surveys provide summaries of results on gasoline demand elasticities,
such as Graham and Glaister (2002). These traditional literature surveys are
complemented by meta-analyses. Brons et al. (2008) perform a meta-analysis on
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a dataset composed by 312 elasticity estimates from 43 primary studies. The
estimates of the short-run price elasticity of gasoline demand fall between 1.36
and 0.37 and are in general lower in absolute value than the long-run estimates,
which fall between2.04 and0.12. The mean price elasticity of gasoline demand
is0.34 in the short run and 0.84 in the long run. Brons et al. (2008) also identify
the characteristics driving different results. They show in particular that the USA,
Canada, and Australia display a lower price elasticity, that price elasticity increases
over time, and that time-series studies and models with dynamic specification report
lower elasticity estimates (in absolute value) than the general sample. Generally,
price elasticities are lower than the corresponding values of income elasticities both
in the short and in the long run (see Graham and Glaister 2002; Sterner 2007).
Applied to emission taxes, this would imply that the (real) tax rate would have to
grow faster than income, to offset the increase in consumption due to an income
growth (but this could lead to a “Green Paradox”; see below). Compared to other
policy instruments, Austin and Dinan (2005) show that fuel taxes are superior to
standards, because they allow for both short-term (e.g., driving less) and long-term
adjustments (e.g., replacing the vehicles fleet) (see also Sterner 2007). More recent
works address specifically the impact of taxes on gasoline consumption and, in
some cases, on emissions. Results of this literature point out that carbon taxes could
have a specific impact on emissions. For instance, Davis and Kilian (2011) use
a range of econometric techniques to assess the potential impact that a carbon tax
could have in the USA, by estimating the impact of past variations in gasoline tax.
They note that the resulting reductions in carbon emissions may not grow propor-
tionately as linear econometric models predict and that tax elasticity is much larger
than price elasticity, maybe because the price variations due to the tax are perceived
as more permanent by consumers. According to their preferred model, a 10-cent
increase in gasoline tax would imply a short-term reduction in US carbon emissions
of about 0.5 %. The fact that consumers’ reaction depends on the source of price
variation is a consistent finding in the literature. For instance, Baranzini and
Weber (2013) find that in Switzerland an increase in the existing mineral oil tax
decreased gasoline demand by about 3.5 %. Therefore, this study shows that an
increase in the tax has two distinct impacts, both of which decrease demand: first,
the price increase itself, then an additional reaction by consumers, who know
that this price increase is not a natural variation resulting from market forces.
Ghalwash (2007) obtains differentiated impacts, but his results on different types
of goods are somewhat ambiguous. Li et al. (2012) find a much larger effect of tax
increase with respect to price increase and point to an interesting explanation:
because gasoline tax changes are subject to public debates and attract a great deal
of attention from the media, this could contribute to reinforce consumers’ reaction.
Scott (2012) finally finds consumers to be twice as responsive to tax-driven price
changes as to market-driven price changes. In an experimental framework, Goeschl
and Perino (2012) show however that taxes can crowd out agent’s intrinsic
motivation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in their framework, tax revenues
are neither allocated to more abatement efforts nor redistributed.
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Environmental Impacts of Technological Development
The literature reviewed by EEA (2011b) shows that price-based policy instruments
have in general a positive impact on eco-innovation, although this effect is not
universal. A carbon tax is expected to stimulate the production of clean technology,
because it modifies the price differential between the use of high-carbon and
low-carbon technologies. This literature sometimes refers to the “Porter
Hypothesis,” from Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995), in which
the authors outline the hypothesis that stricter environmental regulations could help
a country more than harming it, by fostering technological innovation and
provoking a first-mover advantage (strong version). In our context, we do not
consider the impact on international competitiveness of a carbon tax, as this topic
is beyond the scope of this paper (for a survey, see, e.g., Zhang and Baranzini 2004).
However, we do consider in this section induced technological innovation, and
hence, we consider the weak (Hicksian) form of the Porter Hypothesis (see Jaffe
and Palmer 1997) (for a short introduction to the general Porter Hypothesis’
theoretical bases, including the narrow and strong version, see, e.g., Jaffe
et al. (2005), Krysiak (2011), Lanoie et al. (2011), and Costantini and Mazzanti
(2012); for another survey including empirical studies, see Ambec et al. (2013)).
Studies assessing empirically the technological impact of emission taxes or
environmental regulations often use patents as a proxy for technological change
in a particular sector (see EEA 2011b), whereas they measure total factor produc-
tivity to identify an effect affecting the whole economy, as those proxies seem to
have a good fit with respect to the unobservable technological improvement.
Commins et al. (2011) analyze the impact of energy taxes (and the European
Union Emissions Trading System, from 2005 on) on a panel of European firms over
the period 1996–2007. Despite a large inter-sectoral variation, the results show that
energy taxes lead to an average net increase in total factor productivity. They
conclude by saying that “this finding supports the Porter Hypothesis. Regulation
spurs innovation.” Of course, not only emission taxes are expected to spur
technological innovation. For instance, analyzing seven European countries over
the period 1989–2004, Noailly (2012) shows that more demanding standards
increase patents in energy efficiency in the building sector, whereas higher energy
prices do not. The author gives two explanations for the latter result. First, real
energy prices are generally very low over the observed period. Second, the building
sector faces an important principal-agent problem, perhaps leading to lower
sensitivity to economic incentives. Similarly, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) find that in
the USA, increasing environmental compliance expenditures leads to higher total
R&D expenditures, with a lag. However, they do not find a direct impact on
domestic successful patent applications. This result was already obtained by Jaffe
and Stavins (1994), who assess the technology diffusion in energy efficiency
technologies following a change in energy prices, based on US data from 1979 to
1988. The authors extrapolate their result to the case of energy taxes, which would
lead to an increase in energy prices. Newell et al. (1999) find a similar result
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with a large set of US data from the 1960s to the 1990s: changes in energy prices
(as well as in efficiency standards) induce technological innovation in product
characteristics.
Using US data from 1970 to 1994, Popp (2002) computes an energy-price
elasticity of technology, the latter defined as the share of energy patent applications
relative to all applications. Controlling for the stock of knowledge using patent
citations, he finds an elasticity of 0.06 in the short term.
Applying a similar approach, using European data (EU15) from 1996 to 2007,
Costantini and Mazzanti (2012) find a positive link between environmental
and energy policy (measured through tax revenues) and the export dynamics of
high-technological firms (the result partly applies also to medium-low-tech firms).
The effect on exports, not technology itself, is relatively large, with elasticities
ranging from 0.024 to 0.038, depending on the type of taxation, and does not apply
to green sectors only.
Several studies (Arimura et al. 2007; Johnstone and Labonne 2006; Darnall
et al. (2007), Lanoie et al. 2011) used a business’ self-reporting database including
4,200 facilities distributed among seven OECD countries (Canada, France,
Germany, Hungary, Japan, Norway, and the USA). Lanoie et al. (2011) test the
three versions of the Porter Hypothesis and show that perceiving high environmen-
tal policy stringency has a positive effect on environmental R&D expenditure, but
no impact on total R&D. Keeping stringency constant, the authors try to identify
some instrument-specific effects (e.g., of taxes) and report that only medium and
high performance standards have a positive effect.
The issue of policy stringency is further analyzed by Brunnermeier and Cohen
(2003) on a sample of 146 industries over the period 1983–1992. They obtain that
pollution abatement expenditures (a proxy for policy stringency) do affect patents,
but that monitoring and enforcement (measured as the number of inspections) do
not. Hence, it seems that the announcement of policy tightening suffices to induce
technological change (signal effect).
However, the impact of environmental policy on technological innovation and
diffusion should also be assessed outside the country implementing the climate
policy. Recent theoretical literature discusses the conditions under which trade
spills over technological change and impacts carbon emissions; see, for instance,
Di Maria and van der Werf (2010), Golombek and Hoel (2004), or Acemoglu
et al. (2012). Lanjouw and Mody (1996) first outline the link between environmen-
tal regulation in a given country (proxied by pollution control expenditures) and
innovation in another. Based on a qualitative study, the authors analyze German,
Japanese, and US patents from the 1970s to the end of the 1980s, coupled with
observations from a series of low- and middle-income countries. Among developed
countries, the authors find that most domestic policies stimulate patent production
also in the two other countries, although the strongest impact is within the country.
Moreover, they find that developing countries enjoy the inventions of developed
countries and concentrate their efforts mainly on adaptive innovation, i.e., adapting
existing technologies and patenting for local markets (but not for exports). In
the same vein, Barker et al. (2007b) apply an ex post dynamic econometric analysis
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using cointegration techniques and find that the environmental tax reforms
implemented in some European countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK) lead to a very small geographical carbon leakage
to the EU’s non-ETR countries, because technological innovations cross borders to
non-ETR EU countries, the latter thus enjoying positive spillovers. Di Maria and
van der Werf (2010) posit even the basis for a net halo, i.e., negative carbon
leakage. However, the result of Barker et al. (2007b), Lanjouw and Mody (1996),
and the others needs to be confirmed by additional empirical evidence. For instance,
Popp (2006), in a study on patent reactions to NOx and SO2 policies in Germany,
Japan, and the USA over 1979–2003, cannot find a direct link between domestic
environmental regulation and patenting in foreign countries, i.e., inventions
respond to domestic but not to foreign policy. Follower countries do not seem to
enjoy technology transfers by applying the innovations developed by the fore-
runners, but they rather develop their own. However, Popp (2006) does find an
indirect impact represented by a transfer of knowledge, measured by cross-country
patent citations. Hence, latecomers still enjoy some spillovers but knowledge-
related instead of technology-related.
A final remark concerns the rebound effect associated to technological change,
i.e., technologies can favor clean energy (and thus a decline in emissions) but also
reduce the real cost of energy services per unit, thus leading to an increase in
emissions. Hence, the net effect of eco-innovation could be theoretically ambigu-
ous. Since aggregate empirical estimations are assessing the total change in emis-
sions resulting from emission taxes or technology changes, the rebound effect is
implicitly accounted for in the final result. On the contrary, the rebound effect has to
be explicitly modeled in simulation studies or general equilibrium models.
The importance of the rebound effect is subject to debate. Some authors like
Bra¨nnlund et al. (2007) find that in Sweden, an increase in energy efficiency of
20 % augments CO2 emissions by approximately 5 %. In this case, technological
change is thus increasing emissions. By considering capital costs explicitly, other
studies like Mizobuchi (2008) find for Japan a lower rebound effect of 27 %, which
means that actual emission reductions due to technological change are 73 % of the
engineering potential. The macroeconomic simulation of Barker et al. (2007a)
for the UK economy leads to a similar result, with a rebound effect of
approximately 15 %. In these cases, technological improvements have thus a net
abatement impact on emissions, in line with Lin and Li (2011).
Counterproductive Carbon Taxes? The Green Paradox
Reminiscent of exhaustible resource theory and starting in particular from Sinclair
(1992), new theoretical contributions introduce more explicitly the supply side of
the market in the assessment of the environmental effectiveness of carbon taxes.
Sinn (2008) shows that more stringent climate policy could not only lead to
a geographical dislocation of emissions but also to their temporal displacement
(“temporal carbon leakage”). Indeed, if future climate policies are expected to be
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more stringent than those currently in place, wealth-maximizing resource suppliers
can anticipate a depression in their revenues and thus anticipate the extraction of
those resources. If this effect is so strong so that the net effect on damages is
positive, a climate policy could even exacerbate the climate issue. This is the
so-called Green Paradox.
Following Gerlagh (2011), there are two versions of the Green Paradox.
The weak version is a short-term phenomenon and is represented by the case
when, following a climate policy, resource owners anticipate the timing of
extraction, thus increasing current emissions. However, given the long-lasting
effects of emissions in the atmosphere, climate policies have to consider cumulative
emissions and their damages. If emissions increase today, but they decrease
sufficiently tomorrow, climate change is then less severe and we face a weak
Green Paradox (see Gerlagh 2011; Habermacher and Kirchga¨ssner 2011).
A strong Green Paradox implies instead that the climate policy modifies the
anticipations of resource owners such that the resulting cumulative extraction
corresponds to larger environmental damages.
Gerlagh (2011) does not analyze an explicit climate policy, but refers to
a backstop technology. Under some conditions, he finds a weak and a strong
paradox. However, when relaxing the assumptions regarding the perfect substitut-
ability between limited resources and the backstop technology and introducing an
increasing marginal cost in the backstop technology, Gerlagh (2011) does not
obtain a Green Paradox (see also Hoel 2010). Sinn (2008) notes that time-invariant
unit taxes on carbon extraction would lead to a flattening of the carbon supply, thus
avoiding a temporal carbon leakage. However, since resource-owner countries are
likely to be against this policy, Sinn (2008) proposes instead a worldwide system of
emission trading, in which oil-importing countries would act as a monopsony, thus
constraining the suppliers’ inter-temporal maximization. Habermacher and
Kirchga¨ssner (2011) expand Sinn’s (2008) model by introducing additional
climate measures such as alternative carbon taxes and peculiarities such as backstop
technologies, global fuel demand cartels, and carbon capture and storage systems.
Their model reverses the outcome, since with both competitive and monopolistic
resource suppliers (see e.g., OPEC), the net present value of cumulative emissions
decreases with a carbon tax once taking into account future carbon measures, i.e.,
there is no evidence of a strong Green Paradox. Fischer and Salant (2012) obtain
a similar result, but find evidence in favor of the weak version, i.e., in their
model, there is inter-temporal carbon leakage due to climate policies. Interestingly,
they note that a relatively more stringent policy is likely to lead to lower inter-
temporal carbon leakage, i.e., the simulations accounting for rent adjustment
converge to those that omit the possibility of carbon leakage. That is why Fischer
and Salant (2012) advocate for ambitious policy reducing inter-temporal carbon
leakage.
Using a Pareto optimality approach as in Sinn (2008), and not a utilitarian
approach as often done in the literature, Spinesi (2012) shows that increasing
subsidy to R&D expenditures in the field of fossil fuels could also avoid both
the weak and the strong Green Paradox. Indeed, greater subsidies could counter the
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reduction in resource-owners’ profits due to an increasingly strong climate policy
(in this case a higher carbon tax). This result is valid with both perfect and imperfect
competition in the suppliers market, similarly to Habermacher and Kirchga¨ssner
(2011). However, subsidizing fossil fuel production could raise distributive issues
since it could create additional rents for monopolistic firms. Moreover, other
contributions on the optimal path of emissions suggest exactly the opposite, i.e.,
coupling carbon taxes with (temporary) research subsidies in the clean sectors.
Empirical assessments of the Green Paradox are extremely rare as we are aware
of one study only, in addition not specific to climate policy. Di Maria et al. (2013)
find a substantial drop in the price of coal deliveries to US (coal-fired) power plants
between a program announcement capping SO2 emissions in 1991, and its imple-
mentation in 1995, especially for high-sulfur coal. This finding is in line with
theory, since we expect coal producers to increase their supply prior to introduction
of the cap. However, the evidence on the Green Paradox itself, which focuses on the
emission trajectory, is rather mixed. Indeed, the price drop is not transferred to an
overall change in quantities or on the quality of coal (i.e., the sulfur intensity).
Plants seem to start early adapting to the new regulation by reducing the sulfur
content ahead of schedule. Only those not constrained by long-term contracts take
advantage of lower spot prices, in line with theory. Hence, this paper concludes that
a Green Paradox does not automatically rise in anticipation of a tighter regulation.
We recall that the theoretical background predicts that supplier’s response may lead
to a Green Paradox, under given circumstances, but that proper policy design
matters. Following Di Maria et al. (2013), we emphasize two factors against the
rise of a Green Paradox. First, coal demand from power plants appears to be quite
inelastic. Actually, it seems that long-term contracts play an important role and that
a short implementation lag (4 years in this case) leads to a prolonged period of coal
sales but not all plants can take advantage of such window of opportunity, due to
capacity constraints and other sources of short-term inflexibility. Second,
overlapping environmental regulations may limit the risk of a Green Paradox.
The lesson applicable to climate policy is that it is possible to avoid a Green
Paradox by introducing as soon as possible stricter regulations in view of the
2020’s new Kyoto agreement abatement goal. In any case, announcing the
objectives early and postponing policies later is the worst solution.
Summarizing, the intuition of the Green Paradox extends our knowledge of the
impacts of climate policies, in particular allowing resource supply to be
endogenously determined. However, the theoretical literature on the Green Paradox
does not suggest that policymakers should not implement climate policies to avoid
counterproductive effects. On the contrary, the literature indicates that the strong
version can be avoided if policymakers carry on their climate policies taking into
account the reaction of resource owners. Moreover, this reaction is generally
modeled also in the case of reduced competition, a theoretical framework that
characterizes the market of many natural resources, e.g., oil. Empirical assessments
of the Green Paradox are currently very rare, because the largest part of the
theoretical literature is very recent and also because of challenging empirical issues
related to endogeneity and information on policy expectations.
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The Co-Benefits of Emission Taxes and Carbon Policies
In addition to greenhouse gases, climate policies may have an impact on other
pollutants. In theory, those impacts can be positive or negative. For instance,
a policy targeting CO2 abatement can decrease SO2 emissions, by leading to
a switch from oil to natural gas. That is, CO2 and SO2 are in this case complements
and spillovers are positive. However, the same policy may lead to a higher com-
bustion temperature of natural gas, creating more emissions of NOX. That is, CO2
and NOX are in this case substitutes, but spillovers can be either positive or
negative, depending on the output effect, e.g., if less natural gas is used overall
(Holland 2011). However, there is a general consensus that positive spillovers
substantially overweigh negative externalities. That is why the literature talks
about co-benefits, secondary or ancillary benefits. We use the IPCC’s (2007)
definition of co-benefits, illustrating the importance of an integrated approach that
considers additional benefits as important as direct benefits.
OECD (2002) presents a long list of beneficial effects induced by emission
abating policies. It includes lower mortality and morbidity from lower local air
pollution, better visibility, higher crop yields, less damages to structures due to less
acid rain, and reduced urban congestion, noise, and accidents. Indoor pollution
matters mainly for developing countries (OECD 2009). According to OECD
(2002), ecological benefits should also be included, because tropical forests are
important for the conservation of flora and fauna.
Most of these benefits are local and arise in the short term, which could contribute
to increase the acceptability of climate policies (see OECD 2002). Pittel and
R€ubbelke (2008) show with a simple game-theoretical setting that international
negotiations would be favored if the player’s payoff would include co-benefits,
reducing the free-riding problem. Moreover, there is some evidence outlying that
co-benefits are likely to be higher in emerging economies than in developed countries.
That is, Pittel and R€ubbelke (2008) show that accounting for exclusive and immediate
local benefits increases the payoffs of a developing country’s cooperative attitude.
An important issue in this literature is represented by the valuation of co-benefits
in monetary terms, in particular because many studies focus on the health impacts
of reduced air pollution, which typically represent the largest component of
co-benefits. But the value of statistical life is a controversial approach, with
considerable political sensitivity (see OECD 2002, 2009).
An additional methodological issue is the determination of the baseline scenario,
i.e., the case wherein the climate policy is not implemented. For instance, projected
changes in standards for air pollutants have to be considered (OECD 2002). More-
over, simulations should consider both the opportunity cost of investing in another
policy targeting local pollutants instead of a carbon policy and the reduced admin-
istrative burden deriving from the co-benefits of a single policy on different fields of
regulation (OECD 2009). Furthermore, model calibration is not neutral. For instance,
the determination of the social discount rate is very likely to affect the final results, as
well as other underlying assumptions. For example, a nonlinear relation between air
pollution and health makes more sense than a linear assumption (OECD 2009).
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Due to all these issues, estimations of co-benefits are not very consistent across
studies. According to OECD (2002), they range from 30 % to 100 % of abatement
costs, with lower estimates in more recent studies. Furthermore, empirical estimates
are likely to underestimate the effect of co-benefits, since it is particularly demand-
ing to take into account all spillovers. Therefore, studies generally focus on the
main co-benefits only.
Ekins (1996) surveys the estimated co-benefits for a series of developed coun-
tries (the USA, the UK, Germany, Norway, and European countries in general) and
finds a very large range of values from US$21 per ton of carbon up to US$794, with
an average co-benefits per ton of carbon of US$273. OECD (2002) reviews
13 studies and finds that estimates depend on the scope of the analysis (i.e., how
many co-benefits and how many sectors are analyzed) and on the country. When
results are monetized, they range from US$3 to US$452 per ton of carbon. More
recently, OECD (2009) surveyed 9 studies focusing on different cases in terms of
country of interest, horizon, pollutants, co-benefits, and model assumptions. When
results are monetized, they range from about US$14 to $58 per ton of carbon.
Nemet et al. (2010) review 37 studies on air-quality-related co-benefits provid-
ing 48 monetary estimates, 28 relative to developed countries and 20 for developing
countries. Although comparability between studies with different architecture is not
always ensured, Nemet et al. (2010) confirm that recent analysis tends to be more
conservative and that in general estimates for developing countries are higher than
for developed countries. The median (mean) for developed countries is US$31
(US$44) per ton of CO2 and US$43 (US$81) for developing countries. A possible
explanation for higher co-benefits in developing countries is their higher levels of
air pollution and thus larger health benefits from abatement, assuming a nonlinear
relation between pollution and health effects.
Groosman et al. (2011) analyze the transport and electric power sectors in the
USA, ending up with estimates for co-benefits over the period 2010–2030 ranging
from US$1 to US$77 per ton of CO2. Estimates are sensitive to modeling assump-
tions and years, with co-benefits at the end of the period being many times larger than
in 2010. The authors present 4 scenarios, modifying the underlying assumptions and
in particular mortality response to pollution exposure, capped SO2 emissions, and the
social discount rate. Interestingly, the authors find that marginal co-benefits exceed
marginal abatement cost for 2 scenarios over 4. Omission of co-benefits would thus
substantially underestimate the benefits of a climate policy using, e.g., carbon taxes.
Summary and Conclusions
Carbon taxes political acceptability is a major concern, which may explain why in
practice only few countries have implemented them. Major issues range from
distributive consequences to administrative burden and competitive impacts.
In this paper, we discuss specifically the concern regarding their environmental
effectiveness. In the literature, the environmental performance is often evaluated
through ex ante simulations based on disputable assumptions. In this paper, after
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reviewing the main characteristics of carbon taxes, we discuss their environmental
impacts mainly based on empirical estimations using real data. We highlight several
factors determining emissions, such as technological innovation, the complementary
decrease of other pollutants (co-benefits), and the reaction of suppliers (the Green
Paradox). We stress that climate policy should be considered from an integrated
perspective and that the full potential of carbon taxes can be assessed only with
a comprehensive approach which includes all aspects related to the implementation
of this instrument. When carbon taxes are evaluated in this multifaceted way,
rationales for implementation tend to increase rather than decline.
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Abstract 
The idea of a global carbon price has been a recurrent theme in debates on international climate policy. 
Discarded at the Conference of Parties (COP) of Copenhagen in 2009, it remained part of deliberations 
for a climate agreement in subsequent years. Unfortunately, there is still much misunderstanding about 
the reasons for implementing a global carbon price. As a result, ideological and political resistance 
against it prospers. Here we present the main arguments in favor of a carbon price to stimulate a fair 
and well-informed discussion about climate policy instruments. This includes arguments that have 
received surprisingly little attention so far. It is stressed that a main reason to use carbon pricing is 
environmental effectiveness, so not only economic efficiency (including the special case of cost-
effectiveness). In addition, we provide ideas on how to implement a uniform global carbon price, 
whether using a carbon tax or emissions trading.  
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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of COP21 in Paris, countries will have to turn pledges into effective policies, to 
guarantee that their promises about reduction of greenhouse gas emissions are realized. It is easy to 
underestimate this challenge. We argue that ambitious targets can only be met by using the instrument 
of carbon pricing, with the ultimate aim of a uniform global carbon price. All alternative options are 
likely to lead to insufficient, ineffective and very costly abatement activities, thus undercutting the 
pledge and review system, as well as jeopardizing the potential for more ambitious targets in the 
future. Our society is at a turning point. Imprudent policy design could have extremely far reaching 
consequences, not least because of the real chance of dangerous climate change. 
However, many observers, notably social scientists, are critical of carbon pricing, even though 
often without being well informed about its precise impacts and benefits. Here we argue that the main 
reason for it is not only efficiency or cost-effectiveness, but environmental effectiveness. We provide 
many reasons, which have been largely overlooked in critical writings on carbon pricing.  
 
2. Characteristics of climate change and implications for policy instruments  
Climate change possesses several characteristics that must be accounted for in the formulation of 
climate policies to guarantee their effectiveness. Sources of anthropogenic emissions are diverse and 
cover all economic sectors. Emissions arise from both production and consumption, including resource 
extraction and waste management activities. Hence, abatement costs are very heterogeneous. In 
addition, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions accumulate in the atmosphere with residence times 
stretching from centuries to millennia. Therefore, abatement incentives should be dynamic, i.e. 
responsive to economic and technological change, and last through time. Moreover, the location of 
GHG emissions does not have an impact on climate change. As a result, the distribution of GHG 
abatement efforts can be uneven across space. Another feature of climate change is that there is no 
simple set of unproblematic end-of-pipe solutions – witness the debate about carbon capture. It 
follows that it is necessary to abate GHG emissions through a wide range of options, including 
changes in behavior (e.g. using less energy), structural change in the composition of the economy 
(dirty versus cleaner sectors and products, and different input mixes in production), more energy-
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efficient technologies, and low-carbon (notably renewable) energy production. Finally, particularly 
challenging for international negotiations is that abatement activities are costly and constitute global 
public goods; that is, others can benefit from them without undertaking any effort. It is thus necessary 
to coordinate actions to avoid free-riding behavior and international carbon leakage. Therefore, a 
worldwide policy is needed to avoid unwanted transboundary displacement of emissions and to ensure 
fair economic competition between countries. 
We argue that carbon pricing supported by a climate agreement is able to address these 
characteristics of climate change. This becomes clear by considering seven unique advantages of it, as 
explained hereafter. 
3. Seven arguments in favor of international carbon pricing
Carbon pricing affects carbon emissions by penalizing energy sources in proportion to their carbon 
content. It is easily applicable to emissions coming from energy use, but can be extended to emissions 
arising from land use changes and other sources. The following are the most important arguments in 
favor of carbon pricing: 
1. In accordance with the Polluter Pays Principle, carbon pricing changes relative prices. As a
consequence, when making decisions that cause carbon emissions, firms and consumers will not
just take into account their private costs and benefits, but will automatically account, without
necessarily being aware of it, for the social costs due to (direct and indirect) carbon emissions
generated in every phase of the product life cycle from resource to waste. The entire economy can
then become less carbon-intensive, since all consumers and producers will adjust their decisions to
prices corrected for the climate externality. The carbon price should, though, be high enough to
induce the required adjustments leading to the emissions abatement objective.
2. Compared to other types of instruments, carbon pricing can address the vast heterogeneity of
greenhouse gas emitters, thus helping to minimize the cost of pollution control. Heterogeneity
might result from firms having different production (and thus emitting) technologies, sizes,
organizations, etc., which translates into distinct marginal pollution abatement costs. In theory –
assuming perfect information and substantive rationality – all polluters should choose that level of
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emissions abatement for which the associated marginal cost equals the carbon price. With a unique 
carbon price, the marginal abatement costs would then be identical among all polluters, which 
implies that a particular abatement goal will be met at the least global cost. No other instrument 
than pricing is able to realize this goal. However, since polluters are not always perfectly aware of 
relevant abatement technologies and associated costs, one may expect that the actual global cost 
will not reach the lowest level.  Nevertheless, empirical research suggests that reliance on non-
price policy instruments can lead to considerably higher abatement costs in the absence of price 
incentives (Pizer 2002; Fischer and Newell 2008). The reason is that such instruments are less 
effective in covering diverse sources of emissions (e.g. technical standards cannot be applied 
subtly to all millions of technologies and products in the world). Instead, a carbon price is a 
systems-approach that spans over all sources of emissions. 
3. Carbon pricing contributes to dynamic efficiency. That is, through time it stimulates research and 
development, innovation and adoption of new technologies emitting less carbon. By increasing the 
cost of carbon-emitting technologies and activities, carbon pricing provides a financial incentive 
for consumers and producers to invest in technologies reducing emissions. Empirical evidence 
suggests indeed a positive relationship between higher energy prices and the development of 
(green) innovation technologies (Ambec et al. 2013). Compared to emission or technology-based 
standards, carbon pricing can provide a higher economic incentive (benefit) for adoption of, and 
R&D on, improved abatement technologies (Jaffe and Stavins 1995). Carbon pricing is thus an 
important element of a policy package aimed at redirecting technical change towards the cleaner 
goods and ways of production (Acemoglu et al. 2012; Aghion et al. 2012). Indeed, without 
ecologically corrected prices one cannot expect innovation to be well oriented. This is 
underappreciated in many discussions about technological change and climate change, where 
pricing is downplayed as if innovation/diffusion subsidies and other innovation policies 
(information provision, stimulating cooperation between innovators) were sufficient. But carbon 
pricing and technology policy are largely complementary mechanisms and should thus both be 
part of a climate policy package. 
4. Carbon pricing is the best instrument to control energy and carbon rebound in an effective way.  
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Technological advances and improvements in energy efficiency tend to lead to a direct reduction 
in energy consumption. However, given the improved efficiency, the energy services – for 
instance, travelling by car – become cheaper. As a result, there is a general empirical consensus 
that people consume more energy than if energy efficiency improvements would not imply any 
change in behavior (Sorrell 2007). We argue that opportunities for such rebound effect would be 
limited if carbon pricing is in place (van den Bergh 2011). For example, it will discourage the 
more intense use of a more efficient and – without a carbon price – cheaper technology (e.g., a car 
with more fuel-efficient engine). In addition, it will discourage any money savings due to energy 
conservation to be spent on energy-intensive goods and services, as these will have a higher price 
due to carbon pricing. Empirical evidence suggests indeed that this so-called “re-spending 
rebound” is non-negligible (Antal and van den Bergh 2014). Carbon pricing would, moreover, not 
only reduce rebound with respect to the laissez faire, but also with respect to other policy options. 
While standards tend to control energy use and emissions only for a subset of technologies and 
associated services, carbon pricing can be regarded as a systems approach that discourages 
rebound consistently across all carbon-intensive goods and technologies (van den Bergh 2015). 
Finally, pricing will also assure that consumers can make a trade-off between the benefits and total 
(including environmental) costs of rebound resulting from their decisions. This assures that 
rebound associated with higher benefits than environmental damages will persist under carbon 
pricing. In other words, such rebound effects will not be eliminated by carbon pricing. Carbon 
pricing thus comes out as the best policy to deal with rebound, in terms of effective control and 
welfare effects. 
5. An international carbon price covering all countries and sectors would ensure that there are no 
leakages – i.e. indirect unintended and unwanted production, consumption, innovation and 
diffusion effects that create more carbon emissions elsewhere. With consistently higher relative 
prices for all carbon-intensive products worldwide, there are no escape routes: all economic agents 
and thus countries will be stimulated to search for cheaper and thus less carbon-intensive 
alternatives. As suggested by Nordhaus (2015), if some countries would opt for not enforcing such 
a policy, free riding could be avoided – or reduced – by trade sanctions. Nordhaus proposes strong 
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trade sanctions unrelated with the carbon content of trade. However, sanctions could also take the 
form of border carbon taxes on imports of non-complying countries, which, even though 
insufficient to ensure the incorporation of all countries in international climate policy, would 
contribute to address the problems of competiveness associated to carbon taxes. 
6. Carbon pricing allows for flexibility and autonomy of choice, as emitters can freely change their 
behavior to reduce their costs. This means decentralization of policy, with associated low 
information needs. In addition, carbon pricing – instead of, e.g., eco-labeling – means that no 
separate life-cycle analysis is needed to account for all the carbon emissions of products and 
services over their life-cycle. Instead, firms will integrate carbon prices in existing cost-accounting 
systems of their products and services. This has the additional advantage that transaction costs are 
limited. 
7. Even if one is environmentally conscious, it is virtually impossible to know which goods to buy 
and in what amounts to achieve one’s environmental goals. Moreover, even though many people 
would like to contribute at a personal cost to a more responsible use of resources, such cooperative 
behavior may depend on the perception that others will or will not do the same (Ostrom 2009). 
The fact that an individual action alone has a negligible impact tends indeed to discourage people 
to undertake these voluntary actions. Moreover, many consumers are not particularly 
environmentally conscious in their purchase behavior, being sensitive to personally salient 
concerns, notably financial considerations, when making purchasing decisions. An effective 
climate policy should reach out to this majority: carbon pricing regulation will be capable of doing 
this as it naturally intervenes in the core element, namely pricing, of markets. It does so without 
assuming that people will act altruistically, showing voluntary environmentally benign behavior, 
or can handle much information about products, as in the form of eco-labels.  
 
Even if a global carbon price existed, other climate change policies will still be necessary. In 
particular, given the public good characteristics and lock-in problems of technological innovation and 
R&D activities, subsides or direct investment should be encouraged. Moreover, since in practice 
carbon pricing can hardly cover all GHG emissions, other policy instrument should be implemented. 
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Finally, given informational failures and bounded rationality, carbon pricing can always be 
supplemented with mechanisms that aid households and businesses respond effectively to market 
signals and incentives (see Sanstad and Howarth 1994). Carbon pricing is thus not enough to confront 
all the challenges of climate change, which is not an argument against pricing and its unique and 
desirable properties, but a reason to complement it with additional policies. In this respect, we agree 
with (Bowen 2011, p. 2), who says “Other policies are needed, too, particularly to promote innovation 
and appropriate infrastructure investment, but cannot be relied upon by themselves to bring about the 
necessary reductions in emissions. Carbon pricing is crucial”. 
A not unusual resistance against carbon pricing is motivated by the argument that it will be 
inequitable, i.e. have adverse, regressive distributional effects in terms of income or consumers’ 
purchasing power. But this is a too generalized statement. Distributional effects strongly depend on the 
design of carbon pricing and the broader set of policies of which it is part. Paradoxically, carbon 
pricing, provides an excellent instrument to address undesirable distributional consequences – notably 
if taking the form of carbon taxation, but also of emissions trading, if initial permits are auctioned or 
sold.  The reason is that it will generate public revenues that can in turn be used to compensate low-
income households,  e.g. through  tax reductions for low incomes or energy poor households, or lower 
VAT rates for products serving basic needs (Harrison 2013; Bowen 2015; Thomas and Flues 2015). 
However, progressive effects can also be obtained by lump sum redistribution, which represents the 
simplest and administratively less burdensome way of recycling revenues from carbon pricing 
(Baranzini, Goldemberg, and Speck 2000; Metcalf 2009).  
This critique of carbon pricing further presumes that the comparable scenario is the status quo, 
and neglects the distributional impacts of climate change or of other instruments of climate policy. For 
example, technical standards will not necessarily provide better guarantees for an equitable 
distribution of emissions reductions and associated monetary and welfare costs. In particular, they will 
also raise costs and thus prices, but not generate extra public revenues that could be used to lessen 
perceived unfair distributive impacts. 
In a review of arguments and empirical studies, Fullerton (2011) warns that assessing 
distributional effects of environmental policy (any, also other instruments than pricing) is a difficult 
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task, at it involves six elements: (1) higher prices of carbon-intensive products, (2) changes in relative 
returns to factors like labor, capital, and resources, (3) allocation of scarcity rents from a restricted 
number of permits, (4) distribution of the benefits from improvements in environmental quality, (5) 
temporary effects during the transition, and (6) capitalization of all those effects into prices of property 
values (land, buildings, houses). A good assessment should account for all of them. 
 
4. Practical implementation of international carbon pricing 
Two main instruments can achieve a unique worldwide carbon price: a global carbon tax and a global 
emissions trading system. While a carbon tax sets the carbon price directly through an administrative 
decision, an emissions trading system sets a cap on emissions and allocates the emission allowances 
between emitters, who can then trade them resulting in a carbon price. While they have different 
advantages and drawbacks, both instruments share the general favorable properties mentioned above.  
There is not an unambiguously better alternative, which explains why each option has its own 
advocates. 
The most important difference between emission trading and carbon taxes concerns control of 
quantities versus price (Weitzman 1974). Emissions trading systems, by setting a cap, can guarantee 
the achievement of a given environmental objective. However, the price is uncertain. In contrast, in the 
case of carbon taxes, the price is known, but the level of emissions is uncertain. Emissions trading 
systems have been criticized for their volatility, which may be an important handicap for long-term 
investments, as these depend not only on current prices, but also on expectations about future prices. 
However, carbon prices in emissions trading systems do not necessarily have to be extremely volatile. 
Price floors and ceilings (so-called “safety valves”) have been proposed to address the issue of 
volatility; one way to assure a minimum price takes the form of a mix system, namely a permanent tax 
and a permits market (Wood and Jotzo 2011).   
 
4.1. Implementing a carbon price through a tax  
There are two possible international carbon tax designs, both of which require an international climate 
agreement. One is a global carbon tax, the revenues of which would be collected centrally, e.g. through 
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the UNFCCC Secretariat, and subsequently redistributed among countries, e.g. in relation to their 
demographic weight. Despite its political difficulty, this alternative would clearly be the preferred 
option, as it would imply a single worldwide carbon price.  It would have positive international 
redistributive effects given the positive correlation between per capita GHG emissions and per capita 
income. A part of the revenues might be allocated to the provision of green funds financing 
environmental projects or adaptation measures in poorer countries. Despite economists have long 
advocated to fund only the socially most profitable investments, public acceptability studies show that 
using revenues from carbon taxes to finance environmentally beneficial projects can increase their 
social and political acceptability (Drews and van den Bergh, 2015).  
The second alternative would be a tax raised by each country, while aiming at a single global 
carbon price through harmonized carbon taxes. By agreeing about this harmonized tax, countries 
would not be tempted to deviate from it for competitiveness or political-ideological reasons, which 
have been shown to substantially hamper the effectiveness of early efforts to implement carbon taxes 
(Baranzini and Carattini 2014). A drawback of harmonized taxes is that national governments would 
be less interested in reducing emissions with complementary policies, because any reduction of 
emissions would reduce fiscal revenues in contrast with a global tax (Hoel 1992). Thus, this second 
option should be judged as less attractive in environmental terms, but more viable politically. 
 
4.2. Implementing a carbon price through emissions trading 
An international emissions trading system could also take different forms. A truly global market would 
cover all individual emitters, giving rise to a single carbon price worldwide. This would assure cost-
effectiveness of mitigation at a global level. However, creating such a global system of emission 
trading is very challenging in both political and institutional terms. Alternatively, an international 
treaty would fix a global emissions cap and then distribute allowances between countries, which could 
trade them fixing the global carbon price. In this case, countries could choose whether and how to 
introduce carbon pricing domestically as it would be desirable. However, similarly to carbon taxes, it 
could be easier to start with different emissions trading systems covering certain countries and regions 
(like the EU) and sectors, and integrate these globally in a subsequent stage. In the long run, this could 
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lead to the coverage of all countries and sectors. Indeed, similarly to carbon taxes, various cap-and-
trade systems are and have been developed in North America, Europe and Asia, forming a fertile basis 
for integration at a larger, global scale. 
Setting rules of allocation of allowances among countries and emitters in each country is a 
major hurdle, since they reflect implicit ethical and political choices. The grandfathering approach 
used in many programs favors large emitters and penalize those who made mitigation efforts before 
the policy implementation. As a result, there is now broader support for initializing systems through 
auctioning permits, also as this would contribute to efficiency. However, while this is feasible for 
firms, as the EU ETS program has shown, its application to countries is less evident. As for carbon 
taxes, distributional concern would play in favor of either a redistribution of revenues from permit 
auctions based on the demographic weights of countries or the direct allocation of allowances on per 
capita basis. Hence, both could be progressive in terms of inter-country distribution and so address one 
of the criticisms to global carbon markets in particular and global carbon pricing in general.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
We have presented seven reasons for using carbon pricing in climate policy: 
1. It changes relative prices to reflect all direct and indirect CO2 emissions of products and 
services so that firms and consumers will automatically internalize the costs of global 
warming. 
2. It minimizes the overall cost of pollution control as it accounts for differences (heterogeneity) 
between polluters in terms of abatement opportunities and costs. 
3. It contributes to dynamic efficiency, because it provides continuous incentives for adoption 
and innovation of new technologies that emit less carbon dioxide.  
4. It is the best instrument to control energy and carbon rebound in an effective way and avoiding 
undesirable welfare effects.  
5. If it were to cover all countries and sectors, it would ensure that there are no leakages through 
international relocation of dirty industries and shifts in foreign trade patterns that merely 
replace carbon emissions from one countries to another. 
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6. It implies decentralization of policy, with associated low information needs for regulators.  
7. It relies on the empirical fact that when making purchase decisions, most consumers with 
regard to purchasing most products and services are more influenced by prices than by 
environmental concerns.  
As a result, carbon pricing will be a very effective instrument, particularly because of reasons 
1, 3, 4, 5, and 7. Many countries already have implemented policies to stimulate climate change 
mitigation, including carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes (World Bank 2014). However, these 
policies have been relatively ineffective as the levels of the policy instruments are often weak in the 
absence of a serious international climate agreement, to avoid negative implications for the respective 
countries’ competitive position as well as carbon leakage (point 5). 
Emissions pledges have been at the center of climate negotiations preparing for COP21 in 
Paris. We believe that negotiating around a single price will become easier as more countries get 
involved in carbon pricing and an increasing number of people become well informed about the 
unique advantages of carbon pricing. In view of these, we should remove ideological barriers against 
such a critical element of an effective climate policy package. We hope that the seven arguments in 
favor of carbon pricing presented here can convince readers that such an approach to climate policy 
deserves serious attention and debate. Anyone who is critical of carbon pricing needs to address these 
seven pro-arguments, as well the arguments (at the end of Section 3) on how carbon pricing can be 
designed to have desirable equity effects. Moreover, those critical of carbon pricing should be able to 
present an alternative that is similarly effective in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. As we have 
argued, all alternative options are likely to result in considerably less effective, even though well-
intended, ways of regulating emissions and thus are likely to be unable to avoid dangerous climate 
change. 
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Abstract
Public acceptability is one of the main barriers to the implementation of carbon taxes. Qual-
itative evidence based on a sample of individuals interviewed in Geneva, Switzerland, shows
that the general public would not tackle climate change as economists suggest. The gap con-
cerns not only the choice of climate policy’s instruments (i.e. pull versus push measures), but
also its specific design in the case of carbon taxes. In this respect, the gap is driven by a
diffused perception of environmental ineffectiveness of carbon taxes, which goes hand in hand
with distrust in the government and a strong demand for earmarking carbon tax revenues for
environmental purposes. Our empirical findings are consistent with the recent literature on the
public’s preferences on environmental policy design and provide new evidence for the need to
reconsider the conventional approach to economic instruments and environmental tax reforms.
Reducing resistance to the implementation of Pigouvian taxes cannot abstract from providing
effective responses to the concerns emphasized by the general public.
Policy relevance
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general public, there is a substantial trade-off between efficiency- and acceptability-enhancing
use of revenues from carbon taxes. Earmarking revenues for environmental purposes clearly re-
duces perceived complexity and increases acceptability. The paper addresses this trade-off and,
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1 Introduction
Climate change is one of the most pressing issues of this century. International negotiations aim
at stabilizing emissions at a level preventing severe changes in the climate system. However,
they have generally failed to provide consistent and ambitious agreements. Unilateral initiatives
have emerged in most developed countries, but the choice of instruments can be questioned
from an economic perspective (cf. IPCC 2014; World Bank 2014). Following the IPCC (2014),
we classify climate policy instruments in five categories. The first category encompasses the
market-based approach, i.e. economic instruments such as taxes and emissions trading systems.
In a pure theoretical world, carbon pricing would represent the first best policy (cf. Baumol
and Oates, 1971). The second category refers to regulatory approaches (i.e. standards), which
are still much diffused instruments of environmental policy, even though theoretically inferior
to economic instruments. The remaining categories are represented by information policy (e.g.
labels), public provision of goods and services (e.g. public transportation) and voluntary actions
and agreements.
The evidence suggests that unilateral initiatives have often lacked to implement powerful in-
struments able to dramatically curb emissions, such as carbon taxes. When implemented, large
exemptions hampered their effectiveness (Lin and Li, 2011; Baranzini and Carattini, 2014). In
many other instances, governments preferred second-best policies such as subsidies for renew-
ables and energy-saving measures, eventually leading to relatively high implicit carbon prices
(see e.g. OECD 2013; Marcantonini and Ellerman 2014). The explanations of this pattern rely
on the political economy of climate change mitigation.
We address this issue from a perspective of public acceptability. We follow a qualitative ap-
proach based on face-to-face interviews and ask to members of the general public what measures
are necessary to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, what is the role of
the public sector and the place for carbon taxes as a policy instrument. We carry out our
interviews in Geneva, Switzerland. As other European countries, just after the ratification
of the Kyoto Protocol, Switzerland attempted to implement an ambitious mitigation strategy
relying on energy taxes. However, in 2000 three energy-tax proposals were rejected by the
population in a public ballot (cf. Thalmann, 2004). Since then, Switzerland’s climate policy,
whose cornerstone is the 2001 CO2 Act, relies mainly on a mix of policy instruments, including
regulations, voluntary agreements (cf. Baranzini et al., 2004) and, by 2008, a carbon tax on
heating fuels. The 2013 revision of the CO2 Act increased the CO2 tax rate and introduced
several regulations, e.g. on imported cars. Political-economy aspects played a crucial role in
shaping this path.
Our qualitative evidence suggests that the path followed by Switzerland and other similar
countries is in line with the social perception of its population. This paper thus complements
the recent literature on the public acceptability of mitigation policies (cf. e.g. Thalmann, 2004;
Dresner et al., 2006a; Kallbekken and Sælen, 2011; Sælen and Kallbekken, 2011; Cherry et al.,
2012; see also our companion paper Carattini and Baranzini, 2014). The remainder of the paper
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is as follows: section 2 reviews the methodology, section 3 introduces the qualitative results,
section 4 discusses them and draw policy implications, section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology
This qualitative study is based on a pre-tested semi-structured questionnaire with five face-to-
face open questions to 38 individuals. The interviews last between 15 and 45 minutes, averaging
about 30 minutes. For each general question, we conceive some possible follow-up questions
(in parentheses below) to help people to elaborate their thoughts. The questionnaire is given
as follows1 :
1) By what means it is possible to reduce energy consumption?
(For businesses? For households?)
2) How can reductions in energy consumption be encouraged?
(Who would be the target? Has the public sector any role to play?)
3) Carbon taxes are often mentioned as a policy instrument to reduce energy consumption.
Do you think that they are a good approach?
(What features would make them more acceptable to you?)
4) How should tax revenues be used?
(Here are three options: funding environmental projects; redistribution to most affected
households; tax rebates for households and firms)
The design of the questionnaire relies on a series of classroom discussions and focus groups,
organised prior to the qualitative survey. Participants involved were either “standard” under-
graduate or part-time employed students. This first step provides a first sense of how big may
be the gap between economists and the public on climate policy and contributes to structure
the questionnaire. In particular, students tended to ignore the incentive effect of carbon taxes,
despite having seen the concepts of price elasticity and externality in introductory microeco-
nomics courses.
As shown by Table A.1, the sample of respondents is relatively heterogeneous. The sample
is composed of individuals of all income classes and includes most age categories. Different
job profiles are represented and a large majority of respondents are tenants, in line with the
Swiss real-estate context. Though, given the small size typical of qualitative studies, there is no
pretention of being representative of the underlying population. The interviews were analysed
with RQDA software (Huang, 2012), a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software.
3 Results
The questionnaire starts with a very general question on how to reduce energy consumption
(for households and businesses). We observe a certain degree of consensus across individuals, as
1We do not discuss here an additional question asking for future energy price expectations, since beyond
the scope of this paper (for more details, see Carattini and Baranzini, 2014).
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most answers suggest voluntary measures such as energy-saving tips (cf. Table 1). In particu-
lar, use of public transportation and electric vehicles, adoption of energy-efficient lightning and
appliances, reduced water consumption and preference for local food products are repeatedly
mentioned as possible ways to reduce energy consumption. In general, respondents focus on
household’s activities, often drawing on their everyday experience, and show a marked pref-
erence for measures avoiding to waste energy and as such involving very limited costs for the
agent (in terms of e.g. money, time, effort; cf. Steg and Vlek, 2009). For instance, several
answers refer to overheating:
“In winter, at home, we could get a sweater and do not walk around barefoot. Decreasing
the indoor temperature to 20◦C or 19◦C is perhaps not a big deal, but that effort made
by all would have a positive impact, surely.” [JRC1,male, 26]
For heating, he says that we should not adjust the temperature too high “better to wear
a sweater than heating up to 22◦C.” [KH4,male, 27]
“At home, they could turn off the underfloor heating. In winter, we are burning!”
[LRG2, female, 32]
We observe a similar approach on measures to reduce energy consumption by firms. Reducing
printing and switching off lights and computers are recurrent eco-friendly suggestions, as well
as promoting environmentally-aware behaviour within the firm. Here are some typical answers:
She evokes the large corporations that leave all night long all office lights on. She is
strongly against this kind of practice. She also thinks that department stores’ luminous
signboards could be turned off during the night. [DM2, female, 65]
She replies that if companies made an effort with their incredible holiday decorations, it
would already be a step forward. [JRC2, female, 56]
We emphasize that only in a few cases the public sector is taken into consideration. According
to a few respondents, the government could give incentives to households and firms or apply
directly some of the aforementioned tips to its own operations. Incentives are suggested under
the form of subsidies (e.g. to public transportation) or energy taxes. Altogether, this may
suggest that for the large majority of our interviewees the public sector should not take an
active role to curb energy consumption in Switzerland. That is, emission abatements should
mainly rely on private efforts. Since following our classroom discussions we were expecting this
type of outcome, question 2 asks how to encourage energy consumption abatement, introducing
explicitly the public sector.
As reported in Table 2, the government has a role to play according to the majority of respon-
dents, but this is confined to awareness-raising and persuasion. This figure is consistent with
answers to question 1. Indeed, respondents contend that the responsibility of the public sector is
to stimulate voluntary efforts to reduce energy consumption, such as the ones discussed above.
Hence, it seems that most respondents would like to see the public sector getting involved in
promoting cooperation among individuals so to reduce energy consumption and contribute to
climate change mitigation.
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Measures Household Business Public sector
Energy-saving tips
Reduce heatconsumption 15 1
Reduce air conditioning 2
Reduce water consumption 12
Turn off lights 12 10
Use energy-efficient lighting 6 1
Use bicycles 4 2
Use public transports 13 2
Pool cars 3
Use hybrid/electric cars 3 1
Turn off computers 1 7
Turn off other electrical appliances 10
Reduce street light intensity 2
Promote eco-friendly measures 6 2
Print less 5
Sort waste 3 2
Buy local food 4 1
Buy A-label appliances 3
Install efficient isolation 5 3 1
Install solar panels 6 2
Install video-conference appliances 1
Market instruments
Reduce train fares 1
Increase flight prices 1
Introduce carbon taxes 2
Give tax credits conditional to
energy efficiency investments 1
Total 100 46 10
Table 1: Number of times energy saving measures are mentioned (question 1)
“It [the government] has to inform the public. For instance, by publishing factsheets or
through advertisements.” [SB1, female, 46]
“Children should be educated to this issue. And more: subsidizing organic farming and
keep financing awareness-raising campaigns.” [NB2,male, 23]
“Raising awareness is important. That is the role of the public sector, there should be an
ecological system to be proposed to everybody!” [LRG1, female, 24]
“It should raise awareness through awareness-raising campaigns showing the worldwide
effects of energy, water, etc. overconsumption.” [TDS1,male, 23]
Again, a few respondents evoke that the government could implement economic instruments,
but subsidies (in particular taking the form of tax rebates) are much more preferred than
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Interventions N
Awareness-raising and suasion
Promoting energy savings 23
“Green schooling” 4
Promote renewables 3
Create new labels 1
Diffusing smart metering 1
Taxes
Increasing prices (e.g. electricity, waste) 4
Subsidies
Giving tax credits to green firms and households 11
Subsidizing public transports for low-income households 4
Subsidizing (very general) 2
Subsidizing efficient appliances 2
Subsidizing local food 1
Subsidizing homeowners to improve energy efficiency 1
Infrastructure
Developing bikeways 1
Developing recycling facilities 1
No intervention
No role to play 2
Table 2: Number of times government interventions were mentioned (question 2)
taxes, especially by those that did not consider the public sector in question 1. That is, only a
very small minority thinks spontaneously of carbon taxes as a potential mean to tackle energy
consumption and emissions. Those answers are to some extent coherent. They show that
people are willing to undertake measures to reduce energy consumption either if these do not
imply any cost or, if they do, provided that financial compensation (e.g. subsidies) is offered.
From a political perspective, answers to this question seem backing up the choice done by many
European governments to give priority to subsidies to e.g. energy-efficiency investments and
renewable energy. The lack of support for carbon taxes comes as no surprise and analysing its
determinants is one of the aims of this study. Question 3 thus explicitly proposes carbon taxes
as a policy instrument and asks for the respondent’s opinion on it.
We observe an important amount of discussion around this question. We cluster respondent’s
answers based on the following themes: perceived environmental effectiveness, trust in the gov-
ernment and distributional effects. Concerning perceived effectiveness, an important proportion
of respondents raises serious doubts about the tax effectiveness. For them the tax would hardly
reduce energy consumption:
“Taxing more? I do not know. . . [. . . ] We are forced to consume, it is not with a tax that
this is going to change.” [DM1,male, 30]
The respondent claims he never thought that the simple fact of charging someone an ad-
ditional tax would substantially affect his way of living and consuming. [TDS2,male, 29]
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“I only see increased bills [. . . ]. Though, why not, if it could incite the population to
reduce energy consumption, but I do not really think so.” [SB1, female, 46]
The recurrence of the argument about the tax environmental (in-)effectiveness seems pointing
to a widespread underestimation of carbon taxes. On top of that, we note that a few individuals
claim that with a carbon tax they would face a motivational crowding-out, i.e. the tax would
decrease their efforts to reduce energy consumption. Conceptually, this effect can be defined
as the consequence of a behavioural reversal that intervenes when agents feel to be treated
unfairly with respect to a moral decision between a “good” and a “bad” action. That is, the
introduction of an instrument such as a tax would imply that “no behaviour is good enough
not to be penalized” (Goeschl and Perino, 2012). With the words of Frey and Jegen (2001),
the policy instrument either modifies the agent’s preferences or the perception of her duty, her
environment or herself.
“Energy taxes could end up discouraging efforts. [. . . ] A system of sanctions would be
fairer.” [SB3,male, 57]
She saves energy already and there is no reason to tax current efforts. She would perceive
it as unfair and instead of saving more she would do the opposite. This because her
previous efforts would not be rewarded. [TDS3, female, 53]
This would generate the opposite outcome since for those already saving energy this would
be perceived as totally unfair as they already save energy. Thus, she would stop saving
energy. Since be paying, better enjoying then. [TDS4, female, 23]
Albeit not referring to a potential crowding-out, another respondent underlines the unfairness
(as she perceives it) of carbon taxation:
Respondent says that it is not normal that the good citizen is not thanked for her efforts.
And that she has to pay for bad citizens. A control of bad consumers should be established
so to tax them further. [KH2, female, 29]
Twelve respondents express a lack of confidence in the government and policymakers. Some
explicitly mention distrust, while others raise worries about the use of tax revenues. For some,
carbon taxes are only a pretext to raise new fiscal revenues. That is, a Pigouvian tax simply
hiding a Ramsey tax. In several cases, respondents state a need for transparency in the use of
revenues, which may condition their support to the policy:
He would like to know exactly what is done with the money. “We need the federal
agency in charge of this tax to provide us with all the information and explanations.”
[MG2,male, 31]
“To accept [. . . ] it would be necessary to know where tax revenues go.” [TDS4, female, 35]
Yes, if this tax really contributes to specific projects. “If it is just a pretext to make
money, that is no good!” [LRG4,male, 35]
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“The government says what you have to do and you do not really know where the money
goes [. . . ]. Perhaps the government one day will tax our own exhalation of CO2 and
discourage sports.” [MG1,male, 25]
Distrust in the government leads some individuals to ask for ex-ante earmarking already at this
stage of the discussion:
She would like to make sure that her money is really going to renewable energy projects.
[DM3, female, 30]
“Yes, if the tax contributes to the development of renewable energy. However, we will
never be sure. . . ” [LRG3, female, 30]
Respondents tend to identify earmarking with the financing of environmental investments and
in particular the development of renewable energy. We explore this issue more in detail while
analysing question 4.
Distributional issues seem to be a concern for about half of the sample. Some respondents are
simply worried about how the tax would hit the poorest households. Others propose possible
solutions to overcome the regressive impact of carbon taxes (cf. Baranzini et al., 2000).
“Those with money will keep consuming. At the end of the day, we always hit those
without it.” [DM3, female, 30]
“It is important not to penalize the poorest people.” [NB1,male, 80]
“The situation is already sufficiently difficult with respect to the current economic cri-
sis. Paying an additional tax seems to me a bad idea, above all in time of crisis.”
[SB4, female, 46]
“On the one hand, it would force people to get involved, but on the other it would be
unfair for people who already face financial problems. However, applying a tax based on
the situation of each household would be acceptable.” [NB4,male, 23]
“This tax should be proportional to income and consumption.” [MG2,male, 31]
Question 4 provides respondents with the possibility to define their preferred way of revenue
recycling, i.e. how they would use the revenues from this hypothetical carbon tax. Although
it is an open question and thus respondents can mention any kind of revenue recycling, we
suggest three options:
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1) Funding of environmental projects.
2) Redistribution to most affected households.
3) Tax rebates for households and firms.
Some respondents weigh all options and introduce new ones (e.g. development aid, education),
but most of our sample focuses directly on the funding of environmental project. For them,
there has to be a natural and logical link between the tax purpose and the use of revenues. A
few individuals really struggle to conceive how revenues could be used for other purposes than
the environment.
“It seems normal that revenues would be used in the energy domain.” [SB3,male, 57]
“It is clear that such tax has to provide funding to ecological projects, first of all because
this is the denomination of the tax.” [SC2,male, 30]
“Tax revenues should definitely be used for environmental projects.” [TDS4, female, 23]
“Tax revenues should be used in the field of energy and the environment in general. It
must be a closed circle. The tax has to pursue its target and allow things to improve.”
[MG3,male, 60]
“It is an energy tax, so its revenues should be used to develop green technologies.”
[DM4, female, 34]
“The money obtained would be invested in renewable energies and this would allow finding
new efficient solutions. It would be getting two birds with a stone!” [NB3, female, 20]
The second recycling option targets the tax’s distributional effects by redistributing income
to the most disadvantaged households. Its reception is relatively lukewarm. Only few people
particularly concerned by distributional effects believe that social cushioning is necessary:
“First of all, it is about benefiting the least-advantaged people.” [NB1,male, 80]
“Above all, it is necessary to help retired individuals that need to be kept warm.” [TDS3, female, 53]
Other respondents share the concern about the regressive impact of carbon taxes, but do not
consider social cushioning as a viable option, due to its presumably large administrative burden.
They thus seem to accept that carbon taxes would make some households relatively worse off:
“To me, it seems too complicated.” [JRC1,male, 26]
“Really too complex and hard to realize.” [SB4, female, 46]
“Such system should not cost more than it yields.” [NB1,male, 80]
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These two types of answers represent however a minority. As discussed, for most respondents
not using tax revenues for environmental purposes sounds inconceivable and groundless:
“So, we go nowhere! If we pay more and give back part to others, the money goes nowhere!
The target would be to invest for the future. Otherwise, we are stuck with fossil energy!”
[LRG1, female, 24]
“I do not see the link and I do not see why energy consumption would be used as a pretext
to help the most affected households.” [TDS1,male, 23]
“If the revenues would be used for something different, the government would lose its
credibility regarding how urgent the situation is. Actually, if it is so urgent and important
to stop over-consuming, why should tax revenues be used for things other than saving the
planet?! That is illogical.” [TDS4, female, 23]
Finally, a few argue that there is clearly no need for social cushioning as it would benefit those
already milking the welfare system:
“It would be as always, with losers benefiting of these revenues.” [DM1,male, 30]
“There are already so many subsidies for poor people, and we should not mix up different
problems.” [MG1,male, 25]
Mixed opinions are reported on the recycling option consisting in tax rebates for households
and firms. The support it receives arguably results from the perceived necessity to introduce
a system of bonuses rewarding those curbing their energy demand, rather than from the quest
of a double dividend (except for respondent JRC1). This may explain the popularity of bonus-
malus policies and is clearly in line with the most recurrent critiques from the general public
to the Environmental Tax Reform (ETR, see below).
“Taxing is about making individuals aware of how dear is energy. This is to me the
government’s role, it could push it through the population by decreasing another tax.”
[JRC1,male, 26]
“Using it as a bonus to reduce taxes to households and firms deserving it.” [MG3,male, 60]
“Households and firms that did an effort would deserve a tax rebate.” [KH2, female, 29]
“These revenues could actually allow to reduce taxes to those firms that get involved.”
[MG1,male, 25]
For those that do not like this option the explanation may reside once again in the missing
link between taxation and the use of revenues, i.e. why taxing here and giving back there. A
compelling interpretation is that for respondents NB2 and NB4, carbon pricing should not only
redirect consumption towards cleaner goods and services, but also reduce the overall level of
consumption, eventually leading to some degrowth.
“Tax rebates do not make any sense. At the end, people could consume what they saved.”
[NB4,male, 23]
“This would increase the purchasing power of households and the solution is actually
reducing household’s consumption.” [NB2,male, 23]
10
4 Discussion and policy implications
Our qualitative evidence tends to confirm prior findings in the literature. We observe a general
resistance to public intervention (as in Cherry et al., 2012) with, if deemed necessary, a pref-
erence for pull (e.g. subsidies to public transportation) over push (e.g. carbon tax) measures.
For most respondents, private efforts represent the main approach to climate change mitigation
and their effectiveness can be improved by the public sector through increased information and
communication. Most of these efforts may come at a limited (or even negative) cost. The
literature refers to “efficiency behaviour”, which implies that with little effort the current level
of comfort can be generally maintained, but at a lower level of energy consumption. Efficiency
behaviour is opposed to “curtailment behaviour”, which implies a change in lifestyle. Curtail-
ment actions (such as the implementation of carbon taxes) are therefore much less popular than
those targeting efficiency behaviour (Steg et al., 2006). Indeed, our analysis shows that a large
cloud darkens the sky of carbon taxes: perception of environmental ineffectiveness and distrust
in the government’s real purpose are in our view two sides of the same coin. It follows that
respondents are generally disconcerted about the possibility of using the revenues of an envi-
ronmental tax for something unrelated to the environment (i.e. “issue-linkage”, cf. Kallbekken
and Aasen, 2010; but also e.g. Beuermann and Santarius, 2006; Steg et al., 2006; Brannlund
and Persson, 2012). In this sense, it is because the carbon tax is perceived as ineffective that
fiscal revenues have to be used in the environmental domain, otherwise the government would
be simply seen as collecting extra revenues. Indeed, no other forms of recycling receive a tan-
gible support. Not even social cushioning: although some respondents acknowledge the need
to offset the tax’s distributional effects, it seems that the way of financing social cushioning
should make abstraction of carbon tax revenues (as in Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010).
Hence, we observe a gap between what economic theory suggests both in terms of policy choice,
i.e. first-best versus second-best policies, and policy design, i.e. efficient use of revenues (e.g.
allocation to the general budget ensuring flexibility and thus funding of policies with the highest
social return or direct reduction of distortionary taxes) versus earmarking for environmental
purposes (cf. Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010). We put forward several complementary explana-
tions to this gap.
First, people may interpret the lack of private efforts as the result of a lack of information,
whereas for economists analyse it is simply the standard outcome of a prisoner’s dilemma. The
call of respondents for improved communication may however somehow meet the recent strand
of research on (conditional) cooperation in global dilemmas, see e.g. Cialdini (2003); Nyborg
et al. (2006); Schultz et al. (2007); Ostrom (2009); Carattini et al. (2013); Lindman et al. (2013);
Allcott and Rogers (2014).
Second, while for economists, in the short run and under standard assumptions, subsidies and
taxes are equivalent in terms of incentives, the former are clearly preferred by the public.
This preference is very well documented in the literature. As remarked by Steg et al. (2006),
pull measures are perceived as more acceptable and more effective than push measures, unless
revenues are allocated for environmental purposes (cf. also Kallbekken and Aasen 2010). Non-
coercive instruments that make pro-environmental behaviour less costly are more appealing and
considered as more effective as they are really perceived as an incentive, whereas taxes are seen
more as a disincentive (or punishment), which unsuccessfully try to change people’s lifestyle (cf.
Steg et al., 2006). That is, as stressed in Carattini and Baranzini (2014), perceived effectiveness
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and acceptability go hand in hand. The same seems to apply to our findings. Indeed, our results
point to a diffused underestimation of carbon taxes environmental effectiveness. Respondents
do not expect carbon taxes to be effective and this does not seem to be related to the panoply
of exceptions and exemptions of existing carbon taxes, but rather to either a misunderstanding
of carbon taxes’ incentive effect or to a perception of fully inelastic demand of fossil fuels2.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that people confound Pigouvian with Ramsey taxes (cf.
Kallbekken et al., 2011; Brannlund and Persson, 2012) and ask for earmarking revenues for
environmental purposes. How could they have any environmental effect otherwise? That is,
absent any earmarking, carbon taxes are perceived as a mere pretext to increase fiscal revenues.
It is striking to see that this finding reconciles with those of studies focusing on the ETRs, which
are generally fiscally neutral. Hence, perceived ineffectiveness and distrust in the government
do not create the best premises for the implementation of carbon (or energy) taxes and above
all of more elaborated schemes such as the ETRs (cf. Beuermann and Santarius 2006; Clinch
and Dunne 2006; Clinch et al. 2006; Deroubaix and Lévèque 2006; Dresner et al. 2006a; Dresner
et al. 2006b; Klok et al. 2006). Earmarking for environmental purposes is shown to substantially
increase acceptability of carbon taxes also in Kallbekken et al. (2011), Kallbekken and Sælen
(2011), Sælen and Kallbekken (2011) and Carattini and Baranzini (2014).
From this discussion three policy implications follow. First, when designing climate policies,
policymakers may want to consider to give up some of the potential efficiency gains and trade
them for increased clarity and thus acceptability. This would imply to earmark a substantial
part of the revenues for environmental purposes, thus renouncing to e.g. some reduction in
distortionary taxes, which economists tend to consider as the most productive use of revenues.
This makes sense, since the general public do not fully understand the rationale for such an
“obscure” mechanism. In this point we therefore agree with Grubb et al. (2014): earmarking
should no longer be a taboo for economists, at least as a short-term measure to channel political
support towards first-best policies. As a result, the criterion of revenue neutrality would not be
met. Again, from a political perspective this is no harm, since for the general public neutrality
does not seem to be a necessary requirement to support carbon taxes. Though, one may argue
that in the case of a real ballot lobbies would react differently depending on the way revenues
are used. Yet, we argue that most lobbying usually come from energy-intensive industries
which would lose anyway, if climate policy really aims at allocating resources more efficiently,
regardless of the use of revenues.
Second, since people seem particularly sensitive to their own gains, it would be useful to design
policies in a way that makes them salient for those that may enjoy them. Emphasizing financial
gains may make revenue-neutral policies much more appealing to the general public, thus
contributing to bridge the gap between it and economists. Policymakers may want to build on
the example of bonus-malus policies. These policies enjoy a relatively large support, probably
because they make more explicit which behaviour is profitable and which is punished (cf. e.g.
Dresner et al. 2006b). However, policies redistributing revenues lump sum act in the same way:
small polluters are rewarded whereas big polluters end up with a net loss. The problem is that
2In the lab experiment of Kallbekken et al. (2011) giving to participants explanations on how the tax
works do not improve acceptability. The authors suggest that this may be a feature of lab experiments, since
assessing pay-offs is relatively easier than in real life. Our classroom discussions with students trained in
economics (amongst others) may suggest instead that providing information may not be enough to change
deep understanding and perception of Pigouvian taxes. In the case of Switzerland, estimates for gasoline price
elasticity of demand range from −0.09 in the short run to −0.34 in the long run, cf. Baranzini and Weber
(2013).
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this mechanism is not made salient. The case of the Swiss carbon tax is particularly revealing.
We emphasize the following two related elements. First, the population is not fully aware of
the existing carbon tax on heating fuels (only 40% of the sample are aware of it in Carattini
and Baranzini 2014). Second, redistribution is not salient at all. Using figures for 2014, the
amount redistributed lump-sum to Swiss residents is 52.50 Swiss francs (about 42€). To keep
administrative costs low, this is done through the compulsory healthcare insurance. However,
no particular explanation is given about this refund, which is introduced in small characters
in the monthly healthcare bill (i.e. the full amount is divided by 12). Even though the Swiss
CO2 levy is not yet completely revenue neutral, up to one third of revenues being allocated
to improvements in energy efficiency in buildings, this feature could be easily marketed as a
tax threshold (cf. Pezzey and Jotzo 2013) and thus be associated to a right to pollute, which
would equal the lump-sum transfer times the current tax rate. Furthermore, financial gains
may come with benefits of environmental nature (cf. Carattini and Baranzini 2014). In this
respect, we stress emphasize the role played by the trial period in demonstrating the benefits
of the Stockholm congestion charge and thus contribute to the policy success when people went
to vote (cf. Kallbekken and Sælen 2011).
Third, in a shorter horizon, policymakers may want to develop those policies promoting volun-
tary efforts, which clearly do not face issues of acceptability, and then from them move on to
more stringent policies. Policies targeting voluntary efforts may not necessarily need to take
place at the national level. Subnational and local actors, which likely enjoy more trust by
communities, may be more effective in spurring cooperation (Catney et al. 2013; Tavoni 2013).
As shown by Blumer et al. (2014) for Switzerland, local utilities can have an important role
to play in reducing energy consumption, provided that they are given the right incentives. In
this respect it is of particular interest the choice of some utilities in several Swiss cantons to
set the green electric mix as the default option. Even though users are in most cases given the
possibility to opt out and move back to the “grey” option (thus saving a couple of cents per
kWh), the evidence available so far indicates that only a few households take this chance while
the large majority remains with the new default product. Arguably, such bottom-up approach
would be more a complement than a substitute to top-down carbon pricing.
5 Conclusion
In the context of environmental issues in general and of climate change mitigation in particular,
it is well known that the patient tends not to follow the doctor’s prescriptions (cf. Hahn
1989; Brannlund and Persson 2012). The main reasons behind the limited diffusion of first-
best policies seem to be related to their unpopularity. For most of the general public in this
qualitative study, mitigation should mainly rely on voluntary efforts and public policy, if any,
should be limited to encourage them through information, suasion and education. Market
instruments such as subsidies or tax rebates may enjoy some degree of support, but carbon
taxes do it only in a very limited extent. We assess qualitatively the drivers of this lack of
public support and find them especially in the underestimation of carbon taxes environmental
effectiveness. Perceived ineffectiveness goes hand in hand with distrust in the government,
which is considered as looking for additional fiscal revenues only. In the case carbon taxes were
to be implemented, since people do not understand or believe in their incentive effect, they
would have to respond to a strong demand for earmarking fiscal revenues for environmental
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purposes. Indeed, most people believe that carbon taxes curb emissions only indirectly by
generating revenues to be invested in the environmental realm.
In terms of climate policy, our analysis suggests that complex schemes may better leave the
place for straightforward policies with tax revenues alimenting a visible green fund, albeit this
implies renouncing to efficiency-enhancing redistribution and revenue neutrality. Second, the
public should be given the time to experience or the information to evaluate policy’s benefits.
Third, policies promoting private efforts may be easily implemented (and appreciated) as they
would not face the barriers that carbon taxes do. Such policies may however not be sufficient
for high abatement targets and their cost-effectiveness has to be ensured.
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A Socio-demographic characteristics
ID Length Gender Age Postal code Job profile Income class HC
DM1 28 M 30 1226 - middle-low tenant
DM2 32 F 65 1205 retiree low tenant
DM3 22 F 30 1226 worker middle-high -
DM4 28 F 34 1227 worker middle-low tenant
JRC1 27 M 26 1219 worker middle-low tenant
JRC2 24 F 56 1228 worker middle-low tenant
JRC3 23 M 29 1227 worker low tenant
KH1 25 M 25 1202 student middle-low tenant
KH2 30 F 29 1203 worker middle-low owner
KH3 25 M 25 1203 student low tenant
KH4 21 M 27 1290 worker middle-low tenant
LRG1 20 F 24 1226 student low tenant
LRG2 30 F 32 1227 worker middle-high tenant
LRG3 19 F 30 1227 worker low tenant
LRG4 40 M 35 1207 worker middle-low tenant
MG1 22 M 25 1207 worker middle-low tenant
MG2 24 M 31 1207 unemployed middle-low tenant
MG3 15 M 60 1207 retiree middle-high tenant
MG4 25 F 58 1207 retiree middle-high tenant
NB1 45 M 80 1228 retiree middle-low owner
NB2 45 M 23 1228 worker middle-low tenant
NB3 40 F 20 1227 student middle-low tenant
NB4 35 M 23 1205 student low tenant
PJB2 NA M 22 1252 independent low tenant
PJB3 15 F 47 1206 independent high owner
PJB4 35 F 26 1227 student low tenant
SB1 20 F 46 1201 worker middle-low tenant
SB2 23 F 24 1202 worker low tenant
SB3 30 M 57 1201 worker middle-high tenant
SB4 25 F 46 1201 worker middle-low tenant
SC1 30 F 30 1227 independent middle-high tenant
SC2 25 M 30 1294 worker low owner
SC3 30 M 23 1255 student high owner
SC4 35 F 36 1292 manager high owner
TDS1 30 M 23 1205 student middle-low tenant
TDS2 35 M 29 1227 worker middle-high tenant
TDS3 35 F 53 1201 worker middle-low owner
TDS4 25 F 23 1227 student middle-low tenant
Note: Lenght of interview measured in minutes. HC stands for “housing contract”.
Table A.1: Socio-demographic characteristics
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, international negotiations have aimed at stabilizing the
concentration of greenhouse gases at levels that would prevent dangerous
interferences with the climate system. However, there is increasing evidence
showing that current mitigation efforts are by large not enough (UNEP 2013; IPCC
2014). This result comes as no surprise. Even though economists assessed their
theoretical cost-effectiveness long time ago (cf. e.g. Baumol and Oates 1971), the
implementation of powerful policy instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
such as carbon taxes is a rather recent phenomenon (Baranzini and Carattini 2014).
A recent strand of literature has started exploring the public acceptability of carbon
taxes, pointing to a series of important obstacles such as distributional impacts on
low-income households and fear of competitiveness effects (cf. Baranzini et al.
2000; Zhang and Baranzini 2004). In most developed countries carbon taxes are
indeed at least slightly regressive (see e.g. Roca and Serrano 2007; Bra¨nnlund and
Ghalwash 2008; Sterner 2011) and the local co-benefits benefitting mostly the
poorest households are usually given a lower weight. Despite the recent empirical
evidence points to rather small competitiveness effects (Mathys and de Melo 2011),
potential adverse effects on employment and competitiveness represented a real
concern when the first carbon taxes in Scandinavian countries were designed (cf.
e.g. Godal and Holtsmark 2001; Bruvoll and Larsen 2004) and when similar
schemes were turned down elsewhere (cf. e.g. Thalmann 2004).
More recently, the literature has devoted increasing attention towards the
perceived impact of carbon taxes on the environment. While economists tend to take
the beneficial environmental effects as granted, the effectiveness of carbon taxes
does not seem to be always internalized by the general public. Based on qualitative
assessments, Dresner et al. (2006) first raised the issue of perceived environmental
ineffectiveness: the general public tends to miss the incentive effect of carbon taxes,
thus expecting tax revenues to be earmarked for environmental purposes. When this
is not the case, most people feel that carbon taxes are just a pretext to raise fiscal
revenues. When tax revenues are earmarked for other purposes, the general public is
generally disconcerted about the possibility of using the revenues of an environ-
mental tax for something unrelated to the environment. Sælen and Kallbekken
(2011) define this problem as ‘‘issue-linkage’’. The stylized fact of Dresner et al.
(2006) is supported by the quantitative evidence of Kallbekken and Sælen (2011)
and Sælen and Kallbekken (2011), both finding a negative pattern between
perceived environmental ineffectiveness and stated support for carbon and energy
taxes, and is consistent with real voting behavior as analyzed by Thalmann (2004).
Pigouvian taxes are thus perceived at the same time as coercive and ineffective
(Steg et al. 2006). This may lead Pigouvian taxes to be more popular if not labelled
as such: in the lab experiment of Kallbekken et al. (2011), a ‘‘fee’’ is preferred to an
equivalent instrument called ‘‘tax’’.
We improve this recent literature using survey data and a randomized labeling
treatment to test the effect of several policy variables and perceptions on
acceptability. First, we confirm that perceived environmental ineffectiveness is
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one of the main barriers to the acceptability of carbon taxes. Our original approach
shows that not only the expectation of main environmental effects affects
acceptability, but also the perception of potential co-benefits does. Second, we
show that competitiveness and distributional effects may not have a role as
determinants of acceptability. Third, we show that acceptability increases substan-
tially with earmarking, in particular for environmental purposes. This is especially
true among those individuals who tend to distrust the government. However,
earmarking does not act as a substitute for perceived effectiveness. Even when
revenues are earmarked, perceived effectiveness remains related to higher
acceptability. Fourth, contrasting the labels ‘‘carbon tax’’ and ‘‘climate contribu-
tion’’, we show that labeling can spur acceptability also in the street and not only in
the lab. ‘‘Climate contribution’’ may sound as an appeal to the public good, recalling
to the general public the urgency of climate change mitigation.
We use the Canton of Geneva, Switzerland, as field, and interview more than 300
individuals between December 2012 and January 2013. The Swiss context may be
particularly salient to simulate voting behavior, since Swiss people are used to
express their opinions in poll and ballots, but we consider all of our findings of
general interest. The lack of popularity of carbon taxes has indeed limited its
implementation in virtually all political contexts in developed countries.
2 Survey design and data description
2.1 Hypotheses
We formulate a series of main hypotheses to be tested with the econometric model.
We expect positive perceived impacts of carbon taxes to be positively associated
to carbon tax acceptability. Positive impacts consist of carbon emissions abatements
(i.e. environmental effectiveness) and improvements in local outcomes such as air
quality, health and road externalities. As shown by Dresner et al. (2006) and
Bristow et al. (2010), the acceptability of a given carbon tax design can be
influenced by how agents perceive the instrument as effective (see also Brouwer
et al. 2008 on a carbon travel tax). We are not aware of previous studies examining
the link between perceived co-benefits and acceptability, but Longo et al. (2012)
suggest for instance that the willingness to pay for climate change mitigation is
about 50–70 % higher when co-benefits are considered by respondents.
Concerning drawbacks, distributional concerns affect acceptability in Thalmann
(2004), in which the probability of a yes-vote for a green proposal is substantially
lower when the proposal implies a clear increase in inequalities. Bristow et al.
(2010) find a marked preference for a carbon credit up to 4 tons of CO2 per capita to
reduce distributional effects. Inequality aversion is also present in Kallbekken and
Sælen (2011) and Brannlund and Persson (2012).
Acceptability is supposed to increase with earmarking and we expect earmarking
for environmental purposes to have the largest impact (cf. e.g. Dresner et al. 2006;
Steg et al. 2006; Kallbekken and Aasen 2010; Sælen and Kallbekken 2011). When
earmarking is not specified, we expect people distrusting the government to be less
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likely to approve carbon taxes. Since most people fail to understand the difference
between Pigouvian and Ramsey taxes and thus perceive environmental taxes as a
mean to raise more revenues (Kallbekken et al. 2011), they may be willing to give
up some of their income only if the use of revenues is clearly made explicit.
Because the tax is perceived as environmentally ineffective, the only way to impact
the environment is by earmarking the fiscal revenues for the environment.
Based on the literature, we forecast different acceptability depending on the
labeling of the tax. According to Steg et al. (2006), environmental taxes are
perceived by most of the general public as ‘‘penalties’’, i.e. coercive measures
imposing a change in behavior. Higher acceptability with different labeling is found
not only in Kallbekken et al. (2011), but also in the online choice experiment of
Brannlund and Persson (2012), in which a policy called ‘‘tax’’ is opposed to another
policy simply framed as ‘‘other’’. To make the contrast even more manifest, in our
survey we opt for the labeling ‘‘climate contribution’’ as opposed to ‘‘tax’’. We
expect ‘‘climate contribution’’ to sound as an appeal to the public good, which may
crowd in motivation as predicted by persuasive advertising models as in Becker and
Murphy (1993) and Nyborg et al. (2006). ‘‘Climate contribution’’ may signal that
the climate as we know it (i.e. the status-quo) requires help, whereas a ‘‘tax’’ may
recall a threat to disposable income (cf. e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 2000).
Finally, we recall that most of the general public would not tackle climate change
as economists would, i.e. with first-best economic instruments. Indeed, ‘‘non-
coercive’’ policies enjoy much higher acceptability. Hence, people not considering
carbon taxes as a priority to cope with climate change are expected to be less
supportive of this instrument and the other way round. In sum, the hypotheses that
we test in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2 are the following:
H1 Perceived positive (negative) effects of carbon taxes positively (negatively)
affect carbon tax acceptability. Positive effects consist not only in emissions
abatements but also of local co-benefits.
H2 Earmarking revenues increases acceptability, especially for environmental
purposes.
H3 The support to carbon taxes of people not trusting the government is especially
dependent on the use of revenues.
H4 The label ‘‘climate contribution’’, as opposed to ‘‘carbon tax’’, generates more
support.
H5 Most people do not see carbon taxes as the main solution to curb greenhouse
gas emissions. These people are less likely to support carbon taxes.
To test these hypotheses, we administer face to face a questionnaire pre-tested and
supported by a qualitative study (see Sect. 2.3) to random people in the streets of
Geneva. In an experimental spirit, we test for hypothesis H4 by administering two
types of questionnaire: half of the sample was randomly attributed a questionnaire
with the wording ‘‘carbon tax’’ (hereafter CT), while the remaining with ‘‘climate
contribution’’ (CC).1
1 Cf. Appendix 1 for the full questionnaires.
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2.2 Economic context
From a climate policy perspective, the context of Switzerland is of particular
interest. Switzerland lobbies beside the European Union in the post-Kyoto
negotiations, urging for ambitious agreements. In addition, in the aftermath of the
Fukushima accident, Switzerland decided to start to phase-out nuclear energy. Since
currently 40 % of electricity is from nuclear sources, Switzerland has very low
carbon emissions from electricity in international comparison and thus little room
for maneuver to replace nuclear energy without increasing carbon emissions. This
implies the need for substantial reductions in consumption (Baranzini et al. 2013).
Given the public rejection of three energy-tax proposals in 2000, Switzerland
adopted a climate strategy based on voluntary agreements and only in 2008
introduced a carbon tax limited to heating fuels (cf. Thalmann 2004; Baranzini et al.
2004). After that Switzerland missed in 2012 its objective of CO2 emissions
reduction, the carbon tax rate was revised upward, but an extension of the tax base
to all fuels may be desirable to reach the more ambitious abatement targets currently
under consideration.2 In particular we refer to the pledge that Switzerland submitted
to the UNFCCC in February 2015 in view of the same year’s Conference of Parties,
consisting in a reduction of emissions of 50 % by 2030 with respect to the levels of
1990. Doing so, Switzerland became the first country to submit a pledge and set the
bar high for the following participants.
Energy taxes are already a hot topic in Switzerland. In March 2015, the Swiss
population rejected at 92 % (90.9 % in the Canton of Geneva) an extremely
ambitious popular initiative promoted by the Green Liberals aiming at completely
replacing the current value-added tax (VAT) with an energy tax. Given the
substantial dependence of the Swiss government from VAT revenues and the
concern that energy prices would have spiked well beyond what currently under
consideration by policymakers, the promoters of the initiative found themselves
practically isolated and with the government taking position against the initiative.
While the Swiss government opposed the specific proposal brought up by the Green
Liberals, it does support the principle of economic incentives and in particular of
generalized carbon taxes. Shortly after the vote, the Swiss government announced
its plan for reaching the abovementioned targets, which indeed relies on carbon
taxation of all fuels (with a short embargo on gasoline) and lump-sum redistribution
of revenues. In line with the findings of this paper, the Swiss government interprets
the March 2015’s vote as a rejection of the Green Liberals’ proposal and not of
carbon taxes per se.
2.3 Qualitative survey
To define the questions of the quantitative survey, we first administer through semi-
structured interviews a qualitative survey to a small and unrepresentative sample of
2 The reference tax rate at the time of the study was 60 CHF per ton of CO2, but the government could
increase it up to 120 CHF/tCO2 if deemed necessary. As of May 2015, 1 CHF  1.05 USD  0.95 EUR.
Two thirds of revenues are redistributed lump sum to households and through lower social contributions
to firms. The remaining third is allocated to energy-efficiency investments in the building sector.
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about 40 adults living in the Canton of Geneva. The interviews took place between
October 26th and November 26th 2012. We report the main findings. First, private
actions (e.g. improvements in energy efficiency) are preferred to public intervention
to curb energy consumption and emissions. Second, when interviewers introduce
explicitly the role of the public sector, the general opinion is to limit its intervention
to communication and education (i.e. suasion). Market instruments are mentioned
only by few, and subsidies (e.g. for public transportation) are by large preferred to
taxes, as in Cherry et al. (2012).
Third, interviewers face some resistance when they propose the implementation
of a generalized carbon tax, related to distrust in the government and a presumed
ineffectiveness in changing behavior. It follows that when they ask how tax
revenues should be used, most respondents suggest to keep them in the
environmental domain. Fourth, social cushioning for low-income households is
regarded as important, but it seems that the way of financing it should be
independent of the environmental tax revenues.
2.4 Quantitative survey
2.4.1 Sample properties
We administer the quantitative survey between December 14th 2012 and January
14th 2014. Our sample is composed of 338 valid observations, 158 in the CT and
180 in the CC sub-samples. Respondents are recruited in the street, with the CT and
CC questionnaires being randomly allocated to interviewers and thus interviewees.
The composition of the sample is fairly representative of Geneva population, except
for a slight under- (over-)representation of retired (young) and less educated
individuals. Based on the socioeconomic characteristics of Table 3, we compare the
CT and CC sub-samples. We do not find any statistical differences in the averages
of these variables, except in the case of education (16 years with CT compared to
15.59 with CC) and the number of adults in the households (2.15 with CT and 2.44
with CC). Even though most of our insights are driven by internal validity, we are
also concerned by the external validity of our results. The econometric approach of
Sect. 3 takes thus care of possible sample selection.
The survey also identifies members of environmental organizations (hereafter
‘‘green members’’, 14 % of the sample) and political positioning (coded as left,
center, right and no positioning), and investigates general measures of self-reported
environmental concern. It also asks whether respondents generally trust their
government and if they are aware of the existing CO2 tax on heating fuels. Most of
the people in the sample do trust the government as 93 % declare to be either
‘‘rather confident’’ or ‘‘completely confident’’ with respect to the government’s
deeds. Remarkably only 40 % declare to be aware of the current carbon taxation.
The lack of awareness concerning current taxation may be explained by the limited
salience of both taxation and lump-sum refunds to households through reduced
healthcare bills. Respondents are also asked what role they would attribute to the
public sector to spur energy conservation. Only a tiny fraction of individuals (2 %)
contends that there is no need for energy conservation at all. Similarly, only 3 %
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believe that energy consumption does not need to be regulated. That is, the large
majority expects the government to intervene to curb energy consumption.
However, as for the qualitative survey, market instruments do not represent the
favored tool. Preferences go rather to informational campaigns raising awareness
and to policies funding public transportation. However, already at this stage 35 % of
respondents believe that the Swiss government should intervene with a broader
carbon tax to lower energy consumption.
2.4.2 Policy variables
In what follows we present the main policy variables included in the survey (cf.
Table 5 for the full descriptive statistics).
Carbon taxes’ environmental effectiveness In the survey, we introduce a
hypothetical carbon tax (or climate contribution) with a tax rate of 120 CHF per
ton of CO2, implying a price increase of gasoline of about 15 % and of heating
fuel of about 30 %. The majority of the sample thinks that the tax would lead to a
reduction of their level of energy consumption, but a non-negligible proportion of
respondents (37 %) expects no change in behavior. A small minority (7 %) even
expects larger consumption. These either represent protest answers or suggest that
worries of a possible motivational crowding-out may be justified. That is,
economic instruments may turn out to have counterproductive effects on
intrinsically motivated agents (Deci and Ryan 1985), if individuals that already
provide large efforts for a given public good in the absence of any economic
incentive feel frustrated for being taxed despite their efforts (‘‘no behavior is good
enough not to be penalized’’, Goeschl and Perino 2012) or feel less responsible
toward the provision of the public good as they think that ‘‘since I pay, I can
consume and thus pollute’’ (Bazin et al. 2004).
Next, the questionnaire enlarges the focus and asks whether people expect the tax
to be effective, i.e. if it would lead to a decrease in the energy consumption and
greenhouse gas emissions of Switzerland. A short majority (52 %) expects the tax
not to be effective.
Co-benefits Respondents are asked to spontaneously mention a list of ancillary
benefits of carbon taxes, if any, without having access to the list of potential answers
in the questionnaire, to avoid to influence their opinions. About half of the sample
(56 %) expects better air quality as an ancillary benefit from carbon taxes. The
proportion is lower for congestion issues (27 %), health improvements (42 %) and
road accidents (18 %). People thus exhibit a relatively low awareness of co-benefits,
which may need to be targeted through improved communication, along with
primary benefits.
Disadvantages In line with the literature, regressive effects seem to represent a real
issue for the people in this sample. However, we find that only a minority (25 %) is
concerned about distributional effects on rural households, which are also expected
to be particularly affected, given the limited possibilities of substitution between
private and public transportation in the countryside. This may be specific to the
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context of Geneva, whose countryside hosts many high-income households attracted
by calmness, green spaces and possibly low income tax rates. Instead, only
relatively small proportions of respondents are concerned about employment and
competitiveness effects. In particular, the number of people concerned about
employment issues (11 %) is only slightly larger than those concerned about their
own job (5 %; the correlation between being concerned about unemployment and
being concerned about the own job is 0.46). We note that at the time of the survey,
the level of unemployment in the Canton of Geneva (in Switzerland) was about
5.5 % (3 %).
Finally, one of the main perceived drawbacks is represented by the private cost of
climate change mitigation, which is strictly positive for all citizens absent any
redistribution. The most generalized fear for respondents in this sample (67 %) is to
be constrained to reduce the overall level of consumption due to the higher energy
prices. Interestingly, expecting lower purchasing power does not necessarily imply a
loss of comfort. It appears that people in the sample feel that they could live
comfortably even with less purchasing power, although they may not like it. Further
data inspections show that expecting losses of purchasing power is negatively
correlated with the highest income category and expecting less comfort is positively
associated with the lowest income category.
Acceptability After discussing policy’s advantages and disadvantages, we directly
test for policy acceptability. No earmarking is specified at this stage, i.e. tax
revenues fund the general budget, which is the first best from an economic
perspective (cf. Sælen and Kallbekken 2011). The share of positive answers is quite
high and close to majority (49 %). In fact, the approval rate is very close to the
support given to the ‘‘Energy conservation package’’ in the ballot of 2000 (46.6 %,
cf. Thalmann 2004).3
Social cushioning The questionnaire then asks what groups of population should
be compensated due to the CT/CC perceived adverse impacts. Social cushioning is
particularly warranted for low-income households (72 % of support), but around
50–60 % of respondents support also compensating measures for elderly people
and large families. We stress that retiring implies lower income (60 % of pre-
retirement income is the social security target in Switzerland) and pensions are not
indexed to inflation. In the United Kingdom, for instance, lump-sum transfers are
done in favor of people aged 62 or more under the Winter Fuel Payment scheme.
However, cushioning of these two categories is seldom mentioned in the literature.
Societywide refunds, i.e. the current way of refunding tax revenues from the
Swiss carbon tax on heating fuels, seems not to be the preferred option for our
sample, although it represents a simple and cheap (but also possibly ununderstood)
way of reducing regressivity (see e.g. Metcalf 2009; cf. Pezzey and Jotzo 2013 and
Bristow et al. 2010 on tax thresholds). In particular, we remark that older people are
3 Respondents were also given a ‘‘Do not know’’ option. However, what we want to assess is the
willingness to accept such a policy and hence treat irresolute respondents as no-voters, although
abstention is always an alternative in ballots. 93 individuals are concerned.
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disadvantaged by the current recycling, while the opinions in this sample would
rather justify a specific aid to this sub-population.
Revenue recycling We propose three ways of revenue recycling (and give space for
a possible fourth option). The first option is redistribution towards affected
households, which relates to the previous discussion on distributional effects. The
second option consists in tax rebates for households and firms, which may allow, by
decreasing distortionary taxes, for the double dividend of environmental taxation.
Earmarking tax revenues for environmental purposes is a recurrent and popular
option in the literature and represents the third alternative. Respondents are asked to
rank the alternatives in decreasing order of preference. Unsurprisingly, 60 % of the
respondents would like to see the tax revenues used to finance environmental
projects. Social cushioning comes second, while tax rebates to households and firms
are supported by a small minority only.
Acceptability conditional on recycling We retest the level of acceptability
conditional on earmarking and revenue recycling. In detail, the survey asks whether
the respondent would accept a CT/CC if revenues were to be recycled according to
her preferred recycling option. Yes-votes reach now 64 %, i.e. about 15 % more
than without earmarking. This result is consistent with the literature. This level of
support may however be misleading since obtained by assuming that the preferred
recycling options of each individual can be implemented simultaneously. We also
stress the relative importance of the residual 36 % of respondents for which
earmarking revenues is not sufficient to have them accepting the CT/CC, at least at
the tax rate proposed by the questionnaire. Econometric analyses are performed in
Sect. 3.
Tax rate So far, the questionnaire refers to a CT/CC with a tax rate of 120 CHF/
tCO2, causing with full pass-through an increase of about 15 % (30 %) in the price
of gasoline (heating fuels). The questionnaire, thus, asks to the respondents what
would be their highest acceptable CT/CC tax rate, expressed in terms of energy
price increases. The aim is to measure the intensity of acceptability. The distribution
of answers is bounded by the minimum and maximum possible answers given in the
questionnaire (0 and 30 %) and centered in the 5–10 % interval (using interval
means, the average is 7 % and the median 7.5 %). Hence, albeit 64 % of the sample
supports the tax in the previous question, when asked about defining themselves the
tax rate, respondents tend to indicate more moderate energy price increases than
what proposed by the survey. The two results are not necessarily in contradiction.
Voters are indeed supposed to select the option that is closer to their preferences. In
this respect, the Norwegian choice experiment of Sælen and Kallbekken (2011)
shows that respondents would prefer to decrease the current level of environmental
taxes, absent earmarking for environmental purposes. In a similar spirit, Godal and
Holtsmark (2001) suggest to always start with a low tax rate and increase it
regularly once the policy is in place.
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3 Econometric analysis, results and discussion
3.1 Carbon tax acceptability
In this section, we analyze the determinants of carbon tax acceptability when
earmarking is not specified. Since the outcome variable is binary, we apply a probit
estimation strategy. We use as controls both socioeconomic characteristics and the
policy perceptions presented in the previous section. Several socioeconomic factors
are possible determinants of the demand for environmental policy in general and
climate change mitigation in particular. We obtain from our survey data on e.g.
income, education, age, gender, car holding (as proxy for carbon footprint, see
Thalmann 2004; Kallbekken and Sælen 2011; Diederich and Goeschl 2013) and
membership of environmental organizations (as proxy for pro-environmental
behavior).
Estimations results are reported in Table 1, based on marginal effects at median,
consistently with the median voter theorem.4 Column (1) starts with socioeconomic
characteristics.
Given the many missing values and its statistical non-significance, income is
excluded. A variable taking value 1 if income is missing would also be non-
significant. The absence of an effect of income is in line with the literature on
environmental ballots (see e.g. Deacon and Shapiro 1975; Thalmann 2004;
Bornstein and Lanz 2008) and fits the theoretical prediction, above all in a global
context in which the demand for environmental quality is likely to be only partially
expressed (cf. Roca 2003).
Some other socioeconomic variables are clearly not significant. We do not find
for instance any statistically significant effect for age (both as a continuous variable
or using specific groups such as e.g. youth, retired people), gender and political
positioning.
Column (1) shows that the number of cars held by respondents is negatively and
significantly linked with the probability of accepting a carbon tax, whereas green
membership and education have a positive impact. That is, as in Thalmann (2004), it
is not only car ownership, but also the number of vehicles that is related to political
behavior. Of course, ecologists are expected to be relatively more in favor of
climate policy tightening. The effect of education is also as predicted. Since
education is a long-run investment, educated people may possess a lower discount
rate than the average citizen, according to Bornstein and Lanz (2008). Moreover,
educated people may suffer of lower informational gaps on climate change issues.
4 Marginal effects are derivatives computed in different ways depending on the assumed underlying
distribution. Probit assumes a normal (Gaussian) distribution. We compare marginal effects at median
with marginal effect at mean, average marginal effects, logit (which allows for ‘‘thicker tails’’) and OLS.
Marginal effects at mean and average marginal effects are qualitatively unchanged with respect to the
estimates presented in the tables (estimates not provided here). We find that for most coefficients the
choice of the econometric model has implications for the interpretation in terms of magnitude, but not of
sign and significance. In a few specifications co-benefits turn out to be non-significant. Given the presence
of heteroscedasticity, the estimated model includes a heteroscedastic error term. Standard errors are
computed with the Delta method (cf. Greene 2011). We report estimations for our preferred models, but
the insights provided in this section generally hold also with the alternative specifications.
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Table 1 Testing carbon tax/climate contribution acceptability: marginal effects at median from probit
estimation
Acceptability when earmarking
is not specified
(1) (2) (3)
Number of cars 0.0935** (0.0411) 0.0540* (0.0323) 0.0641* (0.0340)
Green member 0.267*** (0.0790) 0.212** (0.0943) 0.196** (0.0925)
Years of education 0.0286* (0.0162) 0.0144 (0.0159) 0.0166 (0.0173)
Gender (male) 0.0827 (0.0589)
Number of adults in the household 0.0284 (0.0283)
Homeowner 0.0437 (0.0853)
Age 0.000629 (0.00227)
Unemployed 0.0596 (0.189)
Left 0.134 (0.0836)
Center 0.0681 (0.0786)
Right 0.0533 (0.0902)
Climate: high concern 0.164*** (0.0616) 0.146** (0.0673)
Energy consumption: no attention 0.339*** (0.126) 0.377*** (0.097)
Energy consumption: very attentive 0.0483 (0.0785)
Expected cooperation 0.110* (0.0624) 0.0675 (0.0665)
Trust in the government 0.200* (0.112) 0.129 (0.133)
Government intervention:
information
0.103 (0.0707) 0.126* (0.0708)
Government intervention: taxation 0.267*** (0.0635) 0.234*** (0.0693)
Government intervention: subsidies 0.0144 (0.0649)
Government intervention: none 0.0861 (0.211)
CT/CC: effect on own behavior 0.186** (0.0734)
CT/CC: crowding-out or protest
answers
0.0311 (0.128)
CT/CC: environmental effectiveness 0.283*** (0.0672)
CT/CC: co-benefits 0.0387** (0.0174)
CT/CC: drawbacks (less purchasing
power)
0.165** (0.0778)
CT/CC: drawbacks (less comfort) 0.0286 (0.0663)
CT/CC: drawbacks (fear of losing
job)
0.237 (0.172)
CT/CC: drawbacks (distributional
effects on the poor)
0.096 (0.0658)
CT/CC: drawbacks (distributional
effects on rural)
0.0966 (0.0773)
CT/CC: drawbacks (competitiveness
effects)
0.0702 (0.0843)
CT/CC: drawbacks (employment
effects)
0.0352 (0.123)
Labeling (climate contribution) 0.1253 (0.1799)
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Lack of information could downplay the relative benefits of climate change
mitigation (cf. e.g. Cohen and Viscusi 2012). The coefficient of column (1) implies
that an additional year of education is linked with about 3 % more probability of
accepting the tax, thus mirroring the evidence on ballots (cf. Thalmann 2004;
Sciarini et al. 2007; Bornstein and Lanz 2008; Bornstein and Thalmann 2008;
Stadelmann-Steffen 2011) and on the demand for climate change mitigation (see
e.g. Roe et al. 2001; Achtnicht 2012; Loeschel et al. 2013).
In column (2) we introduce variables on environmental attitudes. This allows us
to test the hypotheses H3 and H5. We find that being a priori in favor of a carbon tax
has a very large effect on acceptability. This confirms H5 and provides evidence for
the internal validity in the questionnaire. As expected, trust in the government
engenders higher acceptability, providing first evidence in favor of H3.
We also find that being highly concerned about the climate and paying no
attention to energy consumption have a significant and economically meaningful
impact on acceptability, consistently with Kallbekken and Sælen (2011). Since the
effect of education disappears once introduced the role of information and concern,
we may suggest that its effect is rather driven by information asymmetry than a
difference in discounting. Expectation of cooperation in energy conservation’s
efforts from fellow-citizens is associated with a positive effect on acceptability. This
result suggests that people’s willingness to contribute to climate change mitigation
may depend on others doing the same, a result increasingly found in the literature
(see Carattini 2015 for a detailed review). For instance, using different treatments
Bolsen et al. (2014) show that the propensity of American students to be in favor of
a carbon tax depends positively on the same propensity for the whole population as
reported in polls. In the same vein, Lindman et al. (2013) find that Swedish students
show larger willingness to pay for climate change mitigation when provided with
information suggesting a very high participation of the Swedish population in
voluntary carbon offsetting activities. From a theoretical perspective, these findings,
including ours, point to conditional cooperation in the climate commons (see
Nyborg et al. 2006). As suggested by Ostrom (2009), individuals may be willing to
contribute to a public good such as climate change mitigation if they expect others
doing the same, and this in spite of the global public good property of climate
change. Hence, trust may contribute to overcome some of the incentives to free ride
not only in local environmental dilemmas, but also in global commons, such as
Table 1 continued
Acceptability when earmarking
is not specified
(1) (2) (3)
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.175 0.282
Log pseudolikelihood 205.772 185.675 161.774
N 321 325 325
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p\0:1, ** p\0:05, *** p\0:01
H0: all b equal to zero. In column (1) Chi2ð11Þ = 37.03, p ¼ 0:0001. In column (2) Chi2ð12Þ = 62.43,
p ¼ 0:0000. In column (3) Chi2ð21Þ = 95.10, p ¼ 0:0000
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climate change. In this respect, we refer to the recent empirical evidence providing
support in favor of Ostrom (2009), with trust being negatively associated to
greenhouse gas emissions (Carattini et al. 2015) and trust being positively
correlated with the probability of implementing local sustainable policies under
the Agenda 21 scheme (Owen and Videras 2008).
Column (3) introduces the policy variables. The coefficients of column (2) are
generally robust to this new specification. ‘‘Government: information’’ now reaches
significance, suggesting the perception of a complementarity between information
and taxation. According to the focus group of Kallbekken and Aasen (2010), the
general public feels that information campaigns should accompany the implemen-
tation of climate policy providing knowledge on its instruments and not only raising
awareness on climate change (see also Nyborg et al. 2006; Brannlund and Persson
2012).
Column (3) allows us to further test our main hypotheses. The effects related with
environmental effectiveness and perceived co-benefits are striking and partly
confirm H1. If the tax is expected to be effective in reducing emissions,
acceptability rises by about 30 %. The impact of co-benefits on acceptability has
a similar magnitude, since this variable ranges from 0 to 8. Hence, our findings
strongly support the literature on the perceived effectiveness of carbon taxes and
provide a quantitative estimate of the magnitude of its linkage with acceptability,
which is shown to depend also on perceived co-benefits.5
Neglecting co-benefits would clearly imply an overestimation of the net policy
costs, since most studies providing monetary estimates of co-benefits suggest that
they are relatively conspicuous compared to mitigation costs, also in the case of
Switzerland and other developed countries (cf. e.g. OECD 2014). In fact, co-benefits
are in the order of several tens of dollars per ton of CO2 and may well exceed
abatement costs (Baranzini and Carattini 2014). According to Pittel and Ru¨bbelke
(2008), co-benefits may be sufficiently large to justify cooperation in international
negotiations and lead to binding international agreements, of course provided that
their existence (and magnitude) is recognized. That is, co-benefits may be a game
changer in the political economy of climate change mitigation, if fully internalized
in people’s beliefs.
Regarding policy drawbacks, all included variables have the expected negative
sign, but only loss of purchasing power is significant. Being one of the 67 % of the
sample affirming that carbon taxes are an issue for purchasing power is linked with
about 15 % lower probability of accepting the instrument. The concern of losing
purchasing power makes sense in particular given that at this stage the use of tax
revenues is not specified. However, this concern may vanish over time after that the
carbon taxes are implemented, since the real effect of loss in consumption on well-
being may be lower than actually perceived, as income relative to others may be
rather unchanged (Gowdy 2008, see also Howarth 2006).
5 The coefficient for crowding-out of intrinsic motivation or protest answers does not attain statistical
significance. This may suggest that what we face is indeed some motivational crowding-out rather than
simply protest, although with no impact on acceptability.
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Regressive impacts do not seem to matter in this context. Distributional effects
are an issue for an important number of individuals as indicated in the descriptive
statistics, but fail to significantly impact acceptability. This result differs from those
of most of the literature but provides quantitative evidence for one of the finding
from the focus group of Kallbekken and Aasen (2010), which stress that respondents
seem to be concerned by distributional effects, but not enough to pretend
environmental taxes not to be regressive.
Competitiveness and employment effects are clearly non-significant. We see four
possible explanations for their non-significance. First, individuals may not be
concerned about competitiveness issues, consumers having different interests than
firms, and about unemployment, since they may have very small empathy for
potential jobless and perhaps limited fear of how rising levels of unemployment
could affect their own situation. However, this may be in contradiction with the
evidence based on voting behavior of Thalmann (2004), in which concern about
employment issues contributed to the rejection by the Swiss population of three
energy tax proposals in spite of an unemployment rate below 2 %. Second,
individuals may not expect competitiveness effects to be sufficiently large to
become a real problem. This may make sense in the light of the modeling exercise
of Sceia et al. (2012), which find very limited terms-of-trade effects for Switzerland
when simulating the impact of unilateral moves towards more stringent climate
policy. Third, respondents may expect Swiss climate policy to be part of a concerted
move undertaken with other countries, e.g. under the umbrella of a renewed Kyoto-
like agreement. In such scenario, terms-of-trade effects as modeled by Sceia et al.
(2012) become positive. Fourth, the very low concern for employment and
competitiveness effects may also be due to the low profile of corporate interest
groups at the time of the survey. Indeed, once approaching important votes, the
latter tend to employ massive lobbying efforts to have their vested interests
internalized by the public, leading the industry flight argument to gain a very
important weight in the political discourse (Spash and Lo 2012). This interpretation
would call for green lobbying to oppose the industry flight argument and preserve
the current outcome (see Dietz et al. 2012).
Altogether, this evidence may question the rationale for the large exemptions and
privileges given to some industries by the carbon schemes of some Scandinavian
countries or Australia, which have eventually watered down the environmental
impact of the tax itself (see Lin and Li 2011; Baranzini and Carattini 2014).
Partially rejecting H1, Table 1 suggests that the popularity of carbon taxes may not
necessarily imply a trade-off between environmental, distributional and competi-
tiveness effects.
Labeling is not significant at this stage. Regarding the relative performance of the
three specifications of Table 1, we see that the goodness-of-fit increases as more
variables are added, confirming that policy perception does matter for acceptability,
beside individual characteristics.
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3.2 Impact of earmarking on carbon tax acceptability
In this section, we focus on the individuals that do not accept the policy proposal in
Sect. 3.1 and examine whether their choice changes conditional on the implemen-
tation of their preferred option of revenue recycling. The variable to be explained
takes value 1 for those changing opinion in favor of the CT/CC and 0 otherwise. We
then rely again on a probit model, conditional on choosing 0 in the first acceptability
question. We select the least chosen option, tax rebates to households and firms, as
the reference case.
The estimation reported in Table 2 includes variables for revenue recycling and
labeling, now significant. The literature gives no priors on the potential impact of
socioeconomic characteristics on acceptability conditional on the preferred use of
tax revenues. We find that in general none is statistically significant, except for a
positive effect again of education (p value of 0.098). Policy variables seem instead
confirming our set of hypotheses. Trust in the government is associated with a
negative sign and a fairly large coefficient. This makes sense in the light of the
positive coefficient in Table 1. That is, trust in the government is positively
associated with being in favor of the CT/CC regardless of how tax revenues are
used, whereas respondents distrusting the government are relatively more likely to
reject the first proposal and potentially change opinion in Table 2, once revenues are
earmarked. Hence, we can confirm hypothesis H3.
Compared to the rest of respondents, those suggesting that the government should
address the issue of energy consumption with taxation do not have a higher
probability to change their opinion with earmarking. This is consistent with the
result of Table 1 and hypothesis H4. In contrast, those asking the government to
better communicate the need and possibilities for energy conservation are,
everything else equal, more likely to support the tax both unconditionally and
conditionally on earmarking. This may point again to the complementarity between
taxation and communication.
The effect of perceived effectiveness is in line with our hypothesis. Expecting the
tax to work is linked to a positive effect on acceptability, also among those that
rejected the first CT/CC proposal. As suggested by the qualitative analysis of
Kallbekken and Aasen (2010), being aware of how the incentive effect works does
not necessarily imply no demand for earmarking. The marginal effect in Table 2 is
still pretty large and implies that in this sub-sample the likelihood of voting yes once
the use of revenue is defined is about 25 % larger for those believing the CT/CC to
work than for those that do not. On top of that, there seems to be again a positive
effect of co-benefits.
We observe that the probability of reconsidering the CT/CC is larger for those
selecting recycling for environmental purposes than for those opting for tax rebates
(the dummy of reference), everything else equal. The coefficient for recycling
through social cushioning (as defined by the respondent) is not statistically
significant. Therefore, it seems that earmarking for environmental purposes really
matters for acceptability, confirming hypothesis H2. Since we control for e.g. trust
in the government and perceived effectiveness, we relate this demand for
environmental recycling with the issue-linkage, i.e. the need for the public to see
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a straightforward and logical nexus between the tax and the use of revenues (Sælen
and Kallbekken 2011). At a given tax rate as in this context, this implies larger
abatements, indicating that acceptability tends to go hand in hand with effectiveness
(cf. Steg and Vlek 2009).
Hence, this result may contribute to explain why many environmental taxes
earmark revenues for environmental purposes, as reported e.g. in the ‘‘Database on
instruments used for environmental policy’’ of the Organisation for Economic Co-
Table 2 Carbon tax/climate contribution acceptability with earmarking and revenue recycling: marginal
effects at median from probit estimation
Acceptability when earmarking is specified (1)
Number of cars 0.0753 (0.0652)
Green member 0.0182 (0.192)
Years of education 0.0392* (0.0236)
Gender (male) 0.0695 (0.0956)
Number of adults in the household 0.0208 (0.0447)
Homeowner 0.0912 (0.121)
Age 0.00183 (0.00373)
Unemployed 0.219 (0.275)
Left 0.213 (0.162)
Right 0.119 (0.131)
Expected cooperation 0.0616 (0.0901)
Trust in the government 0.341** (0.149)
Government intervention: information 0.157* (0.0925)
Government intervention: taxation 0.130 (0.115)
CT/CC: environmental effectiveness 0.256** (0.0996)
CT/CC: co-benefits 0.0461* (0.0266)
CT/CC: drawbacks (less purchasing power) 0.120 (0.101)
CT/CC: drawbacks (less comfort) 0.0385 (0.0964)
CT/CC: drawbacks (fear of losing job) 0.437** (0.192)
CT/CC: drawbacks (distributional effects on the poor) 0.00170 (0.0966)
CT/CC: drawbacks (distributional effects on rural) 0.123 (0.102)
CT/CC: drawbacks (competitiveness effects) 0.126 (0.122)
CT/CC: drawbacks (employment effects) 0.201 (0.155)
Revenue recycling: social cushioning 0.0813 (0.129)
Revenue recycling: environmental projects 0.230* (0.126)
Labeling (climate contribution) 0.168* (0.0903)
Pseudo R2 0.211
Log pseudolikelihood 82.128
N 152
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p\0:1, ** p\0:05, *** p\0:01
H0: all b equal to zero. Chi2ð26Þ ¼ 47:97, p ¼ 0:0054
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operation and Development (OECD). For instance, substantial portions of revenues
from local pollution charges are earmarked for environmental improvements in
Czech Republic, Estonia, Japan, Poland, Slovak Republic, Turkey and in most
Spanish regions, as well as in Quebec. Part or all the revenues from carbon taxes
similar to the one proposed in the survey are (or were) used for environmental
purposes in several instances, including Quebec’s hydrocarbon duty, Boulder’s
carbon tax (see Hahn 2009) and the former Australian carbon tax. Absent any
counterfactual, it is yet not possible to know whether such taxes could have been
implemented without earmarking. However, the presence of so many cases of
environmental earmarking seems supporting the existence of a worldwide demand
for this kind of use of revenues and enhance the general relevance of the political
economy argument behind hypothesis H2.
Finally, we observe that labeling has an impact on acceptability, since the
coefficient for CC (versus CT) is now significant. The fact that the CC treatment
affects acceptability as well as revenue recycling may hint that the term ‘‘climate
contribution’’ may not suffice to overcome some general suspicion in the first
acceptability question, but it does increase support when earmarking is made
explicit. An explanation may be that as introduced by the survey, both the CT and
the CC look really like taxes. However, once revenues are earmarked for the
environment, the CC may become much more appealing as it really looks as a
contribution to the climate, whereas the tax still carries the unfortunate ‘‘tax’’
labeling. While hypothesis H4 is here confirmed, chances of wording to matter may
decrease in the political arena, with repeated debates and the intervention of
political parties, although based on Swiss data Buetler and Mare´chal (2007) call for
evidence of a framing effect in voting behavior. In this respect, we note with interest
that since 2015 the Swiss government publicly refers to a ‘‘climate levy’’ to replace
and widen the scope of its current carbon tax. In doing so, the Swiss government
seems to have been inspired by the implementation of the Climate Change Levy in
2001 in the United Kingdom. Again, no counterfactual exists illustrating the
popularity of a similar energy tax going under a different name. Yet, based on our
findings and similar results in the literature, we can suppose that the decision to
name the British scheme of energy taxes ‘‘Climate Change Levy’’ likely did no
harm in terms of popularity, and perhaps contributed to its implementation and
longevity.
4 Conclusion
Carbon taxes are an effective instrument for curbing greenhouse gas emissions, yet
are seldom implemented (Baranzini and Carattini 2014). This paper uses survey
data to assess drivers and barriers to public acceptability of carbon taxes. Albeit the
political discourse generally focuses on the negative impacts on competitiveness
and distributional effects (cf. e.g. Spash and Lo 2012), the data analyzed here
indicate that individuals are more concerned by the environmental effectiveness of
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the tax. Indeed, we show that perceived environmental effectiveness and expec-
tation of local co-benefits are the main drivers of acceptability. Competitiveness
effects are almost completely neglected, whereas distributional issues (in particular
regarding poor households) seem to represent a real concern for the general public,
but with little impact on acceptability.
According to our findings, communicating both primary and ancillary benefits of
carbon taxes seems to be essential for improving acceptability. Along with
earmarking, this could be very useful to reduce the opposition related to mistrust in
the government and Ramsey-type tax aversion (see Kallbekken et al. 2011). In this
respect, we find that in terms of acceptability the best way of recycling the tax
revenues is to give the priority to environmental spending. In the same vein, we also
provide evidence that using a different label, viz. ‘‘climate contribution’’ rather than
‘‘carbon tax’’, can be beneficial in terms of acceptability.
Therefore, our empirical findings provide evidence that with appropriate design
the chances for climate policy tightening could be substantially improved. To the
extent that extrapolation from our data is possible, our results would hint that the
Swiss population may accept relatively ambitious energy and climate policy of the
kind it rejected in 2000, provided that policies are properly conceived and
advertised. The evidence that we provide may also guide policymaking in other
contexts in which the popularity of policies matter for their chances of
implementation. The European experience of environmental taxation and in
particular of the (planned) environmental tax reform indicates that a considerable
level of popularity is a requirement for implementation in virtually all contexts (see
the special issue introduced by Dresner et al. 2006). Transposability of survey
estimates to political support and actual voting needs however to take into account
the room for hypothetical bias and variation in timing, which is linked to media
coverage, lobbying and business-cycle effects.
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Appendix 1: Questionnaires
The original questionnaires were in French. They are available by the authors upon
request. As in French and for labeling purposes, we use the term ‘‘tax’’ for the
carbon tax of the CT sub-sample. However, it could be called ‘‘levy’’.
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Appendix 2: Tables
See Tables 3, 4 and 5.
Table 3 Socioeconomic characteristics: sample’s summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
Gender (male) 0.521 0.5 0 1 336
Age 36.860 14.04 19 85 336
Years of education 15.782 1.935 11 18 330
Categories of income 4.029 1.816 1 7 239
Labor market (active) 0.949 0.221 0 1 332
Number of adults in the household 2.306 1.194 0 6 337
Number of kids in the household 0.333 0.681 0 4 291
Homeowner 0.223 0.417 0 1 336
Number of cars 1.279 0.957 0 4 337
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Table 4 Environmental
attitudes and behavior: summary
statistics
Variable Mean N
Energy consumption: very attentive 0.2 337
Energy consumption: attentive 0.53 337
Energy consumption: not very attentive 0.22 337
Energy consumption: not attentive at all 0.05 337
Saving energy: to save money 0.77 338
Saving energy: for the environment 0.59 338
Saving energy: other people 0.06 338
Saving energy: other countries 0.06 338
Saving energy: no reasons 0.06 338
Saving energy: the best already 0.07 338
Elastic: gasoline 23.40 292
Elastic: electricity 27.68 297
Elastic: heating fuels 24.59 288
Expected cooperation 0.76 242
Expected foreign cooperation 0.52 247
Government intervention: information 0.73 337
Government intervention: public transportation 0.61 338
Government intervention: taxation 0.35 338
Government intervention: unnecessary 0.03 338
Government intervention: irrelevant 0.02 337
Future prices: gasoline 27 331
Future prices: electricity 16 334
Future prices: heating fuels 18 335
Drivers: climate policy 0.58 337
Drivers: scarcity 0.89 337
Drivers: nuclear exit 0.5 337
Drivers: renewables 0.53 337
Accompanying: awareness 0.63 338
Accompanying: subsidies for all 0.18 338
Accompanying: subsidies for poor 0.25 338
Accompanying: subsidies for rural 0.1 338
Accompanying: rebates for all 0.25 338
Accompanying: rebates for poor 0.25 338
Accompanying: rebates for rural 0.07 338
Accompanying: public transportation 0.62 338
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Table 5 Policy perceptions and acceptability: summary statistics
Variable Mean N
Effect on own behavior: less consumption 0.56 338
Effect on own behavior: no change 0.37 338
Effect on own behavior: more consumption 0.07 338
Environmental effectiveness 0.48 338
Co-benefit: better air quality (respondent and society) 0.56 320
Co-benefit: less road congestion (respondent and society) 0.27 320
Co-benefit: better health (respondent and society) 0.42 320
Co-benefit: less road accidents (respondent and society) 0.18 320
Drawback: less purchasing power 0.67 338
Drawback: less comfort 0.34 338
Drawback: fear of losing job 0.05 338
Drawback: none 0.22 338
Drawback: less purchasing power (society) 0.69 338
Drawback: loss of competitiveness 0.20 338
Drawback: distributional effects on the poor 0.46 338
Drawback: rise in unemployment 0.11 338
Acceptability 0.49 338
Social cushioning: low income 0.72 333
Social cushioning: middle income 0.48 333
Social cushioning: high income 0.14 333
Social cushioning: rural 0.35 333
Social cushioning: urban 0.19 333
Social cushioning: large families 0.49 333
Social cushioning: elderly people 0.58 333
Social cushioning: firms 0.24 333
Revenue recycling: social cushioning (first) 0.26 313
Revenue recycling: tax rebates (first) 0.11 313
Revenue recycling: environmental projects (first) 0.60 313
Acceptability when earmarking is specified 0.64 337
Tax rate: 0 % 0.13 330
Tax rate: 0–5 % 0.30 330
Tax rate: 5–10 % 0.31 330
Tax rate: 10–15 % 0.16 330
Tax rate: 15–20 % 0.05 330
Tax rate: 20–25 % 0.02 330
Tax rate: 25–30 % 0.02 330
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Abstract
Turning greenhouse gas emissions pledges into domestic policies is the next chal-
lenge for governments. We address the question of the acceptability of cost-e ective
climate policy in a real-voting setting. First, we analyze voting behavior in a large
ballot on energy taxes, rejected in Switzerland in 2015 by more than 2 million people.
Energy taxes were aimed at completely replacing the current value-added tax. We
examine the determinants of voting and find that distributional and competitive-
ness concerns reduced the acceptability of energy taxes, along with the perception
of ine ectiveness. Most people would have preferred tax revenues to be allocated for
environmental purposes. Second, at the same time of the ballot, we tested the ac-
ceptability of alternative designs of a carbon tax with a choice experiment survey on
a representative sample of the Swiss population. Survey respondents are informed
about environmental, distributional and competitiveness e ects of each carbon tax
design. These impacts are estimated with a computable general equilibrium model.
This original setting generates a series of novel results. Providing information on the
expected environmental e ectiveness of carbon taxes reduces the demand for envi-
ronmental earmarking. Making distributional e ects salient generates an important
demand for progressive designs, e.g. social cushioning or recycling via lump-sum
transfers. The case of lump-sum recycling is particularly striking: it is su cient
to show its desirable distributional properties to make it one of the most preferred
designs, which corresponds to a completely novel result in the literature. We show
that providing proper information on the functioning of environmental taxes can
close both the gap between acceptability ex ante and ex post and the gap between
economists’ prescriptions and the preferences of the general public.
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1 Introduction
During the last decades, countries and international organizations have strug-
gled to define a system of global governance able to tackle climate change. The
Kyoto Protocol spurred the adoption of a first generation of climate policies
(Fankhauser et al. 2015), but much more e ort is required to meet the challenge
of climate change mitigation (IPCC 2014). Unilateral policies have emerged to
partly compensate for the continued failure of international negotiations (Os-
trom 2009; Jordan et al. 2015), but only a fraction of countries opted for energy
and carbon taxes (Baranzini and Carattini 2014; World Bank 2014). Most coun-
tries went for “soft policies” such as subsidies for renewable energies, which in
some cases turned up to be not only strongly regressive but also extremely ex-
pensive (Marcantonini and Ellerman 2014). Vested interests and the general
unpopularity of taxes are the main reasons behind this political choice.
The developments related with the 2015 Conference of Parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement
have created a major breakthrough in the international negotiations for climate
change mitigation. However, countries’ emissions pledges are not credible policy
commitments. The world is at a turning point: strong domestic policies are now
necessary to meet the Paris pledges at a reasonable cost. Any other outcome is
likely to put the pledge-and-review system under pressure and to jeopardize the
future tightening of current pledges (Baranzini et al. 2015).
How to overcome resistance to energy and carbon taxes is thus of primary
interest. A recent literature has attempted to provide a first set of explanations
to the lack of public support for environmental taxes. Since real ballots on
environmental taxes take place sporadically and so real voting behavior is hard
to observe, most of the literature relies on survey techniques to approximate the
determinants of voting behavior. These surveys are usually realized in neutral
times, i.e. absent any political campaigning. However, vested interests and
media coverage are very powerful drivers of public opinion on environmental
matters (Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui 2009; Jacobsen 2011; Spash and Lo 2012).
On March 8, 2015 the Swiss population was called to vote on a popular initia-
tive aiming at replacing the current value-added tax (VAT) with an energy tax.
About 2.2 million voters expressed their opinion. The proposal was rejected by
a large majority, 92% of voters. Right after the ballot, we collected data on a
representative sample of the Swiss population, to explain the observed voting
behavior. This strategy is used to decrease the likelihood of socially-approved
answers and also allows us to compare our sample with the observed outcome.
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At the same time, we administered a choice experiment to another represen-
tative sample of the Swiss population, taking advantage from the very specific
timing to assess the acceptability of alternative tax designs in presence of high
political salience. In the choice-experiment setting we consider a carbon tax
with four di erent tax rates and five revenue recycling options: income tax re-
bates, reduction of the value-added tax, lump-sum transfers, social cushioning
and earmarking for additional emission abatements through the purchase of for-
eign o sets. We exploit the results of a general equilibrium modeling exercise
to inform respondents on the expected outcomes of each tax design in terms of
energy price increases, emission abatements, overall economic e ects and distri-
butional impacts. In this way, we address some of the most recurrent obstacles to
the popularity of carbon taxes, all of which are arguably driven by imperfect in-
formation: excessive fear of adverse competitiveness and distributional e ects,
perceived ine ectiveness and misunderstanding of revenue neutrality. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first time such methodological approach is
used. In the choice experiment, respondents face three alternatives: two di er-
ent carbon tax designs, and the status quo. Hence, we reproduce the situation
of real ballots, in which voters are asked to express their opinion on di erent
proposals, with of course the possibility to reject all of them (see Kriesi 2005).
Our study is of interest for all democratic settings, with or without a sys-
tem of direct democracy. We use Switzerland as a laboratory of study, but the
divergence between economists and the general public on the benefits of revenue-
neutral environmental taxes is a recurring problem to environmental tax reforms
all around Europe (Dresner et al. 2006). The unpopularity of carbon taxes has
hampered their implementation in France (Deroubaix and Lévèque 2006), while
fear of competitiveness e ects led to massive exemptions in Scandinavian coun-
tries, decreasing the potential for any sizeable environmental e ect (Baranzini
and Carattini 2014). Similar obstacles reduce the popularity of carbon taxes in
emerging economies, too (Gevrek and Uyduranoglu 2015).
We find that the design of green taxes is the main driver of acceptability, and
that information provision can lead to very di erent results from those in the
literature. Data on voting behavior shows that the chances of the 2015 popular
initiative would have been much higher if tax revenues had been earmarked for
environmental purposes rather than for replacing the VAT, everything else equal.
Concerns about the e ect of higher energy prices on the distribution of income
as well as on the competitiveness of firms are among the main determinants
of rejection. People are also generally skeptics about the potential change in
behavior that energy taxes could generate.
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The design of our choice experiment addresses all these concerns and provides
a series of original findings. Estimations from our modeling scenarios suggest
that all carbon tax designs under investigation imply limited competitiveness
e ects and all provide significant reduction in emissions. Using the full tax
revenue to purchase foreign o sets allow for massive emission abatements, in the
domain of negative emissions. Most recycling options imply slightly regressive
e ects, except for lump-sum transfers and social cushioning, which (the latter
by design) lead to a net progressive e ect.
A common finding in the literature is that people are most willing to accept a
carbon tax if its revenues are used to strengthen its environmental e ectiveness,
which people believe to be small. This stylized fact is confirmed by our analysis
of voting behavior. However, our choice-experimental setting, by informing on
the emissions reduction associated with the di erent carbon taxes, allows closing
the gap between (possibly low) perceived e ectiveness and (higher) predicted ef-
fectiveness. As a result, we find that earmarking for additional abatements is
no longer particularly attractive. Information on the scenarios’ predictions ren-
ders instead lump-sum transfers and social cushioning particularly popular, by
making salient their progressive properties. The finding for lump-sum transfers
is particularly striking. Despite their minimal administrative burden and the
ability to address distributional concerns (Baranzini et al. 2000; Metcalf 2009),
lump-sum transfers are especially neglected by the literature on the acceptabil-
ity of carbon taxes. The reason for this is that these properties may not to be
perceived by the population, along with revenue neutrality. Our setting shows
however that it is su cient to provide people with some supplementary informa-
tion to reduce the gap between their preferences and economists’ prescriptions.
We find that recycling through income tax rebates is relatively unpopular,
as often found in the literature. People do not seem to understand the concept
of environmental tax reform, or at least they do not see its advantages as some
economists do. We stress that our modeling scenarios do not suggest the ex-
istence of a particular double dividend, i.e. positive economic e ects through
the reduction of distortionary taxes. Reductions in the value-added tax perform
similarly poorly, in terms of acceptability. We also find that the support for
green taxes decreases linearly with the rise in the tax rate. If we simulate based
on our choice experiment the level of acceptability of the popular initiative voted
on March 8 2015, we obtain a figure that is very consistent with the observed
real outcome, indicating a high external validity of the results based on our
choice experiment.
We contribute to the literature on the acceptability of carbon taxes by shed-
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ding new light on the obstacles to the acceptability of carbon taxes. We make
the voting decision in the choice-experimental setting as realistic as possible and
provide people with su cient details to take an informed decision on carbon
taxes. Our results show that making the e ect of environmental taxes salient
can contribute to render relatively unpopular designs much more popular. So
far, the literature has showed that only experiencing the functioning of a given
policy allows citizens to revise their beliefs on the e ectiveness and fairness of
environmental taxes, which by default tend to be overly pessimistic (cf. e.g.
Carattini et al. 2016). Our approach thus provides an alternative to the use of
trials that has been increasingly called for to remedy environmental taxes’ lack
of popularity (Sælen and Kallbekken 2011; Cherry et al. 2014; Carattini et al.
2016). With the proper design and information, acceptable carbon taxes can
exist at a moderately high tax rate, and sustain credible climate policies.
2 Context
2.1 Literature review
The theoretical literature on the political economy of environmental policy
mostly focuses on lobbying by energy-intensive industries (see Oates and Portney
2003 for a review). Yet, Kirchgassner and Schneider (2003) stress the importance
of considering voters’ preferences, and how their pure economic objectives may
compete with other interests, including environmental preferences. The opinion
of the general public may however be biased by media and captured by vested
interests, possibly leading to inaccurate opinion formation and policy-making
(Millner and Ollivier 2015). But citizens can also organize in environmental ad-
vocacy groups and play an active role in the political arena. The model of Dietz
et al. (2012) shows that the presence of green lobbies influencing policymakers
may contribute to increase the stringency of environmental policy, as well as the
likelihood of a stable coalition in environmental agreements.
The theoretical literature usually takes a narrow perspective and presumes
that people rarely vote on policies, but rather for candidates and parties. The
empirical literature has instead taken a broader perspective, assessing for in-
stance the private willingness to pay for climate change mitigation (see Nemet
and Johnson 2010 for a review), as well as the acceptability of specific poli-
cies. The case of environmental taxes has received particular attention. So
popular among economists for reasons of e ciency and environmental e ec-
tiveness (Baranzini et al. 2015) and so unpopular among the general public,
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they represent a unique opportunity to study the consequences of informational
asymmetries between citizens, policy-makers and experts.
Empirical economists have used a wide range of tools to understand the
determinants of energy taxes’ acceptability. Qualitative assessments using focus
groups have helped understanding the obstacles to the European Environmental
Tax Reform (Dresner et al. 2006) and to environmental taxes more in general
(Kallbekken and Aasen 2010). Qualitative surveys have also been used to orient
quantitative surveys, as in Baranzini and Carattini (2016).
The focus groups of Dresner et al. (2006) revealed the high level of distrust
in environmental tax reforms among the general public. The general public
seems to underestimate the e ectiveness of environmental taxes and to perceive
them mainly as a pretext for raising additional public revenues. People may
only be willing to support their introduction if revenues are clearly earmarked
for environmental purposes. They also wonder how environmental taxes could
green the economy if revenues were to be redistributed. Moreover, they raise
fears of adverse competitiveness and distributional e ects.
These findings from small samples have been then confirmed by larger sur-
veys. Steg et al. (2006) interview about one hundred respondents in the Nether-
lands about the perceived e ectiveness and acceptability of energy subsidies
and taxes. They find subsidies to be much more e ective, at least in people’s
eyes. “Pull measures” (i.e. subsidies) are seen as incentives driving a volun-
tary change in behavior, whereas taxes are felt as coercive measures imposing
a change in behavior and facing people’s resistance. Taxes can however be per-
ceived as e ective if revenues are earmarked for environmental purposes. In
terms of acceptability, instruments and designs that are perceived as e ective
(i.e. subsidies) overperform those that are not (i.e. taxes). Similar results are
provided in Kallbekken and Sælen (2011) based on a Norwegian sample. In
their sample, perceived ine ectiveness of fuel taxes represents a major obstacle
to acceptability, as in the study on the popularity of carbon taxes of Baranzini
and Carattini (2016). In this respect, the latter find that acceptability depends
on the expectation of both primary and ancillary benefits. Earmarking revenues
for environmental purposes contributes to reduce the hostility to carbon tax, as
well as renaming it “climate contribution”.
The potential of standard surveys is however limited, in particular when re-
spondents are required to deal with complex issues such as the design of carbon
taxes. A few authors have thus opted for choice experiments, which also allow
focusing on the internal validity and thus reduce the room for bias related to
hypothetical answers. Bristow et al. (2010) analyze the acceptability of personal
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carbon trading schemes and carbon taxes with a sample of about 300 individ-
uals. They compare di erent tax rates and modes of recycling and find for
instance that tax thresholds perform particularly well in terms of acceptability.
Thresholds can indeed reduce the regressive e ects of carbon taxes, similarly
to lump-sum recycling. While the authors call for the use of larger samples
to support their findings, they suggest that acceptable carbon tax designs are
not a chimaera. Sælen and Kallbekken (2011) show, with a choice experiment,
that the chances for carbon taxes to be acceptable are higher with earmarking
for environmental revenues. With this type of recycling, the Norwegian pop-
ulation would agree to an increase of the current fuel tax rate by about 15%.
Brannlund and Persson (2012) also test di erent designs for a carbon tax with
a choice experiment. The labeling of the tax changes randomly with the other
attributes and the authors find that even labeling it “other” is better than us-
ing its real name, “tax”. Progressive designs are also preferred to regressive
ones. Gevrek and Uyduranoglu (2015) extend the analysis of the acceptability
of carbon taxes to emerging economies with a choice experiment for Turkey.
While their setting does not allow measuring the overall level of acceptability
of Turkish carbon taxes, their empirical exercise provides very similar findings
to the literature in developed countries, including the preference for progressive
schemes, for earmarking of revenues and for low tax rates.
Choice experiments contribute to tackle the issue of hypothetical bias. How-
ever, inference is still based on stated preferences. Revealed preferences are
elicited in lab experiments, but issues of external validity may arise if the gen-
eral public behaves di erently than the sample participating in the experiment
(Harrison and List 2004). Some examples of lab experiments are available in this
literature. For instance, Kallbekken et al. (2011) provide experimental evidence
in favor of tax aversion and of the demand for earmarking of Pigouvian tax rev-
enues. They show that e ciency and acceptability may conflict even when real
stakes are involved, i.e. participants do not necessarily prefer the policy that
is pay-o  maximizing. Labeling carbon taxes as “fee” helps however to reduce
tax aversion. The experiment of Cherry et al. (2012) supports these findings,
as well as the analysis of Steg et al. (2006), showing that “non-coercive” instru-
ments such as subsidies (and even quotas) are much preferred to carbon taxes,
so that policymakers betting on carbon taxes may end up with the status quo.
In the authors’ words, ine cient “half measures” are more likely to be politically
feasible than e cient “full measures”.
These methods are used as imperfect substitutes for the observation of real
ballots on environmental taxes, which are unthinkable in some countries and very
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rare in others. A few opportunities to study voting behavior on environmental
matters already occurred in the United States or Switzerland (see Deacon and
Shapiro 1975; Fischel 1979; Kahn and Matsusaka 1997; Fort and Bunn 1998;
Salka 2001; Kahn 2002; Stadelmann-Ste en 2011), even though not exclusively
on environmental taxes. An exception is Thalmann (2004), who analyzes three
energy tax proposals voted and rejected by the Swiss population in 2000. While
all proposals failed, two were really close to the majority threshold. Di erences
in the use of revenues (earmarking for subsidizing renewable energy versus re-
distribution) and in the tax rates are shown to potentially contribute to the
small di erences in the rate of approval between the revenue-neutral “Green tax
reform” (44.6% of yes-votes) and the “Energy conservation package” (46.6%).
The third alternative, the “Solar initiative” (31.9%), proposed to earmark half
of the revenues for solar energy, and the other half for energy conservation. Dif-
ferences in the socio-economic and geographic characteristics of voters explain
instead within-proposal variation (see also Halbheer et al. 2006 and Bornstein
and Lanz 2008).
2.2 Local context
On March 8, 2015, the Swiss population voted on a popular initiative launched
by the Green Liberal Party aiming at replacing the current value-added tax
with an energy tax1. The Swiss government and all other parties but the Green
Party were against the initiative. In spite of the low probability of success of the
initiative, the business organizations invested important e orts in a campaign
emphasizing the potential drawbacks of such proposal.
The Green Liberals pointed to the following main arguments in favor of the
initiative:
• Tax dirty energy sources, making renewable energy sources competitive
without subsidization and allowing for a transition towards a more sus-
tainable economy
• Ensure fiscal neutrality, by keeping both the revenues for the government
and the overall tax burden unchanged
• Reward environmentally-friendly consumers, by allowing them to save money
on the VAT while rewarding environmentally-friendly behavior
1The maximum rate of the VAT is 8%. On the same day, the population also voted on a pop-
ular initiative of the Christian Democratic People’s Party of Switzerland aiming at increasing fiscal
exemptions for families with children. This initiative was rejected at 75.4%.
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• Reinforce the local economy, increasing independence from oil producer
states and incentivizing green innovation in Switzerland
• Avoid costs to firms, by eliminating an administratively burdensome tax
such as VAT
The government shared in principle all these objectives, but not the mean to
achieve them as proposed by the initiative. In February 2015 Switzerland was the
first country to submit a pledge to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change’s pledge-and-review system. It pledged to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions by 50% by 2030 with respect to the levels of 1990. However,
the Swiss government opposed the intention to completely erase the VAT and
replace it with an environmental tax, which is supposed to over time reduce
energy consumption, i.e. its own tax base. The government stressed that the
VAT revenues represent the main source of funding for the federal government,
and during the debate a price of 5 francs per liter of gasoline was mentioned
to compensate the fall in VAT revenues2. This would have implied a three-
time increase in the price of gasoline. The government also mentioned a series
of concerns related with the competitiveness and distributional e ects of the
proposed reform.
This scenario was rapidly appropriated by the political parties and organi-
zations opposing the initiative, who claimed that the initiative would have:
• Led to una ordable energy due to exploding energy prices, e.g. 5 francs
per liter of gasoline
• Jeopardized the funding of crucial government’s tasks, since contrary to
the VAT, which represents a stable source of revenues, the energy tax rate
would have had to be regularly increased (and so the price of energy) to
maintain revenues
• Generated adverse competitiveness e ects, putting the country’s prosperity
at risk due to a loss in competitiveness
We consider that the last argument resonated particularly strongly in that spe-
cific period, which followed by a few weeks only the decision of the Swiss National
Bank to drop its euro peg. The ensuing appreciation of the Swiss franc was at the
time expected to put under extreme pressure the many export-oriented sectors
of the Swiss economy.
2Swiss franc close to parity with the US dollar at the time of the ballot.
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The popular initiative was rejected at 92%. The Swiss government renounced
to formulate a counter-proposal, but a few weeks after the ballot announced its
strategy to meet the abovementioned pledges as well as to facilitate the planned
phase out of nuclear energy (the so-called Energy Strategy 2050). This strategy
consists in higher taxes on electricity and heating fuels, while the precise tax
rates are left to further discussion and dependent on the final objectives in terms
of greenhouse gas emissions abatement. Gasoline is also expected to be taxed,
but only after a period of adaptation. We note that Switzerland introduced a
carbon tax in 2008, but only on heating and process fuels. The current tax rate
is 84 CHF per ton of CO2.
3 Methodology
3.1 Analysis of voting behavior
Since 1977, the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences conducts the
VOX survey after each federal ballot. 1500 observations are collected for each
survey. We use these data to assess the determinants of voting behavior on the
March 8 vote on energy taxes. VOX data are widely used to analyze voting
behavior on di erent matters, as they perform well in terms of representativity
and do not present the weaknesses of pure stated-preference studies. We took
advantage of the strong presence of energy issues in the media at the time of
this ballot and the debates following the presentation of the Swiss government’s
new energy strategy to administer a second survey. It uses a choice experiment
format to elicit the acceptability of alternative energy tax designs (see below).
Both surveys were carried out between March and May 2015.
In Switzerland, the rejection of a popular initiative is rather the rule, and
not the exception. From 1891 to date, 9 out of 10 popular initiatives were
rejected at the ballot box (sometimes after having influenced the legislative
process). However, the rejection rate for this initiative is the second highest
since 1891, the highest since 1929. This high rejection rate implies that voters
from all government parties have contributed to reject the initiative, including
the political left. The participation rate (42%) was slightly below the average
participation rate for all popular votes during the period 1991-2014 (43.7%), the
importance of the issue at stake being relatively low compared to the average
ballot, and to hotter energy issues such as nuclear phasing-out.
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3.2 Choice-experiment on alternative designs
3.2.1 Survey setting
Not all designs can be subject to vote. Previous research has shown the im-
portance of the policy design for acceptability and it is thus crucial to have
information on di erent policy attributes and the combination thereof. The
only way to obtain such information from a relatively large sample – that is,
larger than what is usually available in the laboratory – is to rely on stated pref-
erences. It is however possible to set up a survey in a way that it makes choices
and trade-o s the most realistic possible, such as with a choice experiment.
A choice experiment design allows putting the consumers, or voters, in a real-
life situation and, thus, reduces the hypothetical bias. Furthermore, most of the
focus is on the internal validity driven by the comparison of di erent designs. In
our choice experiment, we present all respondents with three potential choices:
two carbon taxes with two di erent designs and the status quo. By giving
to respondents the possibility to reject all proposals, we are able to measure
not only the relative preferences for a given policy attribute, but also the overall
likelihood that a carbon tax can be accepted. The design of the proposed carbon
taxes is the result of the combination of two attributes: the tax rate, measured
in terms of Swiss francs per ton of CO2 emitted, and the use of the tax revenues
(see Table 1). Each respondent is requested to select one of the three options
(two carbon tax designs and the status quo) in 8 di erent hypothetical ballots,
with the attributes being randomly combined at each time. To increase precision
in the identification of the attributes’ e ects, respondents are given one of the
15 randomly-generated versions of the questionnaire.
As all combinations included in the choice experiment were previously part
of a modeling exercise, we are able to provide respondents with information on
the order of magnitude for the expected impacts on the following items of each
carbon tax design:
• Price of gasoline, diesel and heating fuel
• Greenhouse gas emissions abatements. When revenues are used to strengthen
the environmental impact of the policy, we assume that foreign o sets are
purchased and we thus also estimate the e ect on greenhouse gas emis-
sions abroad. We express this reduction in relative terms with respect to
the emissions of Switzerland
• Purchasing power of average Swiss households, based on a proxy for overall
consumption
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Table 1: Choice experiment - attributes and levels
Attributes Levels
Tax rate (CHF/tCO2) 60
90
120
150
Revenue recycling Income tax rebates
VAT rebates
Lump-sum transfers
Social redistribution
Environmental earmarking
• Purchasing power of average low-income households
We provide realistic numbers based on scenarios for 2020 from a dynamic
multi-sectorial multi-household general equilibrium model of the Swiss economy,
called GENESwIS (see Vöhringer 2012)3. For a range of uniform carbon taxes
of 60 to 150 CHF/tCO2, the model achieves domestic emission reductions of
5-15%. Impacts on total consumption are generally negative, up to -0.5% for
a tax rate of 150 CHF/tCO2 combined with environmental recycling. As a
notable exception, a small double dividend can be found for recycling through
reductions of marginal income tax rates. Pure tax reforms with proportional rate
reductions are regressive, and income tax recycling is the most regressive of the
simulated variants. In contrast to this, lump-sum recycling renders the reform
clearly progressive. International carbon o sets are cheap at the moment, and
even very conservative assumptions allow for very sizable additional abatement
abroad when carbon tax revenues are used for purchasing foreign o sets.
The aim of this simulation is to provide su cient information for the most
relevant variables that are supposed to guide voting behavior, replicating the
e ort that a government could do to introduce environmental taxes to the pop-
ulation. Since we carefully explain to respondents the functioning and e ects
3In GENESwIS, households are disaggregated according to living standards and composition.
Households and firms act rationally under perfect foresight and competition, and the government
collects taxes and uses the revenue for public goods provision and social benefits (equal yield is
assumed). Further standard features include international trade with an Armington assumption,
labor-leisure choice, and a putty-clay representation for capital. GENESwIS is based on the 2008
energy related disaggregation of the Swiss Input-Output Table (Nathani et al. 2011), combined with
the population census of the Swiss Federal Statistical O ce (cf. Ecoplan 2012). Core elasticities of
substitution that are relevant for carbon abatement have been taken from Mohler and Müller (2012).
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of carbon taxes, we expect this specific setting to lead to di erent results with
respect to what is most often found in the literature.
The recruitment of participants went as follows. A set of about 4’000 poten-
tial respondents was randomly selected and received by post mail the following
material:
• A letter presenting the study, making participants familiar with the is-
sue and encouraging them to participate in the survey if called by phone,
following the guidelines of Harrison and List (2004)
• A detailed one-page fact sheet explaining how carbon taxes work and the
main implications of each recycling option
• The full set of choice cards for all 8 votes displaying the attributes and
related impacts as estimated by the computable general equilibrium model
(see Figure A.1 for an example)
A randomly drawn sub-set of the about 4000 potential respondents was then
contacted by phone and driven through the questionnaire. In total 1200 indi-
viduals were interviewed. When it came to taking a decision on the hypothetical
ballots, all respondents were read a short and unique text describing the e ects
of each carbon tax type. This ensured that all respondents were provided with
the same information, even those who had not spent time reading the material
that they had received at home. As many already “voted” at home, respondents
were given the possibility to skip the oral explanations4.
3.2.2 Preferences for attributes and carbon taxes
Before identifying the determinants of individual support for a carbon tax, we
hypothesize what they could be, based on our literature review:
Hypothesis 1: Tax rate We expect higher tax rates to lead to lower accept-
ability for carbon taxes, everything else equal
Hypothesis 2: Revenue recycling We expect acceptability to vary substan-
tially depending on the use of revenues. We expect use of revenues for en-
vironmental purposes to increase acceptability the most, followed by social
4In Switzerland, people may be asked to vote several times a year. A few weeks before the day
of voting, all potential voters receive by post mail written information about the ballot, so that
they have the time to form their opinion and also vote by correspondence if wishing so. Our choice
experiment is thus organized in a way that matches standard ballot procedures. We emphasize that
information on proposed policies circulates widely also in democratic countries that do not use the
instruments of direct democracy, even though in di erent forms.
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cushioning addressing potential distributional e ects. We expect lower ac-
ceptability with revenue-neutral recycling. Revenue neutrality (taxing here
and reducing taxes elsewhere) is usually a criterion that the taxpayers do
not request, or understand. This is particularly true in the absence of a
double dividend. We do not have specific priors on the relative ranking
within revenue-neutral recycling methods, i.e. income tax rebates, VAT
reduction and lump-sum transfers
4 Empirical results
4.1 Analysis of voting behavior
The VOX survey mainly consists in a standard list of questions, unchanged
from ballot to ballot, to which are added additional questions specific to each
ballot (some of them on our request). Table 2 presents the main outcomes
for our analysis along with other main variables of interest (see Table A.1 for
descriptive statistics on the characteristics of our VOX respondents, Table A.2
for those of the choice-experiment sample and Table A.3 for the underlying
population)5. As usual, the VOX ballot performs relatively well in predicting
the ballot outcome. The frequency of no-votes in the survey, 90%, is indeed
very close to the real outcome (92%). The survey overestimates instead to some
extent participation, which was in reality 42%. We model participation below,
along with the voting decision. Table 2 displays additional interesting statistics.
For instance, we observe that most people take their decision on the vote on
average 16 days, or about 2 weeks, before the ballot day. Only about 20%
declare to have a set opinion from the start. This shows the importance of
studying political acceptability in the presence of media coverage and political
debates to capture the e ect of (partisan) information on voters. Knowledge of
the initiative is tested directly by the interviewers, based on an open question
introducing the questionnaire.
The survey covers three arguments in favor, and three arguments against the
initiative. These questions are asked only to respondents having participated
in the ballot. Respondents can state their agreement or disagreement with
such statements on a 1 to 4 Likert scale. The higher the score, the higher the
agreement. In general, and not surprisingly comparing with the ballot outcome,
5Predictably, the surveys may slightly under-represent young individuals, and slightly over-
estimate educated, national and (by construction) Italian-speaking people. When appropriate, we
control for these variables with our econometric models. Our main findings are unchanged if using
sampling weights.
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Table 2: VOX data: main outcomes and determinants of voting
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Voting decision
No-vote 0.898 0.302 0 1 914
Participation 0.679 0.467 0 1 1509
Opinion formation
Time of resolution before ballot day -16.314 10.625 -1 -42 714
Immediate resolution 0.186 0.389 0 1 1514
Information
Knowledge of the Energy Strategy 2050 2.767 0.861 1 4 1220
Knowledge of the initiative 0.661 0.473 0 1 1514
Agreement with arguments in favor
Revenue neutrality 2.012 1.006 1 4 856
Environmental e ectiveness 2.652 1.079 1 4 922
Energy security 2.652 1.079 1 4 922
Agreement with arguments against
Competitiveness e ects 3.026 1.004 1 4 908
Distributional e ects 2.922 1.056 1 4 906
Decreasing tax base 3.002 1.012 1 4 852
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arguments against the initiative score substantially higher than those in favor.
In line with the literature, high concern is expressed for the competitiveness
and distributional e ects potentially generated by the implementation of the
proposal. Another argument widely used by the opponents was that over time a
decreasing tax base would have systematically implied higher tax rates, and so
larger e ects on the price of energy, on competitiveness and on the distribution of
income. This argument also seems to have been well understood by the public.
Consistently, the pro argument emphasizing revenue neutrality as a desirable
property of the initiative did not receive much support, which corroborates the
related stylized fact highlighted in the literature. The fact that higher fossil fuel
prices would have resulted in a higher degree of independence from oil and gas
exporters, and thus increased energy security, was moderately seen as a positive
property of the energy tax. Among the pro arguments, the one that scores the
highest relates with the e ectiveness of energy taxes. The relative question asks
respondents whether they believe that an energy tax creates incentives to save
energy, and to switch to renewable energy. Yet, this straightforward question
about the incentive e ect of energy taxes does not receive massive support, and
actually performs poorly in relative terms with respect to e.g. competitiveness
concerns. Once again, we observe how the e ectiveness of energy taxes is not
an established fact for the general public, and its ability to change behavior is
not shared by all the population.
We now analyze the determinants of voting behavior, and participation in
the ballot. Since these two outcomes are jointly determined, we would face a
selection problem if assessing voting behavior without taking into account the
decision to participate or not in the ballot. We stress that participation is not
compulsory in all cantons but one, the latter representing about 1% of the total
population. We hence apply a standard Heckman selection strategy, and esti-
mate jointly the probability to participate in the ballot, and to express either
a “yes-” or a “no-vote”. Since both outcomes are binary, we use a Heckman-
selection probit model. The selection of variables follows Thalmann (2004), who
had used comparable VOX data. We start with a reduced model including only
“objective” socio-economic characteristics potentially a ecting the decision to
participate in the ballot, or to accept the initiative. We include gender, dum-
mies for age categories, education, the number of cars in household (as a proxy
for carbon footprint), and the location of the voter, in terms of linguistic region
and with respect to the urban-rural cleavage. The procedure suggested in Thal-
mann (2004) implies running a second model, in which additional “subjective”
variables are added to the “objective” model. From the standard questions of
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the VOX survey, we indeed know some general preferences, political priorities
and concerns of the voters in our sample, as reported by respondents. In line
with Thalmann (2004), we consider as potentially relevant for this ballot the
following variables: concern with unemployment, with income inequality, and
with public intervention in the economy. We also include a variable capturing
the political a nity as declared by the respondents, based on the stated political
positioning at the last national elections. Given that only two parties supported
the popular initiative, the Green Liberals, its promoters, and the Green Party,
while all others strongly opposed it, including all leftist parties, we capture sup-
port for either one of the two parties as a measure of a nity with green parties
(called “green a nity” hereafter).
The top panel of Table 3 presents the estimates for the “objective” model.
All coe cients are statistically significant in the participation model. Most
estimates carry the expected sign: both higher education and age are correlated
to a higher likelihood to participate in a ballot. Participation rates are higher
for male individuals and in German speaking areas compared to French (the
dummy of reference) and Italian speaking areas. Rural areas also experience
higher turnout. These di erences are very similar to those found by Thalmann
(2004), and mirror general voting behavior in Switzerland. Interestingly, car
ownership is also associated with a higher ballot participation.
Taking into account self-selection into voting, the vote model assesses the ef-
fect of the previous variables on the likelihood to express a yes-vote in the ballot.
Higher education is found to be positively correlated with pro-environmental be-
havior, a common finding in the literature already at the time of the theoretical
and empirical analysis of Californian referenda by Deacon and Shapiro (1975).
Females are less likely to support the initiative, while young generations and
older individuals are less likely to support energy taxes, exactly as in Thal-
mann (2004). The intuition is the following. Elderly are expected to benefit less
from climate change mitigation. For young voters, two opposing e ects may be
at play: they have a higher probability to experience climate change, but are
possibly also more exposed to labor market shocks.
Interestingly, we find that, in statistical terms, car ownership explains par-
ticipation only, and not voting behavior. Yet, we note the expected negative
sign, as car ownership represents our proxy for exposure to higher energy prices.
The bottom panel of Table 3 introduces the subjective variables. Most of the
previous results concerning participation are robust to the addition of general
political concerns and a nity. Among the subjective variables, only concern
with unemployment is significantly linked to participation, with a positive sign
17
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as expected. The positive but non-significant e ect for green a nity suggests
that the sponsors and supporters of the initiative were not really able to mobilize
their voters to participate in the ballot .The picture is slightly di erent for vot-
ing choice. Only gender and the age dummy for the youngest voters significantly
a ect the decision to cast a yes-vote in the ballot. The subjective variables seem
to substantially contribute to explain variation in the model. In particular, we
note how green a nity is linked to a higher propensity to support the initiative
of the Green Liberals6. While the marginal e ect is relatively small in absolute
value, with only a 10% higher probability to vote yes for respondents declaring
themselves as greens, the magnitude of this e ect is very large in relative terms.
Green voters may have intrinsically supported the initiative, or voted strategi-
cally in favor to avoid a major defeat. Polls were indeed forecasting a rejection
as the most probable outcome, even though such debacle came clearly unex-
pected. In line with predictions, concern with income inequality, with public
intervention, and with unemployment are associated with a negative coe cient,
while the latter not in a statistically significant way. That is, the subjective
variables seem to capture the main complaints with the proposal. To better
understand the major impediments to a yes-vote, we exploit the pros and cons
as introduced by Table 2. We recall that these variables are observed only for
the respondents declaring to have participated in the ballot. Hence, we run a
simple probit model, skipping the participation stage. Outcomes of interest are
compared with the estimates of Table 3.
Table 4 shows the estimates for this additional model. Among the objective
variables, only one significantly explains voting behavior once taking into ac-
count subjective variables and opinions on the popular initiative. This variable
is the number of cars in the households, which now reaches statistical signifi-
cance. That is, as in Thalmann (2004), the number of cars could be a measure
of people’s economic sensitivity to higher energy prices, as families with more
cars are less likely to approve the initiative. Concerning subjective variables,
the concern for public intervention remains significant, and its magnitude vir-
tually unchanged with respect to Table 3. Green a nity keeps its significance,
although the marginal e ect is reduced. People’s opinions on the pro and con
arguments mentioned by the survey are the main drivers of voting behavior. All
variables have the expected sign, and comparable magnitudes. Only the coe -
6Given the small proportion of green voters, we estimate the joint e ect of supporting either one
of the two green parties. Both variables would positively a ect the probability of casting a yes-vote
if used separately. If additional variables for other parties would be included in the model, a negative
and significant marginal e ect could be found for supporting a centre-right party called FDP, or “The
Liberals”. Besides these facts, no clear right-left pattern could be discerned in the voting model. All
additional estimations are available by the authors upon request.
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Table 4: Probit model including pros and cons
Coe cient (S.E.) Marginal e ects (S.E.)
Gender (1 = F) -0.311 (0.203) -0.011 (0.008)
Young (1 = 18-29 years) -0.478 (0.427) -0.017 (0.016)
Elderly (1 = 60+ years) -0.301 (0.207) -0.011 (0.009)
German speaking 0.256 (0.278) 0.009 (0.010)
Italian speaking 0.080 (0.360) 0.003 (0.013)
Education (1 = high school+) -0.130 (0.217) -0.005 (0.008)
Number of cars in household -0.457** (0.132) -0.016** (0.007)
Rural municipality -0.051 (0.228) -0.002 (0.008)
Concern with unemployment -0.042 (0.079) -0.002 (0.003)
Concern with income inequality 0.019 (0.065) 0.0006 (0.002)
Concern with public intervention -0.085* (0.059) -0.003* (0.002)
Green a nity 0.628** (0.260) 0.022** (0.011)
Revenue neutrality 0.617*** (0.103) 0.022** (0.007)
Environmental e ectiveness 0.378*** (0.110) 0.013** (0.005)
Energy security 0.181* (0.108) 0.007* (0.004)
Competitiveness e ects -0.394** (0.094) -0.014** (0.005)
Regressive e ects -0.165* (0.089) -0.006* (0.003)
Decreasing tax base -0.057 (0.099) -0.002 (0.003)
Intercept -1.567* (0.848)
N 607
Pseudo R2 0.503
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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cient for the argument that a decreasing tax base could be problematic is too
small to be statistically significant. The adverse consequences of a decreasing
tax base may already be accounted for by the other variables.
When looking at the marginal e ects for these arguments, we observe that the
Green Liberals’ popular initiative was rejected based on the very same contrary
arguments that are most often mentioned in the literature. Similarly, the pro
arguments contributed to higher acceptability, but their lower uptake among the
general public, again in line with the literature, did not help to substantially
move the balance in favor of the reform.
For instance, the higher the agreement with revenue neutrality being con-
sidered a positive aspect of the proposed reform, the higher the likelihood to
have voted yes. Yet, on average people were not particularly enthusiastic about
revenue neutrality. The same applies to the energy security argument, whose
agreement is also linked to a higher probability of approving the proposal. A re-
current finding concerning the perception of environmental e ectiveness, largely
discussed in the introductory parts, is corroborated by our ballot data. Being
relatively confident that energy taxes provide an incentive to decrease energy
consumption and to switch to cleaner sources is linked with a higher probabil-
ity of a yes-vote. The magnitude of this e ect may look relatively small if we
compare with other survey studies testing the e ect of perceived e ectiveness on
acceptability in a similar fashion, such as Baranzini and Carattini (2016). How-
ever, assessing the relevance of this and the other e ects should take into account
the overall outcome of the ballot, very well replicated by the VOX survey. In
this light, the e ects that we measure are considerable.
Similar considerations apply to the contrary arguments. The only di er-
ence is that these were on average considered as much more relevant than the
arguments concerning pros. Competitiveness e ects were already determinant
in the ballot analyzed by Thalmann (2004), in spite of an unemployment level
below 2% at that time in Switzerland. At the time of the ballot that we an-
alyze, the unemployment rate was comfortably below 4%. Similarly to other
contexts, competitiveness concerns often take the center stage when it comes to
take important political decisions on climate policy. This can happen in spite of
the overall minimal adverse e ects on competitiveness observed so far (cf. e.g.
Mathys and de Melo 2011). For instance, when designing their carbon taxes,
Scandinavian countries opted for very generous exemptions to energy-intensive
industries on competitiveness grounds, avoiding important profit losses to the
firms concerned, but also watering down the environmental e ects of the pol-
icy (Baranzini and Carattini 2014). The industry-flight argument and related
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Table 5: Preferred modes of recycling
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Subsidies for e ciency and renewables 0.568 0.496 0 1
Social cushioning 0.115 0.320 0 1
Reduction in existing taxes 0.13 0.337 0 1
Redistribution to households and firms 0.186 0.389 0 1
fears of substantial competitiveness e ects largely contributed to the policy re-
versal observed in the case of the Australian carbon tax (cf. Spash and Lo
2012). Hence, the general public may tend to overestimate competitiveness ef-
fects, and this may be the result of very e ective political campaigning from
energy-intensive industries and fossil energy providers (cf. Ingold and Varone
2012).
Following the previous argument, we complete the analysis by testing the
potential popularity of alternative recycling schemes. Two specific questions
were introduced to respondents, asking them to mention their preferred recy-
cling option, freely, first, and then among a list of four options. These options
are: subsidies for e ciency improvements and renewable energy (environmental
earmarking), social cushioning, reduction in existing taxes, and redistribution
to households and firms. Most answers given in the open question correspond
to one of these four categories. The results of the open question, in which re-
spondents are not influenced by the options given by the questionnaire, are thus
very similar to those of the closed question, displayed in Table 5.
Unsurprisingly, about 60% of respondents would like revenues from energy
taxes to be used in the environmental domain. This result confirms previous
findings in the literature, and suggests that Swiss voters are not di erent from
the other samples analyzed so far. Only a small fraction of the population would
use tax revenues to provide social cushioning, or to reduce existing taxes, and
that in spite of the concerns expressed for distributional and competitiveness ef-
fects. Similar findings on this apparent inconsistency were already provided by
Baranzini and Carattini (2016), based on a specific Swiss canton. Apparently,
such concerns a ect the decision to accept of not an energy tax at a given tax
rate, but do not call for a diversion of revenues from environmental earmark-
ing. Redistribution to households and firms, the current way of redistributing
revenues from the existing Swiss carbon tax on heating fuels, is supported by
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about one fifth of the sample only7. That is, if voters were asked to vote on the
use of revenues of the current scheme, and absent any additional information,
they would probably reject lump-sum transfers, and favor a switch towards full
earmarking of revenues.
4.2 Choice experiment on alternative carbon tax designs
In this section we analyze decision making in our full-information choice-experiment
setting and compare it with the observed real voting behavior, and with the pre-
vious literature, with the aim of testing our two main hypotheses concerning tax
rates and recycling modes. Table 6 presents our main estimates. All columns
display marginal e ects from conditional logit. Column (1) shows estimates for
the full sample, i.e. 1189 individuals. Since we survey a representative sample
of the population living in Switzerland, not all respondents are Swiss nationals
and so entitled to vote. Hence, column (2) restricts the sample to nationals
only. Among nationals, we know self-declared participation to the usual four
ballots per year. Column (3) excludes non-voters while column (4) retains only
people declaring 100% ballot participation. Since all results remain the same
in qualitative terms and most of the time also in quantitative terms, we discuss
results based on column (1). The fact that we find similar results for di erent
sub-samples is however an interesting finding in itself. That is, foreign respon-
dents would not vote di erently than Swiss citizens, according to this sample
and for this matter. If we exclude those individuals that are most likely to
abstain to better predict the outcome of a potential ballot, the results are also
virtually unchanged. The propensity to vote seems thus to have no influence
on how people perceive the tax designs proposed in our study, in spite of the
non-negligible changes in observations across columns.
As expected, a higher tax rate is linked to a lower acceptability, everything
else equal. This follows from economic theory and is in line with Sælen and
Kallbekken (2011), Brannlund and Persson (2012) and Gevrek and Uyduranoglu
(2015). However, the di erence between 0 and 60 francs is relatively small in
comparison with the other tax rates. Hence, in some situations, people might
have preferred a carbon tax, with a moderate tax rate, than no carbon tax at
all. Given that the tax rate of the current Swiss carbon tax on heating fuels
was already fixed at 60 francs at the time of the survey, we did not include in
the survey a lower tax rate, e.g. of 30 francs. Furthermore, we note that except
for the first step from 0 to 60 francs, the progression is almost linear, suggesting
7Note that up one third of revenues are earmarked for subsidies for energy e ciency in buildings.
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that a well-shaped linear demand would be a good approximation for the case
of carbon taxes.
This linearity allows speculating on the negative impact on acceptability of
an extremely high rate, as the one suggested by the popular initiative promoted
by the Green Liberals and rejected by the Swiss population. While promoters
of and opponents to the popular initiative were disagreeing on the proposal’s
expected impact on energy prices, depending on the time horizon that they used
in their campaigning, our most conservative computations suggest that in the
short term the tax rate would have had to be of at least 300 CHF per ton of
CO2 to replace the revenues of the VAT. Figure 1 extrapolates linearly from
the probabilities of success that we observe based on the tax rates proposed by
the survey and predicts the outcome of an initiative proposing a tax rate of 300
CHF per ton of CO2 (see Table A.4 for descriptive statistics). For a like-to-like
comparison, Figure 1 shows only the predicted likelihood of success if revenues
were to be used as proposed by the Green Liberals. While interpreting any
out-of-sample prediction always requires a lot of precaution, our extrapolation
provides support for the external validity of our choice experiment. At a rate of
300 CHF per ton of CO2 the predicted support is virtually zero, which is very
close to the share of yes-votes in the public ballot. That is, if anything, our
choice experiment predicts lower support than the ballot.
The Green Liberals’ popular initiative could probably have had a better
outcome with a di erent use of tax revenues. As the estimates show, reducing
the current value added tax is not linked to any higher acceptability with respect
to income tax rebates (the reference case, omitted due to multicollinearity).
Together, these two revenue-recycling options are the most unpopular. This
result comes as expected and confirms our hypothesis on the low support for
revenue neutrality. In this respect, it is important to recall that based on the
modeling exercise we find none or little double dividend with these two ways to
recycle revenues, the net e ect on the domestic purchasing power being broadly
as negative as with the other types of recycling. This confirms a general result
in the double-dividend literature (Goulder 1995). Hence, respondents informed
about the potential beneficial e ects of reducing distortionary taxes knew that
they should not be expecting a double dividend from lower income taxes or a
reduction in the value-added tax.
We are however surprised by the estimates concerning lump-sum transfers,
environmental recycling and to some extent social cushioning. The results that
we provide for these variables are novel in the literature and deserve to be ana-
lyzed carefully. The signs for these variables are positive, negative and positive,
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Table 6: Choice experiment - Estimates from conditional logit
Full sample Nationals Without no-voters Always voters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax rate
0 CHF (reference)
60 CHF -0.018 -0.030 -0.037** -0.043*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.067) (0.020)
90 CHF -0.052*** -0.059*** -0.065*** -0.070***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021)
120 CHF -0.107*** -0.122*** -0.123*** -0.122***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020)
150 CHF -0.177*** -0.186*** -0.193*** -0.200***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.02)
Revenue recycling
Income tax rebate (reference)
VAT reduction -0.013 -0.010 -0.012 -0.016
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
Lump-sum redistribution 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.127***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
Social cushioning 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.144*** 0.135***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016)
Environmental recycling -0.021 -0.029* -0.035** -0.056**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018)
Number of individuals 1189 1066 980 650
Number of hypothetical votes 28536 25584 23520 15600
Pseudo-R2 0.0342 0.0360 0.0351 0.0404
Note: Estimates report marginal e ects from conditional logit.
The dependent variable measures the acceptability of the proposed carbon tax designs.
Robust standard error in parentheses. * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01.
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Figure 1: Prediction with VAT recycling as in the Green Liberals’ initiative
60
12
0
18
0
24
0
30
0
36
0
Ta
x r
at
e
0 .25 .5
Yes-votes
Note: Filled circles indicate observations in the sample, empty circles indicate observations
obtained through extrapolation.
respectively. That is, we find that lump-sum transfers and social cushioning are
the most preferred options for recycling, while environmental recycling does not
seem to obtain the support that it usually does in the literature. We have an
explanation for all the three facts, as well as important policy implications.
Let us start with the relatively high acceptability of the lump-sum redis-
tribution. The modeling exercise suggests moderate net gains for low-income
households with lump-sum transfers. Only social cushioning does better, while
the remaining types of recycling involve regressive e ects. Respondents are
informed about this fact and can internalize the beneficial distributional prop-
erties of lump-sum redistribution. Furthermore, respondents are informed by
the introductory material that the current carbon tax on heating fuels is mostly
redistributed through lump-sum transfers and it may be that this information
could have increased the legitimacy of this type of recycling. This information is
public, but according to Baranzini and Carattini (2016) only a limited number
of individuals are aware of the current carbon tax on heating fuel, and an even
smaller proportion knows how its revenues are redistributed (one fourth of the
1012 respondents interviewed in INFRAS 2015).
However, the most important finding concerns the low demand for recycling
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for environmental purposes. This result is at odds with most of the literature
on the acceptability of environmental taxes previously discussed. This is the
first study providing survey respondents with an estimate of the emission abate-
ments linked with the carbon taxes about which respondents are requested to
express their opinion. Interviewers were instructed on how to provide simple ex-
planations on the price sensitivity of consumers and they reportedly had to use
such information to answer the general public’s curiosity on the economic bases
for the figures for emissions abatements included in the choice cards. That is,
our survey addressed by construction one of the main obstacle to carbon taxes:
perceived ine ectiveness, which often goes hand in hand with earmarking for
environmental purposes. Since all carbon taxes in the survey are shown to be
e ective, and to the extent that the scientific credibility of our study was not
challenged by respondents, the main driver for the demand for environmental
recycling is wiped out. We also note that the demand for environmental recy-
cling expressed so often in the literature may not necessarily correspond to the
most e ective way of obtaining additional emission abatements as economists
would interpret it. Even with a conservative estimate for the price of emissions
on foreign carbon markets, the revenues of a carbon tax between 60 and 150
francs per ton of CO2 can lead to very large emission abatements abroad. All
scenarios imply substantial negative emissions: even the lowest tax rate is shown
to lead to abatements equivalent to five times Swiss emissions. Therefore, at
the current carbon price levels, it would be very tempting for policymakers to
purchase many years of carbon neutrality and so achieve long-term pledges, such
as “the balance” between emissions and removals by sinks, at an extremely low
cost. However, we understand that the respondents in our survey may wonder
why compensating so much. The general public may also do not like the pur-
chase of foreign carbon credits more in general. People may have a preference
for local investments, which provide a number of local co-benefits, and may also
have ethical or practical reservations with respect to the use of o sets in general
(see Conte and Kotchen 2010; Anderson 2012; Carattini and Tavoni 2016).
Finally, the relative popularity of social cushioning does not completely sur-
prise, given that distributional e ects were made completely salient to respon-
dents. Social cushioning is shown to provide the most progressive e ects over all
types of recycling, although lump-sum transfers perform similarly with moderate
tax rates.
Figure 2 extends the simulation of Figure 1 with the most popular recycling
options, lump-sum recycling and social cushioning. As Figure 1 already showed,
our exercise suggests that even with an extremely low tax rate recycling through
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Figure 2: Prediction with alternative recycling compared to VAT recycling
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VAT rebates could hardly provide a majority in favor of a carbon tax. With
social cushioning, and especially lump-sum transfers, the picture is di erent.
While none of the two recycling options lead us to a majority with the tax
rates considered by our survey, the prediction for recycling through lump-sum
transfers suggests that anything below 60 CHF per ton of CO2 would be in
principle acceptable. This was the rate of the carbon tax at the time of the
vote (since 2016 it is at 84 CHF), but it applies only to heating and process
fuels, not vehicle fuels. While we recall the necessary precautions in taking at
face values such predictions, we stress how recycling modes can completely shift
the demand for carbon taxes, possibly also beyond the required threshold to
make them acceptable. Based on these findings, we reformulate hypothesis 2 as
follows:
Hypothesis 2: Revenue recycling We expect acceptability to vary substan-
tially depending on the use of revenues. In relative terms, we expect lower
acceptability with revenue-neutral recycling, as revenue neutrality (tax-
ing here and reducing taxes elsewhere) is shown to be a criterion that
the taxpayers probably generally do not request, or understand. This is
particularly true in the absence of a double dividend. Lump-sum redis-
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tribution can however be associated to higher acceptability provided that
its progressive properties are made explicit. If distributional e ects are
salient, social cushioning and lump-sum redistribution can lead to higher
acceptability. Providing information on the e ectiveness of the carbon tax
reduces the usual demand for revenue recycling for environmental rein-
forcement. Some types of environmental recycling may even cause lower
support, such as recycling through the purchase of foreign carbon credits.
Finally, we consider how exploiting heterogeneity across individuals may pro-
vide further information on people’s preferences for carbon taxes. Similarly to
e.g. Gevrek and Uyduranoglu (2015), we apply a latent-class model to ex-
plain heterogeneous preferences. According to our data, 5 latent classes can be
identified8. Table A.5 in the Appendix displays how preferences change across
classes, based again on a conditional logit model. Table A.6 introduces informa-
tion on the characteristics of respondents, aiming at describing the composition
of classes using a multinomial logit model9.
We briefly summarize the insights from this additional analysis. Classes
are divided based on the importance given to each attribute (price or revenue
recycling), on the preference for revenue recycling, the elasticity to variation
in the tax rate, and overall acceptability. Low-income households tend to be
associated with classes showing a marked preference for progressive designs,
i.e. through lump-sum redistribution of revenues or social cushioning. The
overall degree of acceptability, and the related sensitivity to tax rates, seems to
be linked to di erent degrees of climate concern. Classes with lower degrees of
climate concern tend to be linked to rather elastic behavior, and low to moderate
overall acceptability. While a positive correlation between concern for climate
mitigation and preferences for tighter climate policy is common in the literature
(see Drews and van den Bergh 2015), we are, to the best of our knowledge, the
first to empirically document di erent preferences for the distributional e ects
of carbon taxes across the income distribution.
4.3 Discussion
Tax rate We find that higher tax rates clearly imply lower acceptability. This
fact recalls once again the general public’s sensibility with respect to the cost of
climate policy, above all when the latter is as transparent as with carbon taxes.
8AIC (BIC) values are given as follows: for two classes, 15495 (15616); for three classes, 14835
(15021); for four classes, 14620 (14870); for five classes, 14427 (14741).
9The number of observations is limited for a series of variables, such as income or commuting
preferences for workers.
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As pointed out in the literature, this reminds policymakers of the importance
of proceedings in small steps (Baranzini and Carattini 2014). Starting at a
moderate price level may also reduce the opposition from energy-intensive lob-
bies, even though some evidence suggests that vested interests may be mobilized
against any departure from the status quo (see e.g. Rocchi et al. 2014)10. In this
respect, it is important that policymakers have at their disposal estimates of the
potential competitiveness e ects of carbon taxes. These are indeed likely to be
small overall and should not be overemphasized. Our results suggest that the
general public is likely to be ready to give up some fraction of national income,
if they have no doubts on the environmental e ectiveness of the measures that
they are supporting. Hence, resistance to carbon taxes seems not to be due to
complete free riding in the provision of the global public good which is climate
change mitigation, thus supporting the idea of some degree of cooperation in
the climate commons (cf. Ostrom 2009; Carattini et al. 2015; Carattini 2015).
Gradual introduction and information The acceptability for a given in-
strument may increase once the instrument is in place, supporting the use of
moderate tax rates to start. This for three reasons. First, the role of relative
consumption: once the tax in place, people realize that their purchasing power
compared to the others around them may be actually unchanged (Howarth 2006;
Gowdy 2008). Second, the role of revenue recycling: revenue neutrality can in-
crease acceptability ex post, once people see that they are given some of the
money back. Of course, this requires the redistribution of revenues to be su -
ciently salient. With full redistribution, some households may be net winners,
as with feebates. Third, the role of observing the functioning of the policy:
as discussed, the general public tends to underestimate the e ectiveness of en-
vironmental taxes, especially absent any recycling for environmental purposes.
However, if the e ect of the policy is su ciently salient, people may review their
beliefs ex post, causing an important gap between perceived e ectiveness (and
thus acceptability) ex ante and ex post. Evidence in this sense is provided for
instance by Carattini et al. (2016), who exploit the forced implementation of
pricing garbage by the bag on a relatively large population to assess its overall
e ectiveness, and its acceptability both before and after the implementation.
People are very concerned with pricing ex ante, but implementing the policy
substantially reduces concerns with e ectiveness and fairness. Similarly, Kall-
bekken and Sælen (2011) have argued in favor of the use of trial periods, based
10The descriptive statistics in Table A.2 report that a substantial majority of the choice-experiment
sample would have a preference for a carbon tax that starts low and increases over time.
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on the successful example of the Stockholm congestion charge (see also Cherry
et al. 2014). In the specific case of carbon taxes, Murray and Rivers (2015)
show based on poll data how resistence against British Columbia’s carbon tax
substantially decreased after its introduction, with positive spillovers to the rest
of Canada. In the case under consideration, we note that although Switzerland
has already a carbon tax on heating and process fuels, an important fraction of
the population is not aware of its existence.
Our choice experiment was designed to inform voters on the e ectiveness of
the incentive tax, something that is generally missing in similar studies in the
literature as well as in the political arena.
Revenue recycling Selling an environmental tax reform may be hard, but
not impossible. Our findings from the choice experiment support the decision of
the Swiss government to go for full lump-sum recycling in the planned extension
of the current carbon tax on heating fuels to all fuels, as announced in March
2015. However, our specific framework provides more detailed information that
usually done in the public arena. As emphasized based on the VOX data, absent
any additional information the general public would probably reject lump-sum
transfers in favor of environmental earmarking. That is, policymakers should
be willing to undertake the e ort that is needed to reduce the informational
gap between them and the general public. In our case, we provided respondents
with clear and concise information on how carbon taxes work, on the mecha-
nisms through which higher energy prices lead to lower energy consumption –
including scenarios for emission abatements – and on the competitiveness and
distributional e ects of each type of revenue recycling for any given tax rate.
Explaining how lump-sum redistribution works and how it can be progressive
will be a first step in favor of higher acceptability of revenue-neutral designs.
We also believe that providing figures for the expected emission abatements
will also improve acceptability and decrease the demand for environmental re-
cycling. In this case we stress how it is crucial to explain to the population
how the incentive e ect works. These figures could also emphasize the exis-
tence of co-benefits for the local population. Expecting positive co-benefits is
indeed associated with higher willingness to pay for climate change mitigation
(Longo et al. 2012) as well as higher acceptability of carbon taxes (Baranzini
and Carattini 2016).
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5 Conclusions
Pledges are not per se credible policy commitments. The ability of countries to
turn pledges into cost-e ective policies such as carbon taxes will determine the
possibility to ramp up future ambitions and to push for further policy tighten-
ing. The implementation of carbon taxes has experienced a hard time in many
countries, so far. Learning from these experiences is crucial to increase their
popularity and broaden their implementation in a post-Paris world.
This paper analyzes voting behavior in a real ballot on energy taxes in
Switzerland. Revenues from these energy taxes were to replace completely the
current value-added tax. The proposal was massively rejected. We collect data
on a large representative sample of voters. We find that several obstacles lim-
ited its acceptability, such as distributional and competitiveness concerns and
perceived environmental ine ectiveness. Given the perception of little environ-
mental e ects, revenue neutrality is not a priori a solution for the general public.
These energy taxes would have instead been more popular if revenues were to
be earmarked for environmental purposes.
At the same time of the ballot, we administer a choice-experiment survey,
exploiting the salience of the topic. The choice experiment addresses all the
obstacles emphasized by the analysis of real voting behavior. Based on a com-
putable general equilibrium model, it provides information to all respondents
on the social, economic and environmental impacts for di erent tax rates and
use of revenues. We analyze the demand for carbon taxes for each design and
show that this information leads to a very di erent outcome compared to the
ballot and the literature. First of all, revenue-neutral policies can become pop-
ular, provided that their progressive properties are emphasized as in the case of
lump-sum transfers. Second, environmental earmarking may no longer be abso-
lutely necessary to receive a substantial support for carbon taxes, if information
is provided on their environmental e ectiveness.
Based on our findings we argue that policy designs usually preferred by
economists, but in most cases opposed by the general public, are not neces-
sarily unpopular, provided that the general public shares at least some of the
information that economists have. Our findings can help devise e ective car-
bon taxes that are accepted by citizens, because they are convincingly shown to
be environmentally e ective and because their revenues are refunded in a form
that mitigates their burden on low-income households. Addressing the concerns
and limited information of the general public is probably the only way to avoid
important resistances to cost-e ective instruments of climate change mitigation,
32
which could put at risk the realization of the current pledges and potentially
jeopardize their necessary tightening. The consequences are known. The inabil-
ity to turn Paris pledges into policy would this time hardly leave any room to
avoid running into dangerous climate changes.
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Appendix
A.1 Figures
Figure A.1: Example of a choice card
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A.2 Tables
Table A.1: VOX data - Sample composition
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Gender (female) 0.526 0.5 0 1 1514
Age 18-29 (young) 0.117 0.321 0 1 1514
Age 30-59 0.532 0.499 0 1 1514
Age 60+ (elderly) 0.351 0.477 0 1 1514
German speaking 0.534 0.499 0 1 1514
French speaking 0.267 0.442 0 1 1514
Italian speaking 0.199 0.399 0 1 1514
Education (high school+) 0.616 0.486 0 1 1514
Number of cars in household 1.381 1.031 0 9 1514
Rural municipality 0.258 0.437 0 1 1514
Concern with unemployment 4.846 1.487 1 6 1488
Concern with income inequality 3.952 1.649 1 8 1489
Concern with public intervention 4.249 1.668 1 6 1444
Green a nity 0.063 0.243 0 1 1514
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Table A.2: Choice experiment - Sample composition
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Socio-economic characteristics:
Gender (male) 0.487 0.5 0 1 1200
Age 51.711 15.263 18 94 1200
National 0.897 0.305 0 1 1200
Education (years of) 15.341 2.072 11 18 1196
Household size 2.884 1.333 1 8 1200
Household annual income:
<35’000 CHF 0.06 0.237 0 1 957
35’000-50’000 CHF 0.144 0.351 0 1 957
50’000-80’000 CHF 0.242 0.429 0 1 957
80’000-120’000 CHF 0.304 0.46 0 1 957
120’000-160’000 CHF 0.154 0.361 0 1 957
160’000-200’000 CHF 0.047 0.212 0 1 957
>200’000 CHF 0.049 0.216 0 1 957
Geographical location:
German speaking 0.542 0.498 0 1 1200
French speaking 0.292 0.455 0 1 1200
Italian speaking 0.167 0.373 0 1 1200
Urban agglomeration 0.264 0.441 0 1 1200
Environmental attitudes:
Main transport for commuting:
Car 0.578 0.494 0 1 969
Bicycle 0.195 0.396 0 1 969
Bus 0.227 0.419 0 1 969
Concern for climate change:
Very threatening 0.405 0.491 0 1 1189
Somewhat threatening 0.476 0.500 0 1 1189
Not threatening 0.119 0.324 0 1 1189
Preference for gradual carbon tax 0.635 0.482 0 1 1200
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Table A.3: Swiss population - Socio-economic characteristics for comparison
Variable Mean
Socio-economic characteristics:
Gender (female) 0.505
Age 18-29 (young) 0.149
Age 30-59 0.448
Age 60+ (elderly) 0.234
National 0.757
Education (high school+) 0.521
Household size 2.25
Geographical location:
German speaking 0.633
French speaking 0.227
Italian speaking 0.081
Rural municipality 0.17
Environmental attitudes:
Votes to the Green Party 0.063
Votes to the Green Liberal Party 0.072
Source: All variables come from Swiss Statistics and concern the end of 2014.
Election data concern the federal elections of 2015.
Table A.4: Choice experiments - Descriptive statistics
Tax rate
60 CHF 90 CHF 120 CHF 150 CHF
Re
cy
cli
ng
Income tax rebate 0.352 0.317 0.273 0.175
VAT reduction 0.319 0.319 0.229 0.193
Lump-sum redistribution 0.496 0.432 0.374 0.321
Social cushioning 0.455 0.441 0.410 0.359
Environmental recycling 0.350 0.295 0.215 0.148
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Table A.5: Latent classes - Estimates from conditional logit
Latent classes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tax rate
0 CHF (reference)
60 CHF -0.130*** 0.326*** -0.314*** 0.582*** 0.0161
(0.032) (0.013) (0.028) (0.0110) (0.026)
90 CHF -0.099** 0.377*** -0.425*** 0.432*** -0.167***
(0.032) (0.010) (0.036) (0.017) (0.025)
120 CHF -0.069* 0.379*** -0.387*** 0.266*** -0.308***
(0.023) (0.011) (0.033) (0.019) (0.028)
150 CHF -0.119*** 0.373*** -0.372*** 0.126*** -0.463***
(0.028) (0.011) (0.035) (0.025) (0.031)
Revenue recycling
Income tax rebate (reference)
VAT reduction -0.0004 -0.009 -0.094* 0.038 0.002
(0.030) (0.008) (0.044) (0.021) (0.029)
Lump-sum redistribution 0.552*** 0.034*** -0.027 0.059** 0.125***
(0.031) (0.008) (0.039) (0.022) (0.026)
Social cushioning 0.589*** 0.051*** 0.0095 0.054* 0.104***
(0.0302) (0.008) (0.034) (0.023) (0.031)
Environmental recycling -0.051 -0.018* -0.067 0.019 0.063
(0.038) (0.009) (0.042) (0.020) (0.033)
N 3861 8190 6564 4191 5334
Pseudo-R2 0.3752 0.3523 0.8726 0.5399 0.1635
Note: Estimates report marginal e ects from conditional logit. The dependent variable measures the
acceptability of the proposed carbon tax designs. Robust standard error in parentheses.
* p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01.
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Annex 6 
QUELLE EST L'UTILISATION PRÉFÉRÉE DE LA RECETTE D'UNE TAXE 
SUR L'ÉNERGIE? 
Philippe Thalmann, EPFL, Lausanne, 30 mai 2016 
 
Le 8 mars 2015, 2'010'326 électeurs suisses votaient contre l’initiative populaire fédérale 
« Remplacer la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée par une taxe sur l’énergie » alors que 175'405 (8%) 
votaient pour. Comme après chaque votation, un sondage VOX a été réalisé peu après cette 
votation par l'institut gfs Berne pour comprendre les motifs de vote. 1'514 personnes ont été 
interrogées par téléphone dans toute la Suisse entre le 9 et le 22 mars. Les principaux résultats 
de ce sondage ont été analysés par Kurer, Traber et Widmer (2016). La représentativité de 
l'échantillon a également été vérifiée par Schmidely et Thalmann (2016) et par Carattini et al. 
(2016). Ces derniers ont également estimé des modèles économétriques expliquant la 
décision de participer ou non au vote et la décision de voter pour ou contre l'initiative. Ces 
analyses utilisent les données communes à toutes les enquêtes VOX. Nous avons pu ajouter 
deux questions spécifiques, portant sur l'utilisation préférée de la recette d'une taxe sur 
l'énergie pour le cas où elle devait être introduite. En effet, utiliser cette recette pour remplacer 
la TVA n'est pas la seule possibilité. Kurer, Traber et Widmer (2016) montrent d'ailleurs que si 
l'initiative a été rejetée, ce n'est pas parce que les votants étaient opposés à une taxe sur 
l'énergie mais parce qu'ils ne voulaient pas qu'elle remplace la TVA: "Remplacer cette source 
de revenus importante et bien acceptée par un nouvel instrument dont on n’entrevoit que 
partiellement les conséquences fiscales a été considéré comme trop risqué par une grande 
majorité des votants." Carattini et al. (2016, tableau 4) confirment ce résultat: le désaccord 
avec l'argument du remplacement de la TVA est le deuxième facteur le plus important de rejet 
de l'initiative, talonnant de peu l'absence d'affinité avec l'un des deux partis écologistes, seuls 
soutiens de l'initiative. 
Le but de cette note n'est pas de répéter les résultats des publications citées ci-dessus. Elle 
en présente d'autres, en réponse à ces questions: 
1. Dans quelle mesure les arguments concernant l'affectation de la recette ont-ils 
contribué au rejet de l'initiative? 
2. Quelles sont les affectations que proposent spontanément les sondés pour la recette 
d'une hypothétique taxe sur l'énergie? 
3. Quelles sont les affectations que choisissent les sondés lorsqu'on leur suggère les 
types d'affectation classiques? 
4. Comment se comparent leurs propositions spontanées d'affectation et leurs choix entre 
affectations suggérées? 
5. Quelles sont les caractéristiques personnelles qui expliquent le choix d'une affectation 
suggérée plutôt qu'une autre? 
1. IMPORTANCE DES ARGUMENTS POUR ET CONTRE L'INITIATIVE 
Le sondage VOX a proposé aux sondés qui ont déclaré avoir participé à la votation trois 
arguments en faveur de l'initiative et trois arguments contre l'initiative, en se basant sur les 
débats lors de la campagne référendaire qui a précédé le vote populaire. Pour chaque 
argument, les sondés pouvaient exprimer leur accord sur une échelle de 1 (très d’accord) à 4 
(pas du tout d’accord). Nous avons supprimé les réponses « ne sais pas/refuse de répondre », 
si bien que les effectifs sont différents pour chaque argument type. Ils restent cependant 
proches, si bien que les différences ne devraient pas fausser la comparaison des résultats. 
Nous opérons une transformation des réponses pour faciliter la compréhension. En effet, on 
peut être opposé à l'initiative en étant d'accord avec les arguments contre ou pas d'accord 
avec les arguments en faveur de l'initiative. Pour comparer les degrés d'accord/désaccord et 
leur lien avec le refus de l'initiative, nous opérons trois transformations des réponses données: 
1. Recoder les réponses pour qu'elles mesurent l'accord sur une échelle de 0 (pas du tout 
d’accord) à 1 (très d’accord) (formule: nouveau score = (4 – ancien score) / 3) 
2. Reformuler les arguments pour que la majorité soit d'accord; donc un argument avec 
lequel la majorité n'a pas été d'accord est inversé 
3. Classer les arguments par degré d'accord décroissant 
Les résultats sont présentés dans le tableau 1. 
Tableau 1 : Accord avec les arguments pour ou contre l’initiative 
Argument Moyenne Effectif 
La taxe sur l’énergie renchérit notablement la consommation 
énergétique et nuit ainsi à l’économie suisse 
67.7% 906 
Les recettes provenant de la taxe sur l’énergie ne 
compensent pas les pertes dues à la suppression de la TVA* 
67.3% 854 
En cas de repli de la consommation d’énergie, la taxe sur 
l’énergie devra continuellement être revue à la hausse pour 
prévenir toute perte fiscale 
67.3% 850 
La taxe sur l’énergie est injuste car les personnes démunies 
seront davantage lésées 
64.3% 904 
La taxe sur l’énergie ne réduit pas la dépendance de la 
Suisse vis-à-vis du pétrole, du gaz et de l’uranium étrangers* 
55.0% 855 
La taxe sur l’énergie incite à économiser l’énergie et à 
considérer des formes d’énergie renouvelables 
54.7% 920 
Les arguments dont le sens a été inversé pour correspondre à l'avis majoritaire sont marqués d'un astérisque 
On voit que l'effet négatif sur l'économie est le principal argument contre l'initiative, suivi de 
très près de l'argument que la taxe sur l'énergie ne saurait remplacer la TVA en termes de 
recettes et de la crainte que la taxe sur l'énergie devrait continuellement être relevée pour 
maintenir les recettes. On voit bien ce qui est confirmé par les autres études citées en 
ouverture de cette note, à savoir que le manque de confiance dans la proposition de remplacer 
un impôt large et établi par un impôt étroit et neuf a particulièrement nui à l'initiative. Le seul 
aspect de l'initiative perçu positivement par les sondés est l’incitation que donnerait la taxe à 
économiser l’énergie et à considérer les énergies renouvelables. 
2. AFFECTATIONS PROPOSÉES POUR LA RECETTE D’UNE TAXE SUR 
L'ÉNERGIE 
L’analyse ci-dessus a montré que l'utilisation de la recette est un aspect fondamental pour un 
projet de taxe environnementale. Utiliser la recette pour remplacer un  autre impôt comme la 
TVA n'est clairement pas une option populaire. En prévision de ce résultat, le groupe du projet 
SEPIA avait fait ajouter dans le questionnaire du sondage VOX une question interrogeant les 
sondés sur l'affectation qu'ils souhaiteraient donner à la recette d'une hypothétique taxe sur 
l'énergie: 
« L'initiative populaire "Remplacer la TVA par une taxe sur l'énergie" prévoyait 
d'utiliser la recette fiscale de la taxe sur l'énergie pour remplacer celle de la TVA, 
mais on pourrait aussi utiliser la recette d'une taxe sur l'énergie autrement. Si une 
taxe sur l'énergie était introduite, comment faudrait-il utiliser sa recette fiscale à 
votre avis? » 
Afin de faciliter leur interprétation, les réponses à cette question ouverte ont été regroupées 
en 11 types d'affectation. Certains correspondent aux 4 affectations suggérées dans la 
question fermée présentée plus bas, au moins après regroupement. D'autres sont des 
affectations dont nous n'avions pas anticipé la popularité, en particulier le financement de 
mesures de protection de l'environnement, soit la recherche d'un effet de renforcement plus 
large que seulement dans le domaine de l'énergie. 
La tableau 2 montre les 11 types d'affectation regroupant les réponses à la question ouverte 
et, en regard lorsque c'est possible, les 4 options de la question fermée, avec les fréquences 
de choix de chaque affectation. Pour la question ouverte, les modalités "ne peut pas se décider 
ou ne sait pas" (32.7% des sondés) et "refuse de répondre" (9.3%) ont été ignorées, de même 
que les réponses à la question ouverte qui n'ont pas pu être associées à une (seule) des 11 
types d'affectation (15.3%). Au total, il reste 646 réponses utilisables. C'est peu, mais nous 
verrons plus bas les préférences des sondés exclus ici. 
Le tableau 2 montre qu'un sondé sur deux qui a proposé une affectation pour la taxe sur 
l'énergie a spontanément proposé de l'utiliser pour subventionner les énergies renouvelables. 
Lorsqu'on ajoute les propositions d'aider les ménages et les entreprises à augmenter leur 
efficacité énergétique, on trouve que près de deux sondés sur trois préfèrent une affectation 
cohérente avec le but de la taxe et capable de renforcer son effet incitatif. De plus, un sondé 
sur dix a proposé une affectation proche, pour des mesures de protection de l'environnement. 
Les sondés souhaitent donc surtout recycler les recettes dans le domaine de la taxe, 
conformément au résultat déjà obtenu notamment par Baranzini et Carattini (2016) et qu'ils 
expliquent principalement par la méconnaissance des effets incitatifs de la taxe. 
Tableau 2 : Affectations proposées et choisies pour la recette d’une taxe sur l’énergie 
Affectation proposée de 
manière spontanée 
(question ouverte) 
Fréquence 
(%) 
Fréquence 
cumulée 
(%) 
Affectation choisie 
parmi celles suggérées 
(question fermée) 
Fréquence 
(%) 
Subventionner les énergies 
renouvelables 51.9 
68.6 
Subventionner les 
économies d’énergie et 
les énergies 
renouvelables 
56.8 Aider les ménages à 
économiser l’énergie 10.7 
Aider les entreprises à 
économiser l’énergie 6.0 
Financer des mesures de 
protection de l’environnement 10.5 10.5   
Aider ménages pénalisés 9.6 
10.7 
Aider les personnes 
fortement pénalisées par 
la taxe 
11.5 Aider les entreprises 
pénalisées 1.1 
Redistribuer l’argent aux 
ménages 3.9 
3.9 
Redistribuer l’argent aux 
ménages et aux 
entreprises 
18.6 
Redistribuer l’argent aux 
entreprises 0.0 
Abaisser un impôt existant 5.0 
6.2 Abaisser ou supprimer un impôt existant 13.0 Supprimer un impôt existant 1.2 
Verser la recette dans la 
caisse de la Confédération ou 
du canton 
0.2 0.2   
L’ordre des affectations dans la table respecte approximativement l’ordre décroissant des pourcentages tout en 
regroupant les affectations. L’effectif total est de 646 pour la question ouverte et 1273 pour la question fermée. 
"Fréquence cumulée" désigne la somme des fréquences par thème. 
Bien que le sondage ait été mené dans les jours qui ont suivi la votation sur l'initiative populaire 
visant à remplacer la TVA par une taxe sur l'énergie, seul un sondé sur dix a pensé à ou choisi 
de proposer d'utiliser la recette de la taxe sur l'énergie pour abaisser ou remplacer un autre 
impôt. Cela démontre que la théorie d'une réforme fiscale écologique avec son deuxième 
dividende fiscal n'est pas connue, comprise ou partagée par les citoyens. 
En Suisse, les débats sur les taxes d'incitation environnementale ont conduit à ce que leur 
recette soit généralement redistribuée intégralement à la population et aux entreprises. Une 
exception concerne la taxe CO2 sur les combustibles, dont un tiers de la recette est utilisé pour 
promouvoir la réduction des émissions de CO2 dans le domaine des bâtiments. Ces mesures 
de renforcement sont ainsi compatibles avec ce que deux sur trois de nos sondés ont choisi. 
Quoi qu'il en soit, seuls 4% environ des sondés qui ont proposé une affectation ont 
spontanément pensé à simplement redistribuer la recette de la taxe sur l'énergie aux ménages 
ou entreprises. Il faut reconnaître que la redistribution des recettes des taxes d'incitation n'est 
pas très connue dans le public, seul un quart des personnes sondées par INFRAS (2015, fig. 
22) sachant que la recette de la taxe CO2 était redistribuée. Notons enfin que l'amortissement 
social – venir en aide aux ménages et entreprises particulièrement affectés par la taxe – n'est 
pas non plus une affectation à laquelle beaucoup de sondés ont pensé. 
3. AFFECTATIONS CHOISIES POUR LA RECETTE D’UNE TAXE SUR 
L'ÉNERGIE 
Comme nous avions prévu que de nombreux sondés auraient de la peine à proposer une 
affectation pour la recette d'une hypothétique taxe sur l'énergie, nous avons fait ajouter dans 
le questionnaire du sondage VOX une deuxième question interrogeant les sondés sur leur 
affectation préférée, cette fois-ci en leur demandant de choisir entre quatre affectations 
suggérées: 
« Nous avons réuni quatre propositions d'affectation de la recette fiscale d'une taxe 
sur l'énergie. Veuillez indiquer laquelle vous préférez: 
a) subventionner les économies d'énergie et les énergies renouvelables 
b) aider les personnes fortement pénalisées par la taxe sur l'énergie 
c) abaisser ou supprimer un impôt existant 
d) redistribuer l'argent aux ménages et aux entreprises » 
Les résultats pourraient changer lorsqu'on suggère des affectations aux sondés et qu'on les 
laisse choisir. Cela élimine d'une part quelques affectations, comme la protection de 
l'environnement en général, ce qui pourrait conduire certains sondés qui ont proposé une telle 
affectation à ne choisir aucune des affectations suggérées, mais ce n'est le cas que pour 3 
sondés. Cela va aussi permettre aux sondés de penser à des affectations qui ne leur étaient 
peut-être pas venues à l'esprit et à modifier leur choix de l'affectation préférée. Cela va surtout 
inclure tous les sondés qui n'avaient pas pu ou voulu proposer une affectation. 
Les réponses à la question fermée sont aussi présentées dans le tableau 2 ci-dessus. Notons 
qu'on perd 15.8% de sondés qui n'ont choisi aucune des options suggérées, mais il reste 
quand même deux fois plus de réponses que pour la question ouverte. Les fréquences dans 
la partie droite du tableau 2 représentent donc la répartition de 1'273 choix entre les quatre 
options suggérées. 
La partie de droite du tableau 2 confirme essentiellement les préférences de la partie de 
gauche, en incluant deux fois plus de sondés. En effet, lorsqu'ils ont le choix entre une 
affectation qui renforce l'effet de la taxe, une affectation qui atténue son fardeau, une simple 
redistribution de la recette et une réforme fiscale écologique, presque six sondés sur dix 
choisissent le renforcement. Relevons cependant que la redistribution de la recette rencontre 
un succès beaucoup plus important que dans les propositions spontanées, ce qui montre que 
cette affectation peut convaincre, mais qu'on n'y pense pas de prime abord. 
Les réponses à la question fermée peuvent être comparées à celles des quelques 1'000 
personnes interrogées en ligne en 2014 par LINK pour INFRAS (2015). Le questionnaire leur 
demandait si la recette de la taxe CO2 existantes (qui ne frappe que les combustibles, en 
particulier l'huile de chauffage) devait être utilisée selon chacune de six affectations possibles 
(Fig. 21): 
1. Contributions au développement des énergies renouvelables (oui: 89%, non: 8%, ne 
sait pas: 3%) 
2. Encouragement de technologies favorables à l'environnement (88%, 8%, 4%) 
3. Subventions pour l'isolation thermique des bâtiments (78%, 17%, 5%) 
4. Développement des transports publics (60%, 36%, 4%) 
5. Création d'espaces naturels protégés (42%, 49%, 10%) 
6. Redistribution uniforme à la population (20%, 75%, 6%) 
La simple redistribution de la recette a été rejetée par trois sondés sur quatre alors que les 
mesures de renforcement ont été plébiscitées par 90% des sondés. Ces résultats sont tout à 
fait compatibles avec les nôtres, même s'il s'agit d'une taxe sur le CO2 et non sur l'énergie. On 
notera en particulier le soutien très marqué pour la promotion des énergies renouvelables. 
4. COMMENT L'AFFECTATION PRÉFÉRÉE CHANGE ENTRE QUESTION 
OUVERTE ET FERMÉE 
En ayant invité les sondés à choisir entre quatre types d'affectation suggérées après leur avoir 
demandé de proposer spontanément une affectation, on a la possibilité de vérifier comment 
les préférences changent entre une question ouverte et une question fermée. On a aussi la 
possibilité de connaître les préférences de sondés qui n'ont pas répondu à la question ouverte. 
Les résultats sont résumés dans le tableau 3, pour les 1'273 sondés qui ont choisi l'une des 
quatre affectations suggérées dans la question fermée. Ils sont d'abord séparés entre trois 
groupes: 
1. Les sondés qui n'ont pas du tout proposé d'affectation dans la question ouverte 
2. Les sondés qui ont proposé une seule affectation qui correspond à l'une des quatre 
options de la question fermée (regroupement comme dans le tableau 2) 
3. Les sondés qui ont proposé plusieurs affectations, ceux qui ont proposé une affectation 
qui n'a pas pu être attribuée à l'un des 11 types du tableau 2 et ceux qui ont proposé 
une affectation faisant partie des types "Financer des mesures de protection de 
l’environnement" ou "Verser la recette dans la caisse de la Confédération ou du canton" 
Les choix du troisième groupe, trop hétérogène, ne seront pas détaillés. Dans le premier 
groupe, la répartition des choix est semblable à celle de l'ensemble des sondés (tableau 2), 
ce qui montre que ces sondés qui n'ont pas proposé d'affectation ont des préférences proches 
de celles des sondés qui en ont proposé une. En particulier, un sondé sur deux a choisi 
l'affectation qui renforce l'effet de la taxe sur l'énergie. 
Le deuxième groupe compte 545 sondés qui ont proposé, dans la question ouverte, une 
affectation qui correspond à l'une des quatre affectations suggérées dans la question fermée 
et qui ont aussi choisi une de ces quatre affectations (32 sondés remplissent la première mais 
pas la deuxième condition). Dans leur cas, on peut vérifier s'ils modifient leur choix lorsqu'ils 
font face à un menu, donc lorsqu'on leur suggère des affectations. Le tableau 3 montre que 
c'est le cas pour un tiers environ de ce groupe. La réorientation la plus importante est d'une 
proposition d'affectation qui renforce l'effet de la taxe vers une redistribution simple (10.3%), 
mais il y a aussi des réorientations significatives dans d'autres sens. Parmi 12 réaffectations 
possibles (des quatre grands types proposés par les sondés dans la question ouverte vers les 
trois options différentes qui leur ont été suggérées dans la question fermée), trois 
réaffectations ont été choisies par plus de 5% des sondés. 
Tableau 3 : Comparaison des affectations proposées dans la question ouverte et 
choisies dans la question fermée 
Affectation proposée 
(question ouverte) 
Affectation choisie 
(question fermée) 
Nombre ou % 
Aucune  454 
 Renforcer l'effet 47.8% 
 Atténuer le fardeau 15.6% 
 Redistribuer 20.5% 
 Réforme fiscale 16.1% 
Une affectation correspondant 
aux 4 types principaux  545 
La même affectation préférée 63.3% 
Renforcer l'effet Redistribuer 10.3% 
Atténuer le fardeau Renforcer l'effet 6.1% 
Renforcer l'effet Réforme fiscale 5.3% 
Les 9 autres redéfinitions de l'affectation préférée 15.0% 
Plusieurs affectations ou une 
affection ne correspondant pas 
aux 4 types principaux 
 274 
Répartition des 1273 réponses à la question fermée. 
Les % sont calculés à l'intérieur de chaque catégorie. 
5. ANALYSE CONJOINTE DES AFFECTATIONS 
Une régression logistique multimodale permet d'identifier les déterminants personnels du 
choix entre les quatre affectations suggérées dans la question fermée. Une modalité de 
référence a été ajoutée pour les sondés n’ayant pas voulu choisir une affectation. Les résultats 
sont présentés dans le tableau 4. 
Cette analyse met en évidence les résultats suivants quant à l'affectation préférée de la recette 
d'une taxe sur l'énergie, des résultats comparables à ceux de Thalmann (2004): 
 Les personnes à niveau de formation plus élevé sont proportionnellement plus 
nombreuses à privilégier le renforcement des effets d'une taxe sur l'énergie par l'utilisation 
de sa recette pour subventionner les économies d'énergie et les énergies renouvelables. 
 Les personnes à sensibilité politique de gauche tendent aussi à privilégier le renforcement 
des effets de la taxe sur l'énergie, mais se distinguent aussi des autres dans leur soutien 
à l'utilisation de la recette pour venir en aide aux personnes fortement pénalisées par la 
taxe. 
 Les personnes âgées sont proportionnellement moins nombreuses à choisir trois des 
quatre affectations suggérées, ce qui revient soit à ne pas se prononcer soit à choisir 
l'abaissement ou la suppression d'un impôt existant. A noter que plusieurs réponses à la 
question ouverte montrent que cette option a aussi été comprise comme le versement de 
la recette dans le fonds AVS. 
 Les propriétaires de voitures soutiennent davantage que ceux qui n'en ont pas l'aide aux 
personnes fortement pénalisées, parmi lesquels ils pourraient se compter. 
 Les germanophones soutiennent davantage que les francophones et les italophones la 
simple redistribution de la recette aux ménages et entreprises. 
Tableau  : Régression logistique multimodale des affectations préférées 
Affectation choisie Déterminant personnel Valeur Pr > Khi² 
Stat. 
significatif 
Subventionner les 
économies d'énergie 
et les énergies 
renouvelables 
Constante 0.734 0.170  
Niveau de formation (1 à 3) 0.370 0.021 ** 
Affinité politique (1 à 10, gauche à droite) -0.116 0.004 *** 
Nombre de voitures du ménage 0.127 0.359  
Catégorie de revenu (1 à 8) 0.097 0.141  
Jeune (18-29 ans) -0.011 0.974  
Âgé (60+ ans) -0.781 0.000 *** 
Germanophone 0.260 0.222  
Italophone -0.318 0.295  
Commune d'agglomération/campagne -0.038 0.858  
Aider les personnes 
fortement pénalisées 
Constante -1.353 0.082 * 
Niveau de formation 0.170 0.467  
Affinité politique -0.124 0.032 ** 
Nombre de voitures 0.403 0.025 ** 
Revenu 0.135 0.124  
Jeune 0.532 0.238  
Âgé -0.176 0.547  
Germanophone 0.318 0.317  
Italophone 0.478 0.245  
Agglomération/campagne -0.237 0.416  
Redistribuer l'argent 
aux ménages et aux 
entreprises 
Constante -1.064 0.131  
Niveau de formation -0.079 0.700  
Affinité politique -0.078 0.135  
Nombre de voitures 0.223 0.185  
Revenu 0.111 0.173  
Jeune -0.679 0.185  
Âgé -0.515 0.045 ** 
Germanophone 1.079 0.001 *** 
Italophone 0.733 0.077 * 
Agglomération/campagne 0.474 0.100  
Abaisser ou 
supprimer un impôt 
existant 
Constante -1.659 0.027 ** 
Niveau de formation 0.195 0.377  
Affinité politique 0.047 0.379  
Nombre de voitures 0.074 0.687  
Revenu 0.117 0.172  
Jeune 0.112 0.805  
Âgé -0.533 0.051 * 
Germanophone 0.182 0.531  
Italophone 0.038 0.925  
Agglomération/campagne 0.362 0.226  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
L'analyse de l'enquête VOX 118, en particulier des réponses aux deux questions que nous 
avons ajoutées, a conduit aux résultats principaux suivants: 
• Tous les arguments contre l'initiative « Remplacer la TVA par une taxe sur l’énergie » ont 
contribué à sa défaite et aucun des arguments en sa faveur n'a vraiment été accepté. 
• Lorsqu'on demande aux citoyens quelle est la meilleure façon d'utiliser le produit d'une 
taxe sur l'énergie, deux sur trois proposent spontanément des mesures de renforcement, 
à savoir la promotion des économies d'énergie et des énergies renouvelables. 
• La redistribution simple, la compensation sociale et la réforme fiscale écologique se 
partagent à parts environ égales les propositions restantes. 
• Lorsqu'on leur demande de choisir entre ces types d'affectation, deux fois plus de sondés 
répondent que lorsqu'on leur demande de proposer spontanément une affectation. 
• Les choix entre affectations suggérées sont semblables aux propositions spontanées, 
avec un léger glissement toutefois en faveur de la redistribution simple, une option 
appréciée par un sondé sur cinq environ même s'il n'y pense pas spontanément. 
• Les citoyens au bénéfice d'une meilleure formation ou avec une sensibilité de gauche 
soutiennent particulièrement les mesures de renforcement. 
• La redistribution simple est un peu mieux acceptée en Suisse alémanique. 
• La compensation sociale est un peu plus favorisée par les électeurs à sensibilité de gauche 
et les propriétaires de voitures. 
Cette analyse de l'enquête VOX qui a suivi la votation du 8 mars 2015 sur l’initiative populaire 
fédérale « Remplacer la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée par une taxe sur l’énergie » confirme ce que 
plusieurs autres enquêtes ont montré: la majorité des électeurs souhaite utiliser la recette 
d'une taxe environnementale pour renforcer son effet ou, ce qui revient au même, pour aider 
les ménages et entreprises à réduire leur exposition à la taxe en réduisant l'activité taxée (par 
exemple subventions pour l'augmentation de l'efficacité énergétique). Que ce soit pour une 
taxe sur l'énergie ou sur le CO2, la promotion des énergies renouvelables est très populaire. 
Ce résultat est en contradiction complète avec le projet du Parlement fédéral de supprimer les 
subventions à l'efficacité énergétique et aux énergies renouvelables dans une dizaine 
d'années pour ne miser plus que sur des taxes incitatives, dont la recette serait intégralement 
redistribuée aux ménages et entreprises (projet de système incitatif en matière climatique et 
énergétique – SICE – mis en consultation par le Conseil fédéral en mars 2015). Il faudra donc 
un grand travail d'information et de persuasion pour faire accepter, par le peuple et les cantons, 
la modification constitutionnelle prévue. 
L'information des sondés est un élément important de ce type de sondage. On l'a déjà vu en 
comparant les réponses à la question ouverte et à la question fermée sur l'affectation préférée 
de la recette d'une taxe sur l'énergie. On le voit aussi dans l'analyse de Carattini et al. (2016), 
qui compare ces réponses avec les choix d'un échantillon similaire de sondés entre "paquets" 
constitués d'un niveau de taxe CO2 et d'un mode de recyclage de la recette avec indication 
des effets économiques et environnementaux de chaque "paquet". Ce sondage montre que 
les sondés sont bien moins favorables à utiliser la recette de la taxe environnementale pour 
renforcer son effet incitatif et plus favorables à une redistribution simple aux ménages 
lorsqu'on leur rappelle que la taxe frappant les énergies "sales" favorise déjà en soi les 
énergies "propres" et l'efficacité énergétique et que la redistribution forfaitaire privilégie (en 
termes relatifs) les ménages à faibles revenus. 
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  Annex 7: Household statistics by family composition 
  NoKids1 NoKids2 NoKids3 NoKids4 NoKids5 Kids1 Kids2 Kids3 Kids4 Kids5 Retired1 Retired2 Retired3 Retired4 Retired5 
Households 180'223    279'988     366'224  454'963     517'725     189'683     199'784    159'518     101'676       69'793    295'698    185'668    139'871    108'478  77'870  
Total persons 2.02 2.00 1.86 1.83 1.77 4.11 3.92 3.64 3.69 3.61 1.47 1.53 1.61 1.52 1.61 
Children 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.81 1.66 1.53 1.58 1.55 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Adults 2.02 2.00 1.86 1.83 1.77 2.30 2.26 2.11 2.11 2.06 1.44 1.52 1.60 1.52 1.60 
Equivalent persons1 1.51 1.50 1.43 1.42 1.39 2.23 2.15 2.03 2.05 2.01 1.23 1.26 1.30 1.26 1.30 
Income 4'405       6'731 8'284  10'401 16'255  6'682 9'327      11'184       14'311       22'896         3'638         5'320   6'950       8'535  14'962 
Inc. per equiv. person 2'915  4'485  5'795  7'342  11'736  2'997  4'342         5'502         6'979       11'378         2'956         4'217         5'331         6'787  11'490  
Income per capita 2'179  3'362  4'457  5'673  9'183  1'628  2'381         3'076         3'877         6'345         2'475         3'487         4'318         5'633  9'320  
Composition with regard to taxation: 
Couple, no kids 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.83 0.77 0.10 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.43 0.52 0.60 0.52 0.60 
Couple, two kids 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.83 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Single 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.48 0.40 0.48 0.40 
 
Source: Ecoplan 2012a. 
                                                             
 
1 Equivalent persons are calculated according to OECD equivalence scale: The first household member is counted as 1, while all subsequent adults count 0.7 and children 0.5 towards 
the equivalent persons measure. 
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Annex 8: Household statistics by place of residence 
  City1 City2 City3 City4 City5 Agglo1 Agglo2 Agglo3 Agglo4 Agglo5 Peri1 Peri2 Peri3 Peri4 Peri5 
Households 194'650 194'693 201'544 194'360 216'231 259'593 273'857 294'362 316'652 336'571 211'361 196'891 169'707 154'105 112'586 
Total persons 2.17 2.14 2.00 1.87 1.81 2.36 2.46 2.31 2.13 2.03 2.57 2.71 2.37 2.19 1.96 
Children 0.44 0.36 0.29 0.20 0.11 0.53 0.52 0.41 0.25 0.21 0.61 0.60 0.39 0.28 0.13 
Adults 1.73 1.78 1.71 1.67 1.69 1.83 1.94 1.90 1.88 1.82 1.96 2.11 1.98 1.91 1.83 
Equivalent persons 1.51 1.50 1.45 1.40 1.38 1.58 1.63 1.58 1.52 1.48 1.68 1.74 1.61 1.54 1.45 
Income 4'331 6'537 8'032 9'928 15'385 4'781 7'087 8'866 10'954 17'694 4'982 7'731 9'200 11'127 16'846 
Inc. per equiv. person 2'868 4'350 5'550 7'108 11'134 3'021 4'337 5'620 7'225 11'995 2'972 4'432 5'697 7'207 11'588 
Income per capita 1'995 3'050 4'007 5'315 8'507 2'027 2'876 3'843 5'154 8'734 1'940 2'850 3'877 5'077 8'604 
Composition with regard to taxation: 
Couple, no kids 0.52 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.64 0.57 0.68 0.69 0.75 0.72 0.66 0.70 0.79 0.77 0.77 
Couple, two kids 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.26 0.26 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.19 0.14 0.06 
Single 0.27 0.22 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.17 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.17 
 
Source: Ecoplan 2012a. 
 
 
 
